

Enhancing Nigerian Advocacy for a Better Business Environment

Project Closure Report, October 2017



Executive summary

Enhancing Nigerian Advocacy for a Better Business Environment 2 (ENABLE2) is a Department for International Development (DfID) funded business environment programme, focused on improving the quality and quantity of business advocacy and public-private dialogue in Nigeria. ENABLE2 will end in October 2017 after three years of implementation, two years earlier than first planned. With early closure, this Self-Assessment Report will be the programme's final review of our results from Years 1 to 3.

In our first year, ENABLE2 focused on entering new partnerships, building on the legacy of ENABLE1 by continuing to empower local system actors to identify and lead business environment reform. In our second year we expanded and deepened our partnerships, refined our approach to business environment issues and worked more on developing effective dialogue platforms. In Year 3, ENABLE2 focused on converting outputs and outcomes into reforms that benefit micro-enterprises.

ENABLE2 has established over 50 partnerships across its four components. Our approach has brought together a portfolio of grassroots associations, national organisations, women's groups, manufacturers, street hawkers and others to improve advocacy. Ministries, Departments and Agencies at federal and state level have improved consultation. State owned and commercial radio stations have worked together to improve their business coverage. Research bodies, from universities, state bureaus to non-governmental organisations, have expanded and improved their analysis of BE Issues. ENABLE2's approach has been common to all of them: empowering local actors to identify business environment reforms that they can, equipped with the tools for success, drive. As a result, local actors have demonstrated ownership over their improved practices, making sustainability likely. Over the three years of the programme, our partners achieved 42 outputs and as the programme closes, seven cases of replication have been validated. Over 80% of partners have adopted substantive practice changes, with a cost per Star Partner of £71,000, significantly improving on ENABLE1.

ENABLE2 contributed to an additional 65 public-private dialogues (PPDs) and 12 PPD Platforms across our focal states. The diversity of these PPD Platforms is also a significant achievement – they range from dialogue with the National Assembly to consultations on local issues with grassroots women's groups in Kaduna, Katsina and Jigawa. Almost 50% of PPDs and 60% of platforms contributed to impact level reform.

At the impact level, 17 policy, legislative, regulatory or administrative reforms have been achieved. This surpasses the logframe target by six. Eleven of the 17 reforms have come in Year 3 of the programme, which is in line with both markets systems development and business environment reform guidance, where outputs achieved in previous years are expected to build momentum for reform (impact).

By 2019, the programme anticipates that the implementation of ENABLE2-supported reforms will benefit approximately 1.8 million microenterprises and workers. In the three years of ENABLE2 the cost per beneficiary is £5.97, a significant improvement on comparable programmes operating in Northern Nigeria. Much of this impact is created through two reforms that have alleviated taxation, but this should not overshadow the improvements in the business environment that have impacted on Nigeria's poorest and most vulnerable groups, such as mechanics in Kaduna and women entrepreneurs in Kano. At programme close, 46% of beneficiaries were women.

ENABLE2 logframe indicator	Target	Results 2017	Results projected for 2019
Cumulative number of additional policy/regulatory/legislative/administrative improvements	11	17	17
Cumulative number of micro-enterprises and workers benefiting from policy/regulatory/legislative/administrative improvements	1,650,000	608,200	1,797,000
Cumulative number of micro-enterprises and workers with a net income increase of 15% or more resulting from policy/regulatory/ legislative/ improvements	412,500	26,700	1,329,600
Cumulative number of additional “dialogues” held	60	53	-
Cumulative number of new “dialogue platforms” introduced	11	12	-
Cumulative number of new “dialogue platforms” sustained	3	6	-
Public Private Dialogue (PPD) Utility Index on Business Environment Issues	3.7	3.75	-

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1. Introduction – our approach to business environment reform

Enhancing Nigerian Advocacy for a Better Business Environment 2 (ENABLE2) builds the capacity of the main institutions affecting policy making in Nigeria: advocacy organisations, government (MDAs), media houses and research providers. With greater capacity and better performance, these institutions contribute to a sustained increase in the quality and quantity of dialogue on business environment issues. This dialogue in turn drives more inclusive and responsive business environment reforms – reforms which benefit poor women and men.



Figure 1: ENABLE2 theory of change

1.1. How ENABLE2’s Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) approach to business environment reform influences the programme’s design

ENABLE2 has used a Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) approach. ENABLE1 delivered locally-led successful business environment reforms with high probability of sustainability. It did this as the first DfID programme to apply the M4P approach to advocacy. ENABLE2 wanted to build on this legacy, with a commitment to expanding the market system approach to the north of Nigeria. Since the beginning of ENABLE, the number of M4P practitioners and programmes have expanded. There is a growing body of knowledge and experience which ENABLE and ENABLE2 have adapted lessons from or contributed to. This has influenced ENABLE2’s commitment to working with local actors first, and letting them define a reform agenda that matters to them helping them to be the drivers of change. This has shaped how the programme chooses where to intervene. Below we summarise ENABLE2’s partner selection process.

ENABLE2 views policy making as a system, where policies are influenced by interactions between a wide variety of individuals and institutions. These interactions are shaped by the capacity and incentives of these individuals and institutions, by formal and informal rules, and by other social, economic, cultural, historical and technological factors. How well the policy making system functions determines the likelihood of good policies being produced. In turn, the quality of policies produced affects the quality of the business environment.

ENABLE2 aims to improve the policy-making system. To achieve this, ENABLE2 aims to address four important shortcomings of the policy making system:

- > Federal and State MDAs often under-appreciate the value of consultation, and lack capacity to consult the private sector effectively. Nigeria's policymakers rarely consult the private sector. ENABLE1 supported some MDAs to test and institutionalise consultation practices. ENABLE2 supported additional MDAs to introduce similar practices. This allowed MDAs to consider private sector feedback on how current policies affect them and how policy changes would affect them.
- > Business and civil society organisations (CSOs) under-appreciate the value of advocating for business environment reforms, and lack capacity to advocate effectively. Professionally delivered advocacy services are still new in Nigeria. ENABLE1 supported several business membership organisations (BMOs) to advocate better on behalf of their members. ENABLE2 supported the replication of successful Phase I advocacy practices across Northern-based organisations, as well as federal organisations that can effectively advocate for issues affecting Northern micro-entrepreneurs.
- > The media under-reports business environment issues and its coverage is often low-quality. The majority of Nigerian media houses make most of their revenue by selling airtime and editorial space, rather than cultivating audiences and earnings from advertisements. This business model gives them little incentive to invest in high-quality journalism that is relevant to their audience. ENABLE1 introduced a new business model in four leading Nigerian media houses, based on delivering well-researched, investigative content that interests a large business audience, including micro-entrepreneurs. ENABLE2 supported the replication of this model in media outlets reaching northern audiences with additional focus on marketing and audience interactivity.
- > Business environment research services for MDAs, advocacy organisations and the media are either unaffordable or low-quality. As ENABLE1 established nascent dialogue and advocacy practices, some researchers became interested in serving this market, notably by conducting polls for BMOs and the media. ENABLE2 built on this work, and helped research institutions and advocacy organisations market their services and build their capacity to research business environment issues.

As well as influencing who the programme supports, ENABLE2's M4P approach shaped how the programme supported partners. ENABLE2 prioritised sustainability and local ownership, in three main ways:

- > **Acting as a facilitator.** ENABLE2 strengthened Nigerian institutions' capacity, relationships and incentives to advocate, consult, research and report on business environment issues. The programme did not perform these roles itself.
- > **Tailoring our support.** ENABLE2 decided which activities to conduct with each partner based on the partner's individual needs. ENABLE2 identified these needs by conducting a diagnostic study at the start of each partnership, and through regular monitoring of the partnership thereafter. For more information on the specific types of support ENABLE2 gave its partners (advocacy training, consultation training etc.) see Section 4.
- > **Giving the right amount of support.** ENABLE2 tried to avoid overloading partners with too many capacity building activities. We wanted to give partners enough time and responsibility to integrate what they learned into their day-to-day operations.

To help our team put these principles into practices, ENABLE2 categorised its activities with partners into three phases: piloting, deepening and replication, described in the box below.

Intervention lifecycle

Interventions typically progressed through three phases. The intensity of support from ENABLE, the type of support, and the number of partners, often varied considerably across the three phases.

- > **Pilot:** At the start of an intervention ENABLE2 tested new innovations and practices with a variety of partners. The aim was to understand what worked and did not work in the northern Nigerian context, and to identify lead organisations willing to try something new. This phase typically involved a lot of hand-holding and mentoring, working with a small number of “champions” in each organisation. If the pilots delivered returns to the partner (either commercial or non-commercial), and meet ENABLE2’s objectives, the intervention moved to the next phase, deepening.
- > **Deepening:** At the deepening stage, the focus was narrowed to those practices and partners that have proven effective. Having achieved some initial success at the pilot stage, ENABLE2 deepened its engagement with star partners to build sustainability of the practice change. This meant promoting institutionalisation and wider buy-in within the organisation, and ensuring that the partner had the necessary capacity to sustain the practice change. The practice change(s) also needed to deliver a “net return” to the partner if it was to be sustained. Sometimes this required ENABLE2 to tackle underlying organisational or systemic constraints (such as weak marketing capacity in media houses).
- > **Replication:** Having achieved sustainability and “proof of concept”, ENABLE2 worked to promote wider replication of the new innovation or practice change. The aim was to encourage the diffusion of the practice change through the system. This could involve promoting linkages and peer-learning between star partners and other system actors, working with “scale-agents” such as apex organisations, and actively supporting new organisations to adopt the practice change. The level of support at this phase was less intensive. The aim was to leverage the capacity and demonstration effect already built during the deepening phase.

1.2. How ENABLE2 prioritises and facilitates business environment reforms

As well as targeting systemic changes in advocacy and dialogue, ENABLE2 targeted specific business environment reforms. The first step in this process was identifying potential business environment reforms that would benefit micro-enterprises and workers, especially women. This was primarily accomplished through partners who identified business environment reforms that mattered to their members.

ENABLE2 then conducted a Business Environment Scoring Assessment, to decide if the programme should prioritise engaging partners from other components to support the potential reform. Here, we assessed each potential reform in terms of the feasibility of achieving it; how closely the achievement of the potential reform aligned with ENABLE2’s desired outputs; and how many micro-entrepreneurs and workers (especially women) would benefit from it. In Year

3, in response to multiple issues competing for investment and the need to reach logframe targets ENABLE2 changed this approach to selecting issues that would have the greatest impact.

For more information on how ENABLE2 has incorporated business environment issues into programme delivery, see Sections 4 and Section 5.1.

1.3. Geographical focus

DfID Nigeria mandated ENABLE2 to intervene in five northern Nigerian focal states: Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina and Zamfara. Based on our political economy analysis we decided to intervene in the first four states but not Zamfara (see Section 5.5.6 for more information on this decision). DfID also allowed the programme to work with partners at the Federal level, where these partnerships contributed to reforms relevant to micro-enterprises and workers in the four focal states. As a result of DfID’s new geographical focus, the programme discontinued ENABLE1’s strong partnerships with Lagos-based organisations.

1.4. Adaptive management

ENABLE2 used adaptive management techniques to guide its implementation, updating its strategy and tactics based on findings from monitoring, political economy analyses and value for money analyses. For more information on how ENABLE2 has done this, see Section 6 (Strategic learning).

1.5. Gender and Social Inclusion

ENABLE2 sought to empower women and other groups socially excluded in northern Nigeria. ENABLE2 meaningfully mainstreamed this objective in its work. ENABLE2 considered how it can improve gender equality and social inclusion when conceptualising, designing and implementing and monitoring interventions, issues and partnerships. Figure 2 outlines twelve ways in which ENABLE2 did this. Annex 2 provides more detail on each of these. The Output, Outcome and Impact sections of this report show how our results have reflected ENABLE2’s GESI objectives.




Figure 2: ENABLE2 mainstreaming of gender and social inclusion

2. Logframe results

In accordance with ENABLE2's strategic framework, results are monitored and reported at three different levels:

- > Impact: improved reform in the business environment, benefiting micro-enterprises and workers
- > Outcome: responsiveness, inclusiveness and evidence-based nature of the policymaking system
- > Outputs – systemic change in partners and the wider business environment reform system
- > This Self-Assessment report will cover all impact from Years 1 to 3, rather than focusing on Year 3.

ENABLE2 has established more than 50 partnerships across four components. Our approach has brought together a portfolio of grassroots market actors, national organisations, women's groups, large scale manufacturers, and street hawkers to improve advocacy. Ministries, Departments and Agencies at federal and state level have improved consultation practices; state-owned and commercial private radio stations have worked together to improve their business coverage; and research bodies from universities and state bureaux to non-governmental organisations have expanded their awareness of and reporting on business environment issues. ENABLE2 is the common factor, empowering local actors with skills that they can use to drive reform. In the past three years, our partners have achieved 41 outputs, and as the programme closes, seven cases of replication have been validated.

ENABLE2 contributed to an additional 65 public-private dialogues (PPDs) and to the creation of 12 PPD platforms in our focal states. A significant programme result is establishing these PPD platforms at both the highest level of government (the National Assembly) and with grassroots women's groups in Katsina and Jigawa. Over 40% of PPDs and 50% of platforms resulted in impact level reform.

At the impact level, 17 policy, legislative, regulatory or administrative reforms have been achieved. This surpasses the logframe target by six. Eleven of the 17 reforms have come in Year 3 of the programme. This is in line with expectations in both M4P and business environment reform where the culmination of outputs from previous years builds momentum for reform. This figure includes significant progress made in some crucial areas such as the passage of the competition and infrastructure bills at the National Assembly. It also include one reform achieved through replication. Of the 17 reforms achieved, eight are currently delivering benefit to microenterprises. We expect the remaining to be implemented after the programme ends in October 2017. By 2019, the programme anticipates that the ENABLE2 supported reforms will have an impact on approximately 1.8 million microenterprises and their workers.¹ Although much of the impact is related to tax reform, this should not overshadow

¹ Outreach is driven by the National Tax Policy and Competition Law, noting that both are national in impact, the outreach will increase to approximately 1.8 million at the original closure date of the programme in 2019 and approximately 12 million after a 10-year period. These are speculative projections, but useful to understand the potential impact of the reforms to which ENABLE II contributed.

the improvements in the business environment that have impacted on mechanics in Kaduna or female entrepreneurs in Kano.

2.1. Effects of early closure on project results

In the second quarter of Year 3, ENABLE2 was informed of early closure as a result of changing priorities for the Department of International Development. In March and April, the programme evaluated how it could achieve maximum results over the remaining period, whilst exiting partnerships responsibly. After consultation with DfID Economic Growth Team ENABLE2 set the following goals:

- > Greater focus on business environment reform issues that could be achieved by the end of 2017 and deliver impact by 2019. ENABLE2 now focused on eight priority issues and four lower priority issues. The priority issues were selected using a scoring method that assessed whether or not a given issue could be resolved by 2017. We withdrew from any issues that did not pass this test. Secondly, issues were scored on their potential for delivering impact outreach, income benefits, gender-positive results and value for money.
- > Delivering technical support to partners to sustain practice changes and public-private dialogue platforms. We prioritised getting partners to a level at which they could sustain practice changes or platforms. This would consolidate the gains of ENABLE2 partners and allow the project to meet logframe targets.
- > Developing technical guides and information. We prepared our partners for our exit by sharing guides on our core areas of expertise, to be distributed to stakeholders and other development programmes.
- > On reflection, the early closure has intensified ENABLE2's attention to targets, pushing the team to deliver more with less time and resources. But in practice it has also risked reducing partners' ownerships of initiatives. We also had to manage the programme's reputation carefully. Many memoranda of understanding had been signed; expectations built; and plans made with new and existing partnerships. At best these plans were radically revised; at worst they were cancelled. The programme takes pride in exceeding number of target reforms, but is aware that the new reality leaves implementation to a post-ENABLE period. It is important that DfID prioritises the reallocation of some initiatives to ensure they are maintained.

2.2. Logframe results

Table 1: ENABLE2 logframe results

Logframe results	Indicator	Target October 2017	Achieved September 2017	Projected Impact for 2019
		Achieved	Partially achieved	Not achieved
Impact Improved Business Enabling	Cumulative number of additional policy / regulatory / legislative / administrative improvements	11	17	17

Environment in lead states and at federal level.	Cumulative number of micro-enterprises and workers benefiting from policy / regulatory / legislative / administrative improvements	1,650,000 (50% women-owned)	608,200 (19% - women-owned)	1,797,000 ² (46% - women-owned)
	Cumulative number of micro-enterprises and workers with a net income increase of 15% or more resulting from policy / regulatory / legislative / improvements	412,500 (50% women-owned)	26,700 (59% - women-owned)	1,329,600 (59% - women-owned)
Outcome The policymaking system in lead states and at Federal level is responsive to business needs, inclusive and makes use of evidence	Cumulative number of additional 'dialogues' held	60	65	-
	Cumulative number of new 'dialogue platforms' introduced	11	12	-
	Cumulative number of new 'dialogue platforms' sustained	3	6	-
	Public Private Dialogue (PPD) Utility Index on Business Environment Issues	3.7	3.75	-
Output: MDA Government MDAs at federal level and in lead states engage in consultation and consider evidence in policy making	Cumulative number of MDAs introducing new or improving current consultation practices (ENABLE2 partners and known copycats)	8	10	-
	Cumulative number of MDAs sustaining the new or improved consultation practices (ENABLE2 partners and known copycats)	3	5	-
	MDA Consultation Performance Index of project-supported MDAs	3.5	3.1	-
Output: Advocacy Organisations Advocacy Organisations engage in effective business advocacy	Cumulative number of advocacy organisations introducing new or improving current advocacy practices (ENABLE2 partners and known copycats)	16	17	-
	Cumulative number of advocacy organisations sustaining the new or improved advocacy practices (ENABLE2 partners and known copycats)	7	7	-
	Advocacy organisations Advocacy Performance Index of project-supported advocacy organisations	3.9	4.0	-
Output: Media Media publishes and airs journalistic products that investigate business environment issues that affect the poor, and marginalised women	Cumulative number of business media products with an improved media quality score (directly assisted products and known copycats)	12	16	-
	Cumulative number of media houses sustaining new or improved practices to publish and air investigative business media products (ENABLE2 partners and known copycats)	8	7	-

	Percentage increase in audience of ENABLE2 media partners for relevant programming where at least 40% are active (project-supported media products)	6	7	-
Output: Research Institution Research and information is available to advocacy organisations, MDAs and the media on a sustainable basis	Cumulative number of research providers producing new or improved Business Environment-relevant research and information (ENABLE2 partners and copycats)	4	6	-
	Cumulative number of advocacy organisations, MDAs and media houses accessing relevant research and information from project-supported research providers or known copycats	16	27	-
	Business Environment Research Utility Index of project-supported research providers	3.5	4.2	-

2.3. Impact results

The Table below shows each Impact Level reform and its corresponding outreach, income increases of 15% and adjustments for overlap. The table is followed by a summary of selected reforms. As can be seen, ENABLE2 has been able to achieve reforms in each focal state and at the Federal level. Tax reforms in Kaduna and at the Federal level have driven the largest impact numbers. On the other hand, ENABLE2 has maintain its balanced approach achieving reforms that specifically help the poor and women. Further discussion on lessons learned are contained in the Strategic Learning Section, particularly the challenges of moving from reform on paper to reaching micro enterprises.

Reform	Region	2017						2019					
		Outreach	Outreach (female)	Income for 15%	Income for 15% (female)	Income for 0 to 15%	Income for 0 to 15% (female)	Outreach	Outreach (female)	Income for 15%	Income for 15% (female)	Income for 0 to 15%	Income for 0 to 15% (female)
Access to Finance through MSMDF QBWA scheme	Cross-River, Delta, Edo, Ekiti, Gombe, Imo, Kaduna, Niger Plateau Rivers, Taraba and Zamfara	6000	5700	3600	3500	100	100	6000	5700	3600	3500	100	100
Access to Finance to MSMDF in Kano state (KaBAC)	Kano	32000	16000	20800	11400	700	300	32000	16000	20800	11400	700	300
Ban of Vehicle Inspection Office in Kaduna (VIO)	Kaduna	6400	300	0	0	6400	300	6400	300	0	0	6400	300
Rice outgrowers scheme in Jigawa*	Jigawa	2300	1000	2300	1000	0	0	2300	1000	2300	1000	0	0
Executive Order on Margin of Preference in Public Procurement to support Made in Nigeria.	National	0	0	0	0	0	0	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
Investment in Tie and Dye sector in Kano State	Kano	0	0	0	0	0	0	5800	300	0	0	5800	300
Kano Market fires	Kano	19700	1000	0	0	0	0	19700	1000	0	0	0	0
Leasing Act	National	48500	28600	0	0	48500	28600	92900	54800	0	0	92900	54800
MoU between NATA and KASTELEA	Kaduna	5300	0	0	0	2300	0	11000	0	0	0	2200	0
National Tax Policy Reform	National	0	0	0	0	0	0	1322300	780700	1322300	780700	0	0
Passage of Credit Reporting Act 2017	National	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Passage of Secured Transactions in Movable Assets (STMA) Act 2017	National	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Renovation of Katsina Central Market	Katsina	0	0	0	0	0	0	7900	2400	0	0	2400	700
Tax Adjustment of Imported Pharmaceutical Goods	Lagos and Ogun	18300	7500	0	0	16700	6800	18300	7500	1700	700	16700	6800
Tax Harmonisation in Kaduna	Kaduna	506000	58200	0	0	0	0	506000	58200	0	0	0	0
Weights and Measures in Jigawa State	Jigawa	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
Total with overlapping		644,500	118,300	26,700	15,900	74,700	36,100	2,030,600	927,900	1,350,700	797,300	127,200	63,300
Overlapping		36,300	3,600	0	0	700	300	233,600	100,500	21,100	11,700	2,900	300
Total		608,200	114,700	26,700	15,900	74,000	35,800	1,797,000	827,400	1,329,600	785,600	124,300	63,000

Table 2: Impact results

2.4. Indirect benefits

The business environment reforms that ENABLE2 has supported will benefit Nigerians in many ways not captured in our logframe. Table 2 captures the most important of these.

Reform	Benefits to Nigeria beyond micro-enterprises and workers
Competition Bill (Passed by National Assembly 25 th November 2017)	ENABLE2-supported research estimates that full implementation of the Competition Bill could eventually generate productivity growth of N742 billion (£1.5 billion). Over a five-year period, the combined effects of price reductions (estimated at 1% economy-wide), job creation and economic growth could reduce relative poverty in Nigeria by 12%. ³ Greater competitive pressure should also benefit consumers. Companies in previously uncompetitive sectors will have stronger incentives to offer better quality products and services.
Tax harmonisation in Kaduna	The GEMS3 and ENABLE2-supported tax harmonisation law in Kaduna has contributed to a 50% increase Kaduna State Government's Internally Generated Revenue. ⁴ Kaduna's internally generated revenue rose from N11.5 billion (£24 million) in 2015 to over N17 billion (£35 million). Malam Muktar Ahmed, the Chairman of the Kaduna State Internal Revenue Service, attributes this to the new tax law. ⁵ The £9 million annual additional tax revenue should allow Kaduna State Government to invest more in public services, benefiting Kaduna's residents. Expert opinion suggests that the improvement in tax collection has come largely from reduced corruption. According to Muktar Ahmed, "in the past (...) most of what government was collecting as revenue never went to government accounts. The process was sloppy and there were lots of diversion of resources. The law, therefore, closed the gaps."
Secured Transactions in Movable Assets (STMA) Act 2017	Nigeria's banks benefit from this legislation, by having a clearer legal process for repossessing moveable assets used as loan collateral, in the event of default. If this legal clarity increases banks' willingness to accept moveable assets as collateral, businesses of all sizes can also benefit by using their moveable assets as collateral to secure finance.
Quintessential Business Women's Association (QBWA): Improving access to finance for the poor	As well as linking micro-enterprises to the CBN's MSMEDF, ENABLE2 partner QBWA is assisting a second subsidised loan scheme, by the government-owned Bank of Industry. QBWA's Chief Executive Officer mentioned that lessons from ENABLE2 persuaded them to accept a partnership with the Bank of Industry. QBWA has

³ Opeyemi Agbaje (2016) 'Economic Impact Assessment' presentation at NASSBER Inaugural Roundtable, March 21st 2016, pp. 21-22.

⁴ Kaduna State Government also receives money from Federal taxes, such as taxes on oil production.

⁵ 'Kaduna generates N17bn in 2016, targets N50.2bn in 2017', *Vanguard* online, 15th January 2017.

through the Central Bank of Nigeria's (CBN) Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Fund (MSMEDF)	encouraged its members from becoming mobile money agents, disbursing Bank of Industry loans via mobile phone to eligible QBWA members and other micro-enterprises. This approach has significantly increased the number of QBWA members who could potential access the subsidised credit. Many mobile money agents are available in underserved locales that are far from micro-finance banks. The mobile money agents also earn a commission on loans repaid, which encourages them to monitor and encourage repayment. This approach reduces the burden on QBWA as an association to monitor loan repayment.
Standardisation of weights and measures in Jigawa	Consumers will benefit from this reform, as well as honest traders. In marketplaces in Jigawa, consumers usually buy grains and salt by the bowlful. A reduction in damaged bowls – often because they have been hammered in to reduce their contained volume – will mean fewer consumers getting cheated out of food. Meanwhile, the introduction of a standard-sized bowls will make it easier for consumers to compare the value of different market traders' offerings, maximising the amount of food they can buy with their money.
Credit Reporting Act 2017	Better credit reporting by banks should ultimately help banks improve the assessment of loan applicants' credit risk. This in turn, will reduce defaults, improving banks' financial performance. If, combined with the effects of the enforcement of the competition bill (see above), and under market conditions which favour an expansion in business lending, banks' reduction in risk may lead them to offer lower interest rates which would benefit businesses and improve the business environment.
Executive Order on Margin of Preference for Made in Nigeria Goods in Public Procurement; tax adjustment of imported pharmaceuticals	Nigeria's manufacturers will benefit, as the higher margin of preference they receive enables them to increase sales and revenues as a result of public procurement. Similarly, Nigeria's 128 pharmaceutical manufacturers ⁶ and their local suppliers will benefit from the tariff on imported medicines and tariff reduction on raw materials. These changes should enable them to increase sales and/or profit margins. As Nigerian manufacturers are not exclusively micro-enterprises, we have not counted in our logframe the new jobs these reforms are expected to create.
Prevention of market fires in Kano	Measures to prevent fires and fight fires more effectively will prevent the loss of goods and revenues for market traders.
Equipment Leasing Act (ELAN's	Leasing firms will benefit as the legislation makes it easier for them to repossess leased assets in the event of default. Business will benefit from the reduced cost of leasing equipment as

⁶ Figures from Pharmacists Council of Nigeria, cited in United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (2011) Pharmaceutical Sector Profile: Nigeria.

prevention of its repeal)	opposed to higher costs of purchasing equipment. Few leasing firms are micro-enterprises, so we have not counted them as beneficiaries in our logframe.
Memorandum of Understanding between Nigeria Automobiles Technicians Association (NATA) and Kaduna State Traffic and Environmental Law Enforcement Agency (KASTELEA); removal of Federal Vehicle Inspection Officers (VIO)	Whilst difficult to verify, there are grounds to assume that some mechanics may have felt forced to pay bribes to secure their release from KASTELEA's detention. By reducing or ending the detention of NATA members for road-testing vehicles, this reform is expected to reduce corruption. Mechanics' customers will also benefit. Previously, when NATA members were arrested, the car owner would need to go to KASTELEA to retrieve their property. The reform should also reduce or end this second form of harassment. Similarly, Federal Vehicle Inspection Officers were accessed of demanding bribes from transporters in Kaduna. Their removal may result in a reduction in corruption.
Renovation of Katsina central market	As well as traders, consumers will also benefit from improvements to the marketplace.

Table 3: Summary of indirect benefits

2.5. Key impact-level reforms

In this section, we present partnerships five reforms that have delivered significant results at impact level. A full description of all such Impact reform can be found in Annex 3. They are:

1. Improving poor women and men's access to finance through Central Bank of Nigeria's Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Development Fund
2. Passing legislation to ensure fair competition in Nigerian markets
3. Reviewing the National Tax Policy
4. Multiple Taxation in Kaduna
5. Memorandum of understanding between NATA and KASTELEA to reduce harassment and improve working conditions

2.5.1. Improving poor women and men’s access to finance through Central Bank of Nigeria’s Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Development Fund

Type of Reform:	Administrative
Type of Benefits	Access to finance
Date Achieved	2015 and 2016
Partners Involved	Quintessential Business Women’s Association
States location	16 states
Outreach Number	6,000 (95% women)
Number with Increased income 15%	3,600 (95% women)

Table 4: Central Bank of Nigeria Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise Development Fund

In a 2016 ENABLE2 survey, micro-enterprises cited access to finance as the single most important business environment constraint they face.

In 2016, just 16% of Nigerian adults had accessed credit in the past twelve months, excluding money from family and friends. Most of these borrowers are in urban areas; poor people, rural people and women were the least likely to access financial services. By region, people in north-west Nigeria suffer greater financial exclusion than Nigerians as a whole.

In August 2013 the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) launched a nationwide access to finance initiative, the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Development Fund (MSMEDF). CBN subsidised loans from the fund, so that MSMEs only have to pay 9% APR interest, much less than prevailing market rates. CBN earmarked 60% of this credit for women-owned MSMEs.

CBN began disbursing funds to banks, which on-lent to MSMEs. However, few banks decided to participate, leaving funds unallocated. Furthermore, few of the businesses accessing MSMEDF credit were micro-enterprises; poor, rural women were particularly under-represented.

The Quintessential Business Women’s Association (QBWA) sought to change this, by helping CBN to find micro-finance banks willing to participate and by linking rural women to the MSMEDF. Around 85% of QBWA’s members are women and 75% are smallholder farmers. In two states, QBWA identified creditworthy borrowers among its members, formed these members into groups to encourage each other to repay the loans, and monitored repayment.

QBWA wanted to perform these services in more states, but was unable to get CBN’s endorsement. ENABLE2’s Diagnostic Study identified two main problems in QBWA’s advocacy which contributed to this: QBWA did not use evidence in its advocacy to the CBN and did not document the outcomes of its meetings with CBN officials, resulting in CBN back-tracking on agreements.

ENABLE2 built QBWA’s advocacy capacity, focusing on addressing the constraints mentioned above. QBWA created a Position Paper with evidence of their value added to the MSMEDF and presented this to CBN. QBWA also began agreeing on minutes of its meetings with CBN

officials. QBWA’s new advocacy approach culminated in CBN endorsing QBWA’s involvement with MSMEDF in 16 more states.

In the sixteen states QBWA has since persuaded additional micro-finance banks to access MSMEDF and lend its subsidised credit to QBWA members. Across the sixteen states QBWA has facilitated N1.6 billion of loans from the MSMEDF, benefiting 6,000 micro-enterprises, most of which are women-owned.

Despite QBWA’s efforts to encourage loan repayment, low repayment rates remain a challenge both among QBWA members and the MSMEDF as a whole. Although difficult to confirm, ENABLE2 believes this is from a prevalent misconception in Nigeria – that government-backed loans are “free money” and people are “finally getting their share” of the nation’s oil wealth.

Nonetheless, given how rarely women micro-entrepreneurs access credit in Nigeria, the CBN has praised QBWA’s role in the MSMEDF. Elenwor Ihua, a CBN official overseeing the fund, notes that “QBWA was a very important intervention. They brought a fresh perspective about how to target women.”

QBWA now also facilitates its members’ access to a second low-interest credit scheme, the Bank of Industry’s Government Enterprise and Empowerment Program (GEEP). QBWA members are becoming mobile money agents, disbursing GEEP loans to other micro-enterprises. QBWA’s Chief Executive Officer Shimite Bello acknowledges ENABLE2’s role in persuading her to seize this opportunity, saying “when we had problems with CBN, if ENABLE2 hadn’t stepped in, we’d never have gone near banks again.”

2.5.2. Passing legislation to ensure fair competition in Nigerian markets

Type of Reform:	Legal
Type of Benefits	Lower prices, better goods and services, economic growth
Date Achieved	December 2017 (projected)
Partners Involved	Nigerian Employer Consultative Association, National Assembly Business Environment Roundtable, National Association for Small and Medium Enterprises
States location	Nationwide
Outreach Number	318,000 (projection, majority after 2019)
Number with Increased income 15%	318,000 (projection, majority after 2019)

Table 5: Competition bill

Note: this reform was passed by the National Assembly in November 2017. However, assent of the President remains pending and therefore outreach impact is only counted in the logframe for 2019. Progress made towards its passage is an important achievement of the programme, and is tied to one of the programme's largest investments in a platform

Nigeria has no law which enforces competition. Firms can collude to fix prices, gain unfair competitive advantages and abuse market power without fear of punishment. When this happens, micro-enterprises and end-consumers tend to pay more for goods and services, receive less choice and make lower quality purchases.⁷

Seeking to address these issues, competition legislation was first introduced to Nigeria's National Assembly fourteen years ago. Successive attempts to pass the legislation have failed. A key reason for this was the absence of sustained, coordinated advocacy. Businesspeople who favoured competition legislation had failed to jointly advocate for its passage. Similarly, supporters of competition legislation within the National Assembly had no formal way of collaborating with advocates in the private sector.

From 2015, ENABLE2 supported a private sector and civil society coalition to advocate for the passage of the Competition Policy. The coalition was coordinated by the Nigeria Employers' Consultative Association (NECA) and included Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN), Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture (NACCIMA), Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG), Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI), National Competitiveness Council of Nigeria (NCCN), Nigerian Association of Small Scale Industrialists (NASSI) and Quintessential Business Women's Association (QBWA), Consumers Empowerment Organisation of Nigeria (CEON) and Advertising Practitioners Council of Nigeria (APCON). The Coalition was successful in undertaking an initial advocacy campaign that comprised of:

- > Met and presented to the House of Representative's sponsor of the bill and the Speaker of the House of Representatives (2015)

⁷ ENABLE2 research on seven sectors in Nigeria substantiates this. The research analyses seven sectors which in Nigerian have monopolistic, duopolistic or oligopolistic characteristics: cement, cable television, sugar, beer, soft drinks and banking. The research compared prices and efficiency indicators in Nigeria with the same sectors in several other countries (benchmarks). These seven sectors exhibited higher prices and lower efficiency or innovation than in benchmark countries. For example, Nigerian businesses buying cement for construction or repairs pay among the highest prices in the world for cement, around double their counterparts in other middle income countries such as India, Thailand and China and higher than the UK, Germany or Spain. See Opeyemi Agbaje (2016) *Economic Impact Assessment of Comprehensive Review of The Institutional, Regulatory, Legislative and Associated Instruments Affecting Businesses in Nigeria*. RTC Advisory Services Ltd for ENABLE2.

- > Developed and delivered a position paper at the public hearing on the Competition Bill (May 2016)
- > Undertook a media advocacy campaign (2016)
- > Held three “Competition Walks” in Lagos, Kaduna and Enugu to raise more public awareness of the bill (June-July 2016)

The National Assembly Business Environment Roundtables (NASSBER), an ENABLE2 partner, has also made important contributions towards the passage of the Competition Bill. Since November 2016 NASSBER has provided legal and competition policy expertise to the National Assembly on the Competition Bill, helping to fine-tune the legislation. NASSBER has also helped the advocacy coalition to track the bill’s progress and liaise with key legislators. Meanwhile, GEMS3 also provided the National Assembly technical advice on the bill; see Section 5.6.1 for more details on how we worked together.



Figure 3: Competition bill National Assembly progress

The Competition Bill has now completed seven of the eight steps required for it to become law, as illustrated in Figure 3.

The legislation passed its final reading in both houses of the National Assembly, due in part of the advocacy mentioned above. In November the bill passed through Concurrence (harmonisation of the different versions passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate) and sent for presidential assent. ENABLE2 partners continue to advocate for its passage.

When the Bill is assented, it will take several years to be fully enforced. Once fully enforced, ENABLE2-supported research suggests that the Competition Bill could, over five years, have a substantial impact on the economy. Prices could reduce by up to 1% economy-wide, spur the creation of 318,000 jobs and reduce poverty by 12%.⁸

In order to achieve this, Nigeria’s new Competition and Consumer Protection Council on secondment, the body tasked with the bill’s enforcement, will benefit from technical support (e.g. seconding international competition experts). ENABLE2 is helping the Consumer Protection Council (which will expand to take on the competition regulation function) to assess its technical capacity needs. We recommend that Dfid review the findings and encourage relevant programmes to support the Competition Bill’s implementation.

⁸ Opeyemi Agbaje (2016) *Economic Impact Assessment of Comprehensive Review of the Institutional, Regulatory, Legislative and Associated Instruments Affecting Businesses in Nigeria*. RTC Advisory Services Ltd for ENABLE2, p. 43; Opeyemi Agbaje (2016) ‘*Economic Impact Assessment*’ presentation at NASSBER Inaugural Roundtable, March 21st 2016, pp. 21-22.

2.5.3. Reviewing the National Tax Policy

Type of Reform:	Policy
Type of Benefits	MSMEs benefit from reduced corporation tax, receive tax penalty waivers and VAT exemptions.
Date Achieved	February 2017
Partners Involved	National Association of Small and Medium Enterprises, Tax Coalition
States location	Federal
Outreach Number	1.3 million micro-Enterprises (780,000 female) by 2019
Number with Increased income 15%	1.3 million micro-Enterprises (780,000 female) by 2019

Table 6: National Tax Policy reform

Of the various World Bank Ease of Doing Business indicators, Nigeria ranks 182 out of 190 on the payment of taxes indicator⁹. As a result of a myriad of issues ranging from high and multiple taxes, to stringent penalties for default, the Nigerian Association of Small and Medium Enterprises (NASME) wanted to work with its members and the government to improve the taxation system. Pursuing change with the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) and the Joint Tax Board (JTB) offered the opportunity for a significant change in policy direction for an issue impacting over one million MSMEs in Nigeria. Following sustained advocacy from NASME in February 2017, the Federal Executive Council approved the new National Tax Policy.

In the three years of partnering with ENABLE2, NASME was equipped with skills in research, advocacy strategy development, coalition building, funding raising, financial management, media relations, stakeholder engagement and these skills have enabled the organisation to significantly influence a major policy shift by the Federal Government.

The partnership between ENABLE2 and NASME began in July 2015 with a functional review of the organisation geared towards solving the ineffectiveness of NASME's internal governance systems and identifying business environment challenges that its members were facing. Out of ten issues, taxation was ranked as a top three challenge that NASME members were facing. Some of the problems identified with the tax system included 1) complex and cumbersome tax payment processes; 2) use of aggressive collection methods by authorities; 3) multiplicity of taxes; 4) unclear and inaccurate tax categorisations for MSMEs; 5) multiplicity of revenue agencies; and, 6) poor accountability for tax revenue.

The Lagos chapter of NASME hosted a forum to study Nigeria's tax and regulatory framework and the impact on the Micro Small and Medium Enterprise (MSME) sector. At this forum Deloitte, a tax advisory firm, pledged support to NASME and other stakeholders to advance

⁹ World Bank Doing Business Report 2017 <http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/nigeria>

their advocacy goals. After this session, armed with findings from the ENABLE2 supported functional review, NASME planned a national level tax intervention.

The first step in the intervention was to develop an evidence backed position with which to engage government. ENABLE2 supported NASME to develop and agree on a partnership framework with Deloitte, where Deloitte would provide their tax expertise in supporting evidence gathering while NASME, through its members, would provide data needed for the research. It is important to note that prior to ENABLE2 support, NASME had never employed the services of consultants in its advocacy to the government.

In recognition of the tax challenges outlined in the report from Deloitte, NASME sought out other stakeholders with whom to build a coalition for change. ENABLE2 provided coalition building support to NASME, who then identified other stakeholders with whom they could act in concert to provide to lobby the government on a continual basis.

With a new and strategic relationship with Deloitte, NASME requested Deloitte's assistance in documenting the challenges faced by MSMEs and highlighting the inherent tax and regulatory gaps MSMEs face. Most importantly, NASME and the coalition worked with Deloitte to develop key recommendations for the government which would improve the taxation system for MSMEs.



Figure 4: National Tax Policy reform process

On the 10th of August 2016, the government, through the Ministry of Finance, set up a National Tax Policy Review Committee. This committee was charged with reviewing the existing Tax Policy and developing a tax system which would improve the business environment.

One of the Committee's first acts was to call for memoranda from relevant stakeholders and NASME and Deloitte presented their memorandum to them. In November 2016, the committee further engaged stakeholders to assist with the validation of its preliminary findings. At this session, NASME and other coalition members provided more detail on their tax experiences and the reasons behind the recommendations contained within the position paper. In February 2017, the Federal Executive Council (FEC) approved the revised National Tax Policy.¹⁰ Recommendations from NASME are clearly adopted in the new policy – a major victory for their advocacy campaign. Some of these recommendations include:

- > Lower corporation tax rates for small and micro-enterprises
- > VAT exemption for micro-enterprises

¹⁰ Revised National Tax Policy: <http://pwcnigeria.typepad.com/files/fec-approved-ntp---feb-1-2017.pdf>

> Automation of tax payment systems

The policy marks the start of a new tax regime at the highest level of government in Nigeria. ENABLE2 estimates that a reduction in corporation tax from 30% to 10% will increase incomes for 1.3 million microenterprises, of which 780,000 these are women owned. However, more advocacy will be required to turn policy to action even though signs of rapid policy implementation are compelling; the government recently set up a Tax Implementation Committee to begin work. NASME has also conducted a series of advocacy visits at the federal level to push for speedy implementation.

Additionally, some parts of the National Tax Policy have already been implemented. For example, the Voluntary Assets and Income Declaration Scheme (VAIDS) section was launched in July and will offer businesses and individuals a waiver of penalties and interest on any tax owed in return for formalising their tax arrangements. FIRS aims to reach 24 million additional tax payers through this scheme and NASME is actively planning to support the roll out of VAIDS with the FIRS. This collaboration between private and public sector has been praised by FIRS Chairman, who says that “[t]his is the first time that a private sector association will partner with the Tax Authorities on tax implementation. We believe this partnership will yield mutual benefits for government and MSMEs”.

2.5.4. Multiple Taxation in Kaduna

Type of Reform:	Policy/Legislation
Type of Benefits	Harmonization of Multiple taxation
Date Achieved	May 2016
Partners Involved	Kaduna Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mining and Agriculture and Kaduna State Ministry of Commerce
States location	Kaduna
Outreach Number	506,000
Number with Increased income 15%	Not Applicable

Table 7: Addressing multiple taxation

Doing Business and Investment climate reports, have consistently identified nuisance taxation such as multiple taxation, as a major hindrance to doing business in Nigeria. In Kaduna state, the burden of multiple taxation is borne by an estimated 65% of the population. Additionally before 2015, businesses in the state could be subjected to about 200 different taxes and charges.¹¹ In May 2016, following advocacy support from ENABLE2 and technical input from GEMS3, the Kaduna State Government signed into law the harmonized tax bill.

ENABLEs engagement with the Kaduna Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture (KADCCIMA) commenced in 2010 through the ENABLE1 programme. The program supported KADCCIMA through a membership survey and advocacy training which led to the identification of multiple taxation as a key constraint for members. Additionally, the programme worked with KADCCIMA to identify the types of taxes that businesses were being asked to pay and the

¹¹ Impact Assessment on Tax Harmonisation Reform - Kaduna State, Kantar Public

authorities requesting them. Additionally, the Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDA) component worked with the Kaduna Ministry of Commerce on a public policy paper to end multiple and nuisance taxation. A consolidation of these two documents through several Public Private Dialogues (PPDs) led to the drafting of a green paper.

When ENABLE2 commenced in November 2014, the GEMS3 programme had delivered technical inputs to the bill but advocacy had slowed down. ENABLE2 quickly reengaged with the Ministry of Commerce (MoC) and KADCCIMA. This engagement was to progress the work on this issue but also to embed earlier practice changes in the two partners.

Capitalising on the opportunity offered by the general elections, ENABLE2 supported KADCCIMA to convene an interactive forum with gubernatorial aspirants in Kaduna state; the purpose of which was to further push the multiple taxation agenda. Two debates, with over 300 people in attendance, were held on the 28th and 29th of January 2015. During the debates the APC aspirant, Mallam Nasir El-Rufai, promised KADCCIMA and the audience that he would address multiple taxation problem if elected.

On the 28th of May 2015, the outgoing government signed the bill into law. Surprisingly however, after the inauguration of the new government of El-Rufai, the bill was repealed. This demanded continued and increased advocacy by KADCCIMA which eventually led the new government to sign the new Harmonized Tax bill into law in May 2016.

The new law has drastically streamlined the tax system at the state and local government levels, as businesses now pay only 19 taxes as opposed to 200. The new law brings with it a simpler tax regime that allows businesses spend less resources worrying about compliance and gives them more time and money to focus on growth. Our impact assessment estimates that about 506,000 micro-enterprises will experience at least one benefit from the new tax law. Such benefits include ease of tax payment, reduction in multiple taxation, reduction in harassment and monetary savings.



Figure 5: Enterprises distributed by satisfaction with the tax system



Figure 6:Enterprises distributed by number of times they have been taxed under the new system

As ENABLE2 prepares to exit Kaduna, a quick survey carried out by the ENABLE team in March 2017, identified that there is still low awareness of the harmonized tax bill among micro, small and medium Enterprises (MSMEs). The impact assessment recently carried out in September 2017, lends credence to the results of the quick survey as only 26% of those interviewed were aware of the new tax law.. Additionally, the study highlighted that 62% of tax payers are being taxed only once, and that 58% of tax payers are satisfied with the new tax system.

This realisation led the ENABLE2 team to support KADCCIMA to re-engage with the Kaduna Internal Revenue Service (KADIRS). Following several dialogues, these two organisations worked closely to put together a plan for information dissemination. This plan involves several information dissemination sessions; the first of which is taking place on the 21st of September. There are plans for additional sessions to occur amongst different categories of stakeholders as increased awareness will lead to further reductions in the burden of multiple taxes on MSMEs.

2.5.5. Memorandum of understanding between NATA and KASTELEA to reduce harassment and improve working conditions

Type of Reform:	Administrative
Type of Benefits	Reduced harassment, increased income
Date Achieved	July 2017
Partners Involved	Nigerian Automobile Technicians Association (Kaduna chapter)
States location	Kaduna
Outreach Number	11,000 (projected by end-2019)
Number who increased income 15%	2,200 (projected by end-2019)

Table 8: Reducing harassment for Kaduna's mechanics

43% percent of Kaduna mechanics report being harassed or detained by Kaduna State Traffic and Environmental Law Enforcement Agency (KASTELEA) officials, for driving without the requisite vehicle registration documents.¹² This problem usually arose as a result of the need for mechanics to test-drive vehicles that had been serviced to test functionality. In Kaduna, however, mechanics risked being arrested when doing this because they often did not possess the appropriate car documents.

ENABLE2 began its engagement with Kaduna Nigerian Automotive Technician Association (NATA) in June 2016. The engagement commenced with an assessment to identify opportunities to improve the association's capacity in several areas. Advocacy capability was one area that needed strengthening and ENABLE2 provided support to improve NATA members' capacity to advocate successfully. NATA applied lessons from the advocacy training and subsequently

¹² ENABLE2 survey of 60 NATA members, Kaduna, September 2017.

adopted a constructive approach in its advocacy approach. This went a long way in improving its relations with the Kaduna State government.

In engaging the government, NATA created an advocacy plan and developed a position paper outlining the problems faced by its members. Utilising these tools, NATA advocated its position at several public-private dialogues held in 2016 and 2017.¹³ NATA's advocacy efforts eventually persuaded KASTELEA to concede to allow NATA members test vehicles on designated roads without fear of harassment. In July 2017, NATA and KASTELEA formalised their agreement through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

At the time of writing this document, NATA Kaduna executives have been actively engaged in raising their members' awareness of the new rules. In a September 2017 survey, 70% of NATA Kaduna members said that they now expect to face less harassment. Comrade Abdullahi Suleiman, NATA Kaduna's Secretary, expressed his satisfaction with the process: "ENABLE2 opened our eyes to great possibilities; we never knew we could engage the governments and get specific commitments."

¹³ For example, the Gender and Business Platform Kaduna and meetings the Kaduna Ministry of Works, KASTELEA and the Office of the Governor of Kaduna State.

3. Outcomes – public-private dialogues and platforms

ENABLE2 outcome level results reflect changes in policy-making systems in lead states and at the federal level – we seek to facilitate dialogue and policy-making becoming more responsive to business needs, inclusive and evidence-based. If the assumptions of the theory of change holds true, sustaining increases in the quality and quantity of advocacy and dialogue will enhance voice and access for poor men and women doing business in Nigeria. The logframe uses the PPD utility index to measure the number and quality of PPDs and the platforms established and sustained with ENABLE2's inputs.

3.1. Cumulative number of additional dialogues held

ENABLE2's partners convened 65 dialogues¹⁴ by October 2017, covering a wide range of business environment issues.¹⁵ There was wide thematic diversity across dialogues, with particularly high incidence of access to finance and access to markets dialogues. This diversity reflects the extent to which partners have played a leading role in setting the agenda. We have worked with grassroots and other previously low-profile groups on the issues that concern them the most. We have been well positioned to assess which PPDs and themes are most likely to progress to reform level, and deploy resources accordingly. The approach has not been without its challenges, foremost of which is finding the right level of facilitation and technical inputs for a significant number of partners and issues. As the range of issues has expanded, it has become increasingly difficult for ENABLE2's in-house technical teams to source the technical knowledge required for a number of inputs, monitoring and evaluation being a primary one.

While dialogue is essential for improved policy making, our learning has taught us that the number of PPDs must be viewed in the context the quality of the engagement and what was achieved. The PPD utility index was developed in Year 2 to measure the inclusiveness, organisation, direction, outcomes and discussion level of each PPD, awarding scores between 1-5 for each, and using the average to assess the overall quality of a given dialogue.

¹⁴ At the time of writing only 53 dialogues had been scored and data analysed, which forms the data for reporting following results

¹⁵ See Annex 5 for a full list of platforms and dialogues




Figure 7: PPD utility scores in ENABLE2 self-assessment reports (SARs)

Although early closure required the project to be selective about where it provided assistance, we surpassed our logframe target of 3.7 with a final score of 3.75. We have seen a marked improvement in the direction and outcomes of PPDs, a likely result of our partners’ growing dedication to following business environment issues which partners have worked on over the last three years. With 11% of PPDs focused on WEE or pro-poor issues such as displacement, and an average score of 3.6 for inclusiveness, ENABLE2 has made PPDs and policymakers more responsive to the business needs of women and the poor.

We assess that 43% of PPDs contributed to a successful reform, with each reform requiring on average 2.14 PPDs. This is better than the expected 15% of PPDs leading to reform in the logframe design. ‘Breakthrough’ dialogues, dialogues which acted as turning points in advocacy and consultation processes, tended to take place in large, open forums. This is in contrast to initial programme thinking, which posited that smaller technical discussions were more effective at pushing reform. Our tentative conclusion is that a groundswell of grassroots support is crucial for delivering policy change. This is an interesting source of future inquiry, to determine what dialogue are best suited to reform.

3.2. Cumulative number of new dialogue platforms introduced and sustained

Platforms are recurring forums for dialogue and, ultimately, reform. They are essential for making the policy-making system more responsive to existing business needs, inclusive and evidence-based.

ENABLE2 has helped establish 12 PPD platforms, of which six show signs of sustainability. Contrary to our expectations, almost all sustained platforms are hosted by government with input and support from advocacy organisations, the exception being Liberty Radio Kaduna’s Village Forum. 50% of these platforms contributed to an impact level reform, bearing out our theory of change, which identifies MDA buy-in as a critical driver of reform. ENABLE2 has

worked extensively to create incentives for sustaining platforms, evidenced by our going well beyond the 27% of sustained platforms required by the logframe for Year 3.

Platform	Partners	Issues addressed	Date
Centre for Democratic Development, Research and Training Seminar Series	Centre for Democratic Development, Research and Training	Farmer pastoralist conflict	September 2016
Gender and Business Forum Jigawa	Federal University of Dutse	Barriers facing women entering markets, encouraging female entrepreneurship	September 2017
Improving Socio-economic Livelihoods in Kano State	Centre for Research and Documentation	Business environment in markets of Kano State	June 2015
Village Forum	Freedom Radio Kano	Central Bank of Nigeria Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Development Fund	
Village Forum	Kano State Radio	Challenges facing cassava farmers in Getso	October 2016
Virtual Dialogue Platform	Equipment Leasing Association of Nigeria, Nigerian Association of Small and Medium Enterprises	National Tax Policy, Equipment Leasing Law	July 2017
Sustained Platform	Partners	Issues addressed	Date
Business Week Kaduna	Kaduna Ministry of Commerce	Multiple taxation, access to markets, vehicle inspection harassment	July 2015
Gender and Business Forum Kaduna	Kaduna Women Economic Advancement Forum, Quintessential Business Women's Association, Ministry of Commerce	Access to land, business Infrastructure, access to finance, multiple taxation, harassment of mechanics and retailers, monitoring of government reforms	October 2015
Katsina MSME Stakeholders Forum	Women's Economic Empowerment Organisation, Katsina Traders Association, Katsina Ministry of Commerce	Garri processing cluster, weights and measures, market renovations	February 2016
Gender and Business Forum Katsina	Women's Economic Empowerment Organisation, Katsina Traders Association, Katsina Ministry of Commerce	Government procurement of locally made goods, access to markets, market renovations	October 2016
National Assembly Business	National Assembly, Nigerian Economic Summit Group, Nigerian Bar Association	13 Priority legislative reforms including, Secured Transactions	March 16

Environment Roundtables		and Movable Assets and Competition Bills	
Village Forum	Liberty Radio Kaduna	Anchor Borrowers Loan Scheme, Access to Extension Services	November 17

Table 9: New dialogue platforms introduced and sustained

3.3. Key ENABLE2 platforms

3.3.1. National Assembly Business Environment Roundtables

The National Assembly Business Environment Roundtables (NASSBER) is the first of its kind for ENABLE2 and the National Assembly.¹⁶ ENABLE2 supported the Office of the Senate President to develop the NASSBER concept for the eighth National Assembly in October 2015. The Office of the Senate President sought to rectify the previous National Assembly's poor performance in addressing issues affecting business, but was struggling to develop a strategy. Our diagnostics revealed generally low awareness of current and pending legislation. The Office also did not fully grasp the importance of working with the private sector on business environment reform. While the recession had generated new interest in legislating changes to the business environment, there remained a high risk that this would be done with little transparency. ENABLE2 and the Office of the Senate President partnered to develop NASSBER as a solution to these constraints.

The partnership commenced with a legislative review, in which all bills and laws affecting the business environment were collated and ranked in order of priority. When the review identified 13 priority bills, ENABLE2 encouraged the Office of the Senate President, the Nigerian Economic Summit Group, and the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) to collaborate on the passage of these bills. ENABLE2 facilitated a strategic session between the private sector and the Office of the Senate President, in which the 13 bills were incorporated into the legislative agenda of the eighth National Assembly.

1	Federal Competition & Consumer Protection Bill 2015	8	Nigerian Postal Commission Bill 2015
2	Secured Transactions in Moveable Assets (STMA) Bill 2015	9	Nigerian Railway Authority Bill 2015
3	Federal Roads Authority Bill 2015	10	Companies & Allied Matters Act 2004 (Amendment)
4	National Roads Funds Bill 2015	11	Investment & Securities Act (Amendment) 2007
5	National Transport Commission Bill, 2015	12	Independent Warehouse Regulatory Bill 2015
6	Nigeria Ports & Harbours Bill 2015	13	Credit Reporting Act 2015
7	National Inland Waterways Authority Bill 2015		

Table 10: NASSBER priority bills

In March 2016, the National Assembly formally launched NASSBER in partnership with NESG and NBA, to facilitate and fast-track high quality business environment legislation. The platform began as an annual dialogue series to serve as a channel to solicit, engage and obtain feedback from a broader set of private sector stakeholders on the business environment legislative agenda. Between its launch and the closure of ENABLE2, NASSBER has become a structured platform with a Steering Committee, Technical Committee and several working

¹⁶ Refer to NASSBER Case Study for detailed information on NASSBER development, structure, achievements and next steps.

groups, driven by a NASSBER secretariat and supported by a Private Sector Liaison Office domiciled in the National Assembly. As well as hosting a second dialogue in July 2017, NASSBER now features in NESG's annual policy summits. NASSBER is also witnessing increased interest and participation from wider private sector actors (QBWA, NASME, MAN) who have all signed up to join the various working groups. What began as an annual dialogue session has evolved to a network of large and small dialogues sustained throughout the year. Encouragingly, ENABLE2 went from funding 75% of the NASSBER launch to 15% of the second annual event. Funding has come from private sector partners, particularly NESG, demonstrating a commitment to collaboration from both sectors.

As a result of the dialogues and technical assistance provided to NASSBER, the National Assembly has passed two out of the 13 priority legislations.¹⁷ In addition, the Competition and Consumer Protection Bill has passed the third reading in both chambers and has been transmitted for concurrence and harmonisation. We expect that it will be ratified by the President by December 2017. After decades of attempts to pass a Competition Bill and with more than a dozen versions in the National Assembly's archives, NASSBER with ENABLE2 support is on the cusp of transformational reform.

With more time, the project would have deepened the partnership, helping NASSBER to continuously improve its practices. However, there is every sign that NASSBER will continue its activities – the platform is now majority funded by non-donor actors and multiple bills are progressing speedily through both legislative houses. As ENABLE2 exits, it will attempt to hedge sustainability risks by seeking technical inputs for bills from other development partners.

3.3.2. Business Weeks Kaduna

Kaduna Ministry of Commerce worked with ENABLE's first phase, and sought to revive the partnership in June 2015. We worked with the Ministry to identify issues affecting the business community. ENABLE2 provided capacity building to the Ministry in the areas of stakeholder consultation, strategic communication, and PPD facilitation. Following a series of focus group discussions, the Ministry launched the Business Week, a quarterly public-private sector event, in November 2015. The event created room for the private sector to raise their concerns about the business environment, and hold the government to account for any commitments that were yet to be honoured.

The platform is being driven by Senior Directors in the Ministry's management team, and received the backing of the Commissioner at its inception. The Business Week has attracted active participation from a wide range of private sector actors including manufacturers, market traders, and individual businessmen. The areas discussed include improving:

- > Physical conditions in Kaduna's markets
- > Implementation of the tax harmonisation law seeking to reduce multiple taxation and harassment
- > Access to finance

The Business Weeks are now a quarterly forum for Ministry to engage on critical constraints to doing business. The PPDs have delivered a tangible achievement in the implementation of tax policy in Kaduna. Following the first Business Weeks session, the MoC raised the issue of federal Vehicle Inspection Officers (VIOs) harassing fruit traders for informal payments directly

¹⁷ Secured Transactions in Moveable Assets and Credit Reporting Acts 2017

with the Governor, who took decisive action and banned their activities in the state (see Annex 3). The reform demonstrates that maintaining an open platform for businesses to raise concerns can lead to speedy remedial action. The Business Weeks are now included in the MoC's budget, an important step towards institutionalisation. The third edition of the platform is scheduled to be fully sponsored by the Ministry. However, constant reshuffles in government present a risk to the Business Weeks. While the Business Weeks have continued despite changes of Commissioners and Permanent Secretaries, there is a high risk of institutional memory loss that is currently being mitigated by investing training and mentoring in lower-ranking officials.

The private sector is tabling a growing number of issues at the Business Weeks and insisting that the Ministry broadens the net of participants by targeting businesses in rural LGAs to ensure that all experiences are covered. Private sector buy-in also yielded strong sustainability potential for NASSBER, and it is encouraging to see it take root here, with even less active facilitation from ENABLE2. As the president of Kaduna State Women Traders Association said, "This is the first time, we ... will have the opportunity of participating in such an event and our being here is because women businesses do not want to be left behind. We commend the Ministry of Commerce for such an initiative"

3.3.3. Gender and Business platform

Grassroots and women's groups often lack the voice and access required to influence policymaking. ENABLE2 sought to change this by empowering women and socially marginalised organisations to engage state governments constructively and effectively.

In Year 1, we partnered with Kaduna Women's Economic Advancement Forum (KAWAEF), Quintessential Business Women Association (QBWA) and the Kaduna Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development (KdMoWA) to create a platform for highlighting business environment constraints faced by women and identifying solutions. ENABLE2 provided technical inputs on topics such as coalition building, advocacy training for participants, facilitation and funding. One of the business environment issues discussed at the first Gender and Business (GAB) forum was poor access to finance and business support services for microenterprises in Kaduna state and how these constraints are particularly problematic for female entrepreneurs. The discussions were recorded and written up in a communiqué at the end of the session.

Participating advocacy organisations were invited to a follow-up meeting with the Governor of Kaduna to discuss the outcomes of the dialogue. At this meeting, the Governor committed to supporting greater access to finance for female-owned enterprises and directed the Ministries of Women's Affairs, Finance, and Works to work with KAWAEF and QBWA to develop a Kaduna Incubator Facility and lending scheme (KIFAC).¹⁸ A KAWAEF coordinator noted that "KAWAEF now enjoys greater recognition from government, we are grateful for the support from the Ministry of Women's Affairs and our partners ENABLE2."

Impressed with the level of dialogue and participation, the Governor and Ministry of Women Affairs pledged to hold the Gender and Business forum annually. The second Kaduna GAB took place in October 2016, with advocacy organisations playing an unprecedented monitoring

¹⁸ KIFAC aims to establish a business incubator space in Kaduna State to assist entrepreneurs in accelerating their business progress with structured incubation services and lending. Kaduna State is implementing KIFAC in partnership with a commercial bank, Stanbic IBTC. Both parties are to commit approximately N1 billion each. Several Ministries in Kaduna State are converging to facilitate KIFAC. Our advocacy organisation partners are working with these with these Ministries, through a technical committee, to define the project's objectives.

role on the KIFAC’s implementation status, offering to cover gaps in government capacity with their own resources. This session also enjoyed increased private sector participation, with groups such as the Mechanics and Street Hawkers Associations using the platform to advocate for reduction in harassment by government officials. At the end of our third year, we are anticipating the third Kaduna GAB; awaiting the launch of the Jigawa chapter; and documenting Katsina’s first GAB session. The Katsina dialogue was led by the Katsina MoC and Ministry of Women’s Affairs, with Women’s Economic Empowerment Organisation (WEEO) and Katsina Traders Association (KTA) playing a strong role in planning.

The platform has had an immeasurable effect on our grassroots partners’ confidence, providing them with a sample of the access and influence they can acquire by implementing good advocacy practices. The MDAs involved stand to improve their reputation with the private sector, a key requirement for an effective business environment. The MoC’s Director of Planning noted that “GAB is the key that has opened the door” to the private sector for the Ministry.

At the impact level, GAB has had more limited success. In Katsina, WEEO and KTA have successfully advocated for investment in Katsina Central Market through the Gender and Business Forum.¹⁹ In Kaduna, there has been some progress towards constructing the incubator facility. However, two years after the agreement with Stanbic IBTC and almost one year after the government agreed to counterpart funding, funds are yet to be released. This highlights the importance of working with partners from issue identification and reform, all the way through implementation (for more on this, see Section 5).

The sustainability of the forum varies between states. There are strong indications of sustainability in Kaduna, given KdMoWA’s commitment to funding the events. The GAB is now in the Ministry’s annual budget. In Katsina, the MoC is committed to dialogue and has welcomed guidance from ENABLE2 on their consultation skills. However, the State is yet to budget for the event, and it is less clear that they have the financial capacity to maintain the forum in its current manifestation.




Figure 8: GAB funding in Kaduna State:

3.3.4. Virtual Dialogue Platform

The virtual dialogue platform (VDP) was an innovative but complimentary approach to improving PPDs. We aimed to create an online space for stakeholders to initiate, respond to, influence and monitor business policy timely, evidence-based and representative reforms. The initiative

¹⁹ See Annex 3 on Impact for more details.

was based on successful examples such as the Zimbisa public sector e-consultation project in Zimbabwe, Brazil's Democracia platform, and other online forums such as Mumsnet in the United Kingdom. The VDP was piloted in Year 3 and is therefore in its infancy, with many lessons still being learned and collated. However, it represents the future of public private dialogues, given the potential for vastly reducing the costs of engagement.

The anticipated benefits of online dialogue for ENABLE2's partners and stakeholders are:

- > Reduced operational and logistics costs, on items such as venues, transportation, and printing
- > Low barriers to entry
 - > Use of familiar interfaces (e.g. Facebook)
 - > Unlimited membership
 - > Cost and time savings for participants, facilitating greater participation by women and poor people
- > Innovation and interactivity for participants:
 - > Live streams
 - > Recorded videos
 - > Online polls
- > Easy information sharing online
- > Quick and low-cost beneficiary feedback on reforms

Two PPDs have taken place on the platform to date, covering:

- > National Tax Policy and Voluntary Asset and Income Declaration Scheme (VAIDS), led by NASME
- > Leasing and the Collateral Registry Act, led by ELAN

Both dialogues took place on the Facebook platform, *ENABLING Reforms Online*.²⁰ Senior NASME executives and representatives of the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) participated in the tax dialogue. NASME was able to pose questions live and publicly to FIRS, while FIRS used the opportunity to explain how VAIDS would affect the private sector. 111 people participated in this virtual PPD. NASME's Executive Secretary reported that "there are increased calls from our members to the secretariat seeking information on how they can take advantage of the VAIDS programme".

The Leasing and Secured Transactions and Moveable Assets (STMA) Act dialogue followed a different format. In place of the live streams, ELAN's Executive Secretary uploaded a recorded video on which he demonstrated how government inactivity was threatening both the leasing and credit sectors. The session was interactive again, with ELAN responding to participants' questions in real time.

The VDP is a promising innovation for Nigeria. It has caught the interest of the private and public sector and shown partners that dialogue need not be expensive in the long run. However, it must be noted that although participants saved time and resources, project management support from ENABLE2 remained a major cost driver and was critical to success.

²⁰ <https://www.facebook.com/groups/ENABLINGReformsOnline/>

Secondly, the competition for public attention online is high. The platform will need to be more visually appealing and exciting if it is to distinguish itself from other options. Our partners were also lacking in the technical requirements for the platform - some members of NASME Executive Council did not have a Facebook account or understand live streams.

ENABLE2 will pilot the VDP with NASSBER, offering the public an opportunity to engage on priority legislation. Crowdsourcing experiences and advice will allow the legislature to better capture businesses' needs when they write new laws. The VDP has allowed ENABLE2 to adapt its strategy to fit with the Nigerians' increasing online participation. Lessons learned will be shared to encourage uptake by other actors in this market.

4. Outputs – systemic change

4.1. Cross-component collaboration

Before we explain the work and results of each component, it is useful to understand how the different components work together towards business environment reforms and how we select our partners.

- > **Supporting and persuading partners and component teams to work across components is critical for success.** ENABLE2 actively encourages partners in one component to collaborate with partners in other ENABLE2 components. Figure 9 illustrates the seven main types of capacity building ENABLE2 provides in order to encourage partners to collaborate across components.




Figure 9: Main types of ENABLE2 capacity building that encourage cross-component collaboration

- > To incentivise cross-component collaboration, assign responsibility clearly: we learned from ENABLE1 that achieving a business environment reform is likelier when multiple partners, across components, support the reform.

To encourage and manage this type of cross-component collaboration, ENABLE2 set up internal Business Environment Reform Working Groups.

The working group format failed. ENABLE2 core team members, busy with their component work, were reluctant to set aside time to contribute the working groups. Often they perceived the working groups as “extra work” rather than “core work”.

ENABLE2 therefore adapted its approach, assigning clearer responsibility for cross-component collaboration. ENABLE2 disbanded the working groups and instead, for each of the programme’s priority reforms, assigned a single Core Team member to coordinate its cross-component work.²¹ This approach, reinforced by oversight and advice from the Senior Management Team, has led ENABLE2 to understand better its priority reforms and achieve greater in-house cross-component collaboration.

²¹ Referred to as “Issue Leads”, each of these Core Team members was also assigned either the Team Leader or Deputy Team Leader to give them oversight and advice. To reinforce the importance of their cross-component work, ENABLE2 also dedicated a full week of Core Team time in April 2017 to understanding better its priority reforms and clarifying what the various components should contribute towards each of them by the end of the programme.

- > **ENABLE2's partner-driven approach to collaboration sets the programme apart: governance and business environment programmes sometimes assume that donors need to create a 'space' or 'platform' for dialogue.** Such 'spaces' frequently close when the programme shuts down. ENABLE2 has therefore worked to persuade government to value consultation and see it as part of a normal and beneficial part of their policy-making. We do this by highlighting how consultation benefits MDAs and by supporting MDAs to pilot consultation in order to experience these benefits for themselves.²²

²² Two examples of our key messages to MDAs on the benefits of consultation are 1) private sector feedback is often a source of ideas to improve the MDA's policies and the implementation of those policies; 2) consultation often improves public support for the MDA's objectives, because people often view a decision more favourably when they feel their opinions on the decision have been taken into account.

4.2. Partner selection

Overall selection of partners:

We applied consistent principles to the selection of partners. Beyond prioritising of partners who demonstrated willingness and an encouraging minimum level of capacity, we also took into account the following characteristics for the partner in question:

- > Popularity or influence (and therefore ability to encourage or compel replication and/or coordination amongst counterparts)
- > Connection with priority issues
- > Willingness and capacity to engage with challenges specific to, or having a disproportionate effect on the women
- > Close ties to businesses operating at the grassroots level
- > Potential for scale

Once potential partners were identified, the component undertook a detailed diagnostic exercise, in which the strengths and weaknesses of the potential partners were documented. Following a collaborative development of next steps and priority capacity building areas, ENABLE2 components formalised the partnerships and proceeded to implementation.

4.3. Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies component (Output 1)

The MDA Component's vision was to improve capacity and willingness among state and federal ministries, departments and agencies to consult effectively with private sector institutions, particularly those representing poor people and women, on issues, policies, legislation and regulations that have an impact on business activity and micro-enterprises.

The profile of MDAs in target areas was mixed. ENABLE1 partners such as Kano and Kaduna Ministries of Commerce had previously engaged productively with the private sector. Despite a loss of momentum following the temporary withdrawal of our support, the project was keen to reengage and continue to build consultation practices with these partners. Additionally, our previous engagement in both states provided an effective springboard for broadening our network of partners and policy issues.

At the Federal level, there was also evidence of occasional, if not systematic, consultation of the private sector. The Central Bank of Nigeria's increased use of Public-Private Dialogues (PPDs) and the creation of the National Competitiveness Council of Nigeria had increased private-sector expectations of consultation prior to policy change. By the beginning of the second phase of the project, most federal MDAs had been exposed to consultation and dialogue, even if not many had proactively initiated such sessions.

Jigawa, Katsina, and Zamfara presented greater challenges. While the Jigawa Government had committed to improve engagement with the private sector, the top-down style of government in Katsina and Zamfara acted as a barrier to meaningful engagement. A general lack of capacity among business environment-related MDAs meant that the rare PPDs were unstructured and ineffective. Further, it removed incentives for advocacy organisations to invest in advocacy initiatives.

Despite varying levels of capacity and experience in our target states, there were commonalities in the overall limitations, including but not limited to skewed incentives, financial constraints, weak research capacity, poor coordination, and an absence of formal obligations to consult affected parties.

4.3.1. Approach

The MDA component delivered two interventions to support its 16 partners:

- > Direct Partnership intervention: the project team worked with MDAs in the following areas:
 - > Research – MDAs were supported in developing policies with a stronger evidence base
 - > Consultation and stakeholder engagement – this was at the core of our support. We introduced MDAs to the benefits of seeking private sector inputs for key initiatives, such as a larger evidence base, and explained the link between private sector contribution and increased compliance
 - > Communications – we encouraged MDAs’ to communicate policies and reform priorities in a clear and timely manner
- > NASSBER intervention strategy: We worked with the National Assembly to create the NASSBER platform in Year 2 to support the legislature in the development of quality legislation, informed by consultation and research. The National Assembly’s focus on improving the business environment, particularly in favour of the poor, aligned well with programme goals.

The MDA component provided support to partners in a variety of areas, prioritising, where necessary, skills gaps that were particularly relevant to a key issue. These included:

- > **Issue identification:** we built partners’ capacity to identify and prioritise business environment issues by considering the significance of the existing constraint, feasibility of reform, and potential impact of reform on key demographics. We provided the framework, but encouraged partners to lead in selecting the issues that were chosen for analysis to ensure partners had full buy-in of subsequent activities.
- > **Developing consultation plans:** we recommended that consultation events and activities be included in the formulation of policies, working with partners to undertake stakeholder mappings and design fully consultative reform strategies.
- > **Training and mentoring:** our pool of skilled STTAs mentored MDAs in areas in which critical skills were lacking, e.g. research. These were not always directly linked to the issue in question, however. The absence or shortage of critical skills such as ICT, report writing and stakeholder mapping often necessitated an adaption from the core intervention strategy.
- > **Encouraging linkages with other system actors:** the severe lack of coordination among MDAs limits the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of enacted policies. At worst, this lack of coordination introduces into the business environment multiple policies and laws, all with different requirements and effects. Our work on harmonising NASSBER, SON and NAFDAC processes is just one example of our efforts to encourage MDAs to coordinate and reduce the burden of doing business in Nigeria. Similarly, we encouraged MDAs to broaden their consultation base by working with advocacy organisations, the media, and research institutions (see examples in Section 4.3.3).

- > **Policy development and implementation:** we recognised that deficiencies in policy and implementation are in large part due to an absence or shortage of technical knowledge on the part of MDA officials. Across states and issues, we offered technical experts to assist in the development of policy – key examples are NASSBER and the design of an agricultural policy in Jigawa.

4.3.2. Results

Of the 16 partners the MDA engaged, 10 achieved at least an Output 2.1 Practice Change, exceeding the logframe target. Of these, 50% have sustained those changes for at least one year. We have validated the sustainability of three partners’ changes to date. The quality of the consultation is indicated by the MDA Consultation Performance Index, which is discussed below followed by an assessment of the drivers of sustainability and lessons learned. As the component moved from output to outcome level, the MDA component’s partners hosted 16 dialogues. Over eight of our impact-level reforms substantially involved our MDA partners.

Our results for the MDA component are a mostly positive picture, surpassing 2 of 3 output indicators. On the one hand, MDAs have achieved multiple practice changes and a greater number have been sustained than was envisioned at the outset of the programme. The NASSBER platform has triggered the passage of laws that will generate significant impact if implemented correctly. Yet, the reputation of government, measured by the consultation index, remains stubbornly low. This is to be expected – weary of government’s past failings stakeholders are likely to change their perception slowly, over time, even as positive reforms are passed. This low perception of government might be an important driver of sustainability, pushing MDAs to maintain or surpass their current levels of achievement.

4.3.2.1. Ministries, Departments and Agencies outputs

Logframe results	Indicator	Target October 2017	Achieved September 2017
Output: MDA Government MDAs at federal level and in lead states engage in consultation and consider evidence in policy making	Cumulative number of MDAs introducing new or improving current consultation practices (ENABLE2 partners and known copycats)	8	10
	Cumulative number of MDAs sustaining the new or improved consultation practices (ENABLE2 partners and known copycats)	3	5
	MDA Consultation Performance Index of project-supported MDAs	3.5	3.1

Table 11: Ministries, Departments and Agencies outputs

4.3.2.2. Ministries, Departments and Agencies practice changes

Partner	Practice changes	Key reforms	Sustainability indicators
Kaduna Ministry of Commerce (Kaduna)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved policy consultation with forums such as the Gender and Business (GAB) forum Improved media relations, e.g. the development of a media strategy to increase 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multiple taxation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sustained hosting of Business Weeks on topics such as access to finance and taxation

	awareness of the Ministry's activities		
Kano Ministry of Commerce (Kano)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased consultation prior to reform, mostly independently of ENABLE2 support Response to findings from consultation, e.g. creating a budget and releasing funds to develop shared facilities for tie and dye operators. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Access to finance Market fires Weights and measures Tie and dye 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sustained consultation with private sector Disbursement of funds from the Central Bank of Nigeria's micro, small and medium enterprises development fund Budgeting for renovations Kantin Kwari Market
Kaduna Ministry of Women's Affairs (Kaduna)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved consultation, evidenced by co-hosting the GAB Establishment of a joint committee comprised of both public and private sector representatives to define concept, objectives and goals for GAB project Development of Kaduna Incubator Facility to provide business development services and access to finance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Access to finance Business development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sustained co-hosting of the GAB
Katsina Ministry of Commerce (Katsina)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establishment of Small and Medium Enterprises Council (SMEC) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Market renovation Weights and measures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identification for new opportunities for SMEC to engage on business environment issues
Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (Jigawa)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development of stakeholder and communications strategy for rice investment Greater inclusion of women's groups in policy dialogues Improved policy research, e.g. through the village livelihood survey 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Responsible agricultural investment Agriculture policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implementation of the communication strategy on other agricultural investments (i.e Lee Group)
National Assembly (federal)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased use of technical expertise in development of national legislation Partnership with private sector actors Launch of NASSBER – improved consultation with private sector 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collateral registry – passage of enabling legislation Passage of Public Procurement Act Significant progress on passage of Competition Bill and much-needed infrastructure legislation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establishment of the Private Sector Liaison Office Establishment of a secretariat to perform administrative tasks for the platform

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NASSBER featured in Nigerian Economic Summits • Institution of annual report
Standards Organisation of Nigeria (federal)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partnership with NOI Polls to execute stakeholders' perception survey 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Business regulations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Although the partnership was exited, the practice change resulted in a 25% reduction in the cost of registration with the MDA
Kano Ministry of Works, Housing and Transport (Kano)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consultative examination of transport green paper • Provision of support to associations in their engagement with government on the issue 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transport 	

Table 12: Ministries, Departments and Agencies practice changes

4.3.2.3. Ministries, Departments and Agencies consultation index

Both MDAs and advocacy organisations are scored by external stakeholders attending their dialogue sessions. We gathered data from at least 75% of these attendants to build a picture of the evolving perceptions of our partners over time. The data suffer from some limitations – perceptions of political or macro economy, respondents may be unfamiliar with consultation or have preconceived bias; and the numbers attributed to each indicator provide guidance rather than nuanced appraisals. However, these indices have served the useful function of triangulating findings and grounding the project's approach in perception as well as outputs, outcomes and impact. Our theory of change depends on the relationship between MDAs and advocacy organisations, and measuring that has been of the utmost importance.

The index below shows a consultation practice score of 3.1. In contrast to the more dynamic, autonomous and resourceful advocacy organisations, MDAs have sometimes presented both a lack of ability and willingness to engage in significant reform. We must also factor in the political economy in northern Nigeria. In Kano, in particular, support for the Governor is falling, almost keeping pace with the fall in support for the President. As the economy continues to stagnate, there is a perception that the government must do more, immediately. Piecemeal improvements in policymaking are unlikely to have significant impact on this perception. Further, the recent stagnation of the Nigerian economy has resulted in visible cuts by government to essential public services.

Despite this, consultation capacity and skills have risen steadily year on year, which is the core goal of ENABLE2s support. Inclusiveness and communication have remained fairly constant based on the achievements of Year 1. This is to be expected given the context in which the surveys are administered – participants are able to recognise the effort made to consult, without being able to give glowing reviews. Openness towards the private sector is where we see a dip in performance. Partners such as SON may have been able to use surveys to understand the needs of MSMEs and engaged in some PPD, but their institutions, regulatory processes and fees still lack transparency. Despite acknowledging their shortcomings and instituting certain changes, the overall success of MDAs in the partnership reflected their willingness to factor the private sector in their decision-making processes.




Figure 10: MDA consultation index

4.3.3. Sustainability

As a legacy partner for the project, the Kano Ministry of Commerce has benefited from extensive exposure to ENABLE2 principles, planning and hosting of five consultation events in the past year. A PPD with traders on the renovation of Kantin Kwari market was organised entirely without facilitative support from ENABLE2. The Ministry has engaged with its similarly promising counterpart in Kaduna, fostering a peer exchange to facilitate the sharing of lessons learned and best practice.

The NASSBER platform is also a strong candidate for sustainability. Private sector players have capitalised on the opportunity to engage with government at the highest level, in coalitions or independently. The Nigerian Economic Summit Group has been particularly prominent, and its standing within the business environment gives it a unique ability to sustain the platform.

Other drivers of sustainability were:

- > **Budgeting.** as with other components, prior budgeting is a key element in the sustainability of a practice change or outcome. Where the component engages a partner prior to its budgeting process, we advocate strongly for the inclusion of a given activity, be it research or consultation events, in the budget. This more often than not leads to implementation. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs Kaduna budgeted for the implementation of the KIFAC initiative and was able to implement it without needing to initiate the bureaucratic process of a request for additional funds. Budgeted activities were also likelier to survive changes in key personnel. Budgeting creates an increased possibility of MDAs having a stake in the outcome of consultation, thereby increasing the likelihood of follow-up. Kaduna’s Ministry of Commerce recently introduced a quarterly Business Week, bringing together stakeholders from the private sector (see Annex 3) with government to discuss needed reforms. The first session yielded positive results for fruit traders in Kaduna. Encouragingly, subsequent sessions have been placed in the Ministry’s budget.

- > ***Building partnerships:*** encouraging multi-stakeholder partnerships has increased the potential for new, independently facilitated reforms. Creating relationships that exist outside of our facilitation and coaching inputs means that MDAs have a portfolio of familiar organisations with whom they can consult on new initiatives. These partnerships are particularly successful when there are opportunities for mutual benefit. Linking MDAs with research institutions, for example reduced the pressure on the former to build its capacity to undertake research rapidly, while increasing the profile of small struggling research institutions. Before we exited the SON partnership, we facilitated a collaboration with NOI Polls that revealed to the regulatory agency the depth of dissatisfaction with its processes and the need to simplify them.
- > ***Strong Advocacy organisations:*** strong advocacy organisations are powerful drivers of sustainability. Where they are able to leverage their geographical spread, support base and media links, they form strong accountability partners for MDAs. The influence of such advocacy organisations was key in securing the support of the Kaduna Ministry of Women's Affairs and the Katsina Ministry of Commerce for the GAB platforms.
- > ***Economic downturns:*** increased difficulties in doing business as a result of the current recession have increased scrutiny of government policies. Complacency is a less attractive option for business operators, who view well thought out policies as a key factor in exiting the recession. Pressure on MDAs is also increased when the President or a Governor takes personal interest in a given reform.

Despite solid achievements by our partners, there remain barriers to reform and sustainability:

- > ***Economic downturns:*** while economic downturns serve the function of increasing private sector agitation, they also provide even the more committed MDAs with a justification for poor practice. Additionally, MDAs are under increasing pressure to generate revenue, which both reduces their appetite to engage in capacity building activities and increases incentives to implement reforms of low quality, without consultation.
- > ***Poor planning:*** planning similarly operates as both a driver of sustainability and a significant threat to it. With the exception of high-performing partners, many MDAs continue to lack the ability to anticipate and plan for change, leaving potential activities vulnerable to administrative and/or personnel changes.
- > ***Knowledge management:*** MDAs generally lack capacity in knowledge management. Behavioural and environmental barriers have resulted in a lack of institutional knowledge in most organisations, which is a serious threat to sustainability. There is a risk that weaker partners will continue to learn and forget lessons learned in the medium-term.
- > ***Skewed incentives:*** regulatory agencies proved particularly difficult to work with. Whilst it is clear to them that their processes are onerous, they are operating in an environment in which funding is scarce and were therefore not receptive to suggestions that they reduce the number of processes involved in registration and, relatedly, the costs of certification.

4.3.4. Innovations and lessons learned

The partnership between SON and NOI Polls was our response to our observation of a pervasive mistrust of data amongst MDAs. SON mistrusted previous perception surveys, which had singled its processes out as particularly harmful to the business environment. By co-opting them into the research process, we secured their validation of the process and adoption

of the results, though further action is still pending. This is similar to the approach applied by the media component in securing support for Media Planning Services. NESG has also demonstrated interest in undertaking an impact assessment to understand the potential ramifications of competition law. We will train Nigerian Bar Association lawyers in this activity, building the base of legal practitioners fully able to understand the impact of policy actions.

A recurring deficiency amongst partners was the inability to develop strategic plans and, subsequently budget appropriately for said plans. Recognising this, we incorporated both issues into our capacity building sessions for the Kaduna Ministry of Commerce and the Kaduna Ministry of Women's Affairs. Budgets and strategic plans are an effective mechanism for providing MDAs with roadmaps and reducing their range of justifications for non-performance.

As the project expanded the range of issues it was working on, it became clear that success would require more than mentoring and training sessions. At times, it required us to go beyond the traditional restrictions of market systems development programmes and offer technical experts to guide particular processes. A key example is NASSBER – it is important that a federal platform with ultimate responsibility for Nigeria's law is consultative and transparent. However, while capacity for drafting representative and salient laws remained at such a low level, there was little value in improving processes. We have therefore engaged technical experts on competition, infrastructure, and general business environment reform to ensure that the outputs of the legislature match the quality of its processes.

As discussed in section on theory of change, regulatory agencies were especially difficult to guide towards practice change. Their unwillingness to lose revenue also translated into an expectation that the project would fund all activities, without a corresponding commitment to improved processes. The only potential impact reform at SON failed the validation process as the written commitment to reform was not matched by organisational action. ²³

It is important to note that the expectation of funds is not unique to regulatory agencies. Over years of implementation, our specialised team has honed the ability to convince MDAs seeking direct inputs of the value of a piecemeal, collaborative approach to reform. Where this is unsuccessful, we exit the partnership, leaving as much guidance material behind as possible.

4.4. Advocacy Organisations component (Output 2)

The component's aim is to facilitate sustainable improvements in the advocacy practices of advocacy organisations, generating an increase in the quality and quantity of dialogue on business environment issues, and, ultimately, concrete, measurable improvements.

At the beginning of the project's second phase, legacy partners such as NASME at the federal level and KADCCIMA in Kaduna, had an awareness of the importance of advocacy and the basic requirements of effective advocacy. Our focus with these partners was to facilitate the improvement of the quality of their engagements; the introduction of new fundraising strategies; and the creation of dedicated advocacy positions.

Advocacy Organisations in Katsina, Jigawa and Zamfara had a far weaker understanding of advocacy practices and their significance in catalysing desired changes. Chambers of Commerce and other advocacy organisations were very weak and, in many cases, had been captured by the state. There was even some evidence of capture among cooperative

²³ For more information on SON Lesson Learned see Year 3 May-July QPR

movements set up to assist poorer beneficiaries. In line with ENABLE2's shift towards grassroots organisations, we targeted credible market organisations, CSOs and women's groups which, despite low capacity, expressed a strong desire to improve their advocacy strategies.

4.4.1. Approach

The advocacy organisations component worked with 23 partners on interventions aimed at building their understanding of the value of good advocacy and their ability to undertake this. We segmented our partners into two categories:

Formal and established: advocacy organisations that were organised and had visible structures in place. Our main focus was the institutionalisation of their advocacy practices and an increase in the quantity and quality of engagement with one another and key decision-makers.

Informal and grassroots: This category comprised local, self-organised community-building groups who mostly operated informally; had little or no physical or governance infrastructure; and mobilised in an *ad hoc* fashion. The starting point for these organisations was different, encompassing training on the value of good, sustained advocacy as well as addressing issues of quality.

All interventions followed the Direct Partnership intervention model.²⁴ This model was broken into the following steps:

- > Advocacy capacity building – partners were trained on ENABLE2's five-step approach to advocacy: issue identification, research, proposal formulation, implementation and follow-up.
- > Member relations – the contract between advocacy organisations and their members is built on the provision of representation in exchange for regular payment of fees. We recognised the importance of building this relationship and developed support in this area. advocacy organisations across the board faced challenges in collecting dues.
- > Media relations – although the media component was simultaneously building the capacity of the media to report systematically on business environment issues, we recognised the value of advocacy organisations having the capacity to shape media agendas and reporting on their issues.
- > Financial and organisational management – a recurring constraint in all components was funding. Organisations either struggled to gather funding from their members, or did not budget sufficiently for advocacy efforts.
- > Government influence and impact – we taught partners to navigate carefully the line between deep relationships with government agencies and government capture. The reactive advocacy practiced by advocacy organisations often meant that they did not understand the value of regular interaction with government agencies, particularly when it came to the critical element of follow-up.

Of the 23 partners, 16 achieved at least one practice change at output level. A majority achieved more than one practice change. Along with the Media component, the advocacy organisations component also recorded one successful case of replication, where the Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Group (PMG) improved their advocacy based on learning from NASME. This brings the total number of outputs to 17, exceeding the logframe target. Of the

²⁴ See Component Intervention Design for more detailed information

partners that achieved practice changes, 7 have sustained this, despite the programmes focus on grassroots advocacy organisations, who are typically under-resourced, financially and in personnel.

The quality of the practice changes is measured by the Advocacy Performance Index. The indices act as a guide to project teams, who have responded to drastic changes with increased coaching and mentoring. Overall the component has exceed the logframe target with an advocacy performance index of 4. This is in contrast to the MDA component. The ability of the private sector to use the skills ENABLE2 has supplied to mobilise, learn, sustain and follow-up on business environment issues far exceeds the public sector. Although our advocacy organisation partners often lack technical skillsets, many have experience of running businesses and their livelihoods may depend on a reform being achieved. This provided fertile ground for ENABLE2 inputs. In all areas of the index advocacy organisations have improved considerably from Year 1 to Year 2 and have remained at impressive levels since.

4.4.2. Results

4.4.2.1. Component outputs

Logframe Results	Indicator	Target October 2017	Achieved September 2017
Output: Advocacy Organisations engage in effective business advocacy	Cumulative number of advocacy organisations introducing new or improving current advocacy practices (ENABLE2 partners and known copycats)	16	17
	Cumulative number of advocacy organisations sustaining the new or improved advocacy practices (ENABLE2 partners and known copycats)	7	7
	Advocacy Performance Index of project-supported advocacy organisations	3.9	4

Table 13: Advocacy Organisations outputs

4.4.2.2. Component practice changes

Partner	Selected practice changes	Key reforms	Sustained
Equipment Leasing Association of Nigeria (ELAN) (federal)	Creation of Advocacy Committee dedicated to advocating for proper implementation of Equipment Leasing Act (ELA) 2015 Commitment to integrating database with the National Collateral Registry to facilitate implementation of collateral registry First-time creation of social media accounts with links to its website to broaden communication of key initiatives	Implementation of Equipment Leasing Act (ELA) 2015 Non-repeal of ELA 2015 Passage of Secured Transaction and Moveable Assets Bill	Active follow-up with the Ministry of Finance towards inauguration of the Leasing Regulatory Authority Advocacy Committee included in ELAN budget in the past two years

<p>Council of Ulama (Jigawa)</p>	<p>Creation of advocacy team to research into the effects of existing regulations on business owners, and developed advocacy strategy and positions on Weights and Measures Development of a coalition across ENABLE2 focal states to form a strong advocacy bloc on the reduction of the cost of certification of measuring bowls (mudus)</p>	<p>Introduction of standardised weights and measures</p>	<p>Creation of team to support and mentor Katsina State Government on introduction of standard weights and measures Development of enforcement framework Consideration of Enforcement Committee to continue to ensure compliance in markets, drawing members e.g. from existing government consumer protection bodies</p>
<p>Kaduna Chamber of Commerce Industry Mines and Agriculture (Kaduna)</p>	<p>Identification of five advocacy issues and development of workplan on advocacy for improved taxation mechanisms Creation of a coalition to increase bargaining power around multiple taxation</p>	<p>Tax reform (passage of the Kaduna Harmonised Tax Bill in 2016)</p>	<p>Ongoing development of dissemination methods to allow for cascading of information regarding the multiple taxation bill</p>
<p>Kano Business Advocacy Coalition (Kano)</p>	<p>Development of coalition to strengthen advocacy efforts Securing funding pledges in fundraising event Holding sessions with media to increase awareness of access to finance initiative</p>	<p>Access to finance (specifically disbursement of the Central Bank of Nigeria's Micro Small and Medium Enterprise Development Fund)</p>	<p>Conceived as a one-issue coalition. Members have now joined the GAB, evidence that the importance of coalitions is understood</p>
<p>Kaduna Women's Economic Advancement Forum (Kaduna)</p>	<p>Clearly documented planning meetings with Ministry of Women's Affairs and other stakeholders prior to formation of the GAB Creation of improved promotional material, including visual presentation, to increase incentives to engage with content Membership of the Gender Equity and Social Inclusion (GESI) Advisory Committee, creating increased links to government</p>	<p>Gender-sensitive reform across the board on business environment issues</p>	<p>The GAB has become a yearly dialogue platform Financing for the GAB is included in the annual budget of the Ministry of Women's Affairs Commencement of the Kaduna Incubator Facility for increased access to finance</p>
<p>Katsina Traders' Association/ Women Economic</p>	<p>Advocacy Strategy and Position Paper Development on Access to Markets Improved coordination and planning for the second GAB</p>	<p>Gender-sensitive reform across the board on business environment issues Renovation of the Katsina Central market</p>	<p>Commitment from advocacy organisations and government to a second GAB Sustained Advocacy on Access to Market</p>

Empowerment Organisation (Katsina)			
Manufacturing Association of Nigeria (federal)	<p>Mapping of private sector stakeholders and members of the organised private sector to create Made in Nigeria Coalition (MINAC)</p> <p>Membership of MINAC broadened to include CEOs of Manufacturing Companies in Nigeria</p> <p>Creation of a social media campaign to increase awareness of aims of MINAC</p> <p>Commission of research on margins of preference in different manufacturing sectors</p>	Made In Nigeria Campaign Amendment of the Public Procurement Act	Vice President Executive Order has placed Made in Nigeria Margin of Preference as government policy. Engagement with the Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment (FMITI) on sustainability of initiative
Masu Rini Progressive Association (Kano)	<p>Increased understanding for advocacy</p> <p>Development of Cluster development framework for the tie and dye sector. Resolutions adopted by the executive</p> <p>Commission of value chain analysis of the tie and dye sector in Kano State</p> <p>Formation of nine cooperatives, evidenced by formal application for registration to the Kano Ministry of Commerce</p>	Improved prospects for tie and dye sector workers in Kano	State Government included tie and dye sector in budget for Kano Ministry of Commerce Ministry of Commerce has taken ownership of the cluster development process. Increase in the number of clusters is indicative that the Ministry will be committing more funds to the sector Potential partnership with Mafita to target skills gaps
Master Bakers and Caterers Association (Kano)	<p>Improved corporate governance, evidenced by holding of first ever elections</p> <p>Cooperative agreement improving members' ability to access finance and work with flour mills</p> <p>First-time engagement with Standards Organisation of Nigeria (SON) and National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) on reducing the cost of registration for members</p>	Harmonised regulation Access to finance	Success of cooperative agreement has improved member engagement and increased incentives to pay dues

	Engagement with Kano State Ministry of Commerce to develop framework for a one-stop-shop to harmonise regulations for the sector		
Nigerian Association of Small and Medium Enterprises (federal)	Commission of research on MSME tax issues, conducted through engagement with tax authorities Development of Position Paper on National Tax Policy Identification of and engagement with 21 Business Membership Organisations to coalesce around tax advocacy planning	National Tax Policy	NASME currently signing agreements with ActionAid and OXFAM to step down tax advocacy to states Financial aid and support from Joint Tax Board for the State Tax Advocacy Stepdown with National Tax Policy
Nigeria Automobile Technicians Association (Kaduna)	Collaboration with media to draw attention to issues around the Kaduna Street Hawking Ban Development of position papers and technical papers for mechanic villages and government kiosks Development of position papers to protest harassment of members by KASTELEA	Reduced harassment for members	Expansion of advocacy portfolio from exclusively aiming for reduced harassment demonstrates eager adoption of ENABLE2 approach Continued payment of fees owed to KASTELEA in return for reduced harassment of members
Quintessential Business Women's Association (federal)	Development and launch of advocacy on business environment issues affecting artisanal miners in Northern Nigeria Creation of three advocacy-focused roles Development of media engagement framework	Access to finance, CBN MSME Development Fund.	QBWA has engaged the Bank of Industry and is actively disbursing funds advocated for Commitment of funds to focus group discussions aimed at better understanding constraints facing artisanal miners
Nigeria Employers' Consultative Association (federal)	Establishment of a coalition to lead advocacy efforts for competition and consumer protection policies Commission of Value Fronteira survey on fast-moving consumer goods	Competition and consumer protection	Coalition was a one-issue coalition, but members continue to follow-up on legislative progress on the bill
Fertilisers Producers and Suppliers Association Nigeria	Identification of broken links in fertiliser value chain and development of advocacy plan and strategy to address it	Agricultural policy	

(federal)	Formation of coalition prior to launching dialogue on value chain Development of factsheet on the fertiliser value chain		
Nigerian Economic Summit Group (federal)	Engagement of Advocacy and Fundraising Manager for the first time in the history of the association, to develop and implement advocacy and fundraising strategy for NESG Provision of secretariat support to National Assembly Business Environment Roundtables	Competition and consumer protection policy	Advocacy and Fundraising Manager remains in place

Table 14: Advocacy Organisations practice changes

4.4.2.3. Advocacy performance index

The Advocacy Performance Index was developed in Year 2 as a qualitative measurement of outputs. It measures advocacy capacity, government relations, media relations and coalition building, by interviewing partner's stakeholders across their multiple events. The chart below demonstrates how our partners' have performed collectively over the life of the project. ENABLE2 is pleased to report a consistent improvement in the quality of advocacy, finishing Year 3 with a performance index score of 4, and exceeding the logframe target of 3.9. The primary areas of success are advocacy capacity and government relations. Advocacy performance improved on Year 1 to achieve a score of over 4 in Years 2 and 3. This is most likely the reason why the component has seen early signs of replication. With high-performing partners securing reforms, their peers are driven to emulate their practices in the hopes of similar success. Government relations improved significantly from a base of 1.89 to 4.12 in Year 3. As partners have progressed from outputs to outcomes, advocacy organisations engagements with government have had to increase to ensure that fundamental reforms are carried out.

The chart below suggests a peak in performance in Year 2. Being perception-based, some of these scores will fluctuate depending on the extent to which the partner has had a high profile in the period in question. For instance, we would anticipate higher scores for GAB-related partners just before and just after their annual events. This is particularly true of partners that operate in coalitions – when the coalition disbands, they risk losing the high profile it brought. Additionally, smaller partners risk 'disappearing' within large coalitions where they might struggle to distinguish themselves. Year 3 has also been a year in which the project has balanced implementation with closure. This has focused partners on delivering reforms rather than taking advocacy to newer heights in this period.




Figure 11: Advocacy performance index

4.4.2.4. Replication

Original partner/practice	Copycat partner/practice	Replication type	Comment
Nigerian Association of Small and Medium Enterprises (Federal)	Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Group (five-step advocacy; federal)	External	<p>Nigerian pharmaceutical manufacturers pay tariffs on essential imported ingredients, driving up the costs of their outputs. Foreign pharmaceutical goods, however, previously enjoyed tariff-free entry into Nigeria, securing a competitive advantage over their local rivals.</p> <p>As manufacturers became increasingly dissatisfied with the arrangement, they called upon the Association to offer a solution. Fortunately, the president of the Nigerian Association of Small and Medium Enterprises (NASME) is an executive of PMG. He offered PMG the advocacy template NASME had implemented with ENABLE2, identifying it as the source of their own successes.</p> <p>Using ENABLE2's five-step approach to advocacy, PMG documented its position; carried out a stakeholder analysis of influential MDAs and Ministers; and created an advocacy strategy. PMG put forward a recommendation that foreign goods pay a 20% levy at the border at a Quarterly Business Briefing with the President, followed by advocacy visits to the Minister of Finance and the Minister for Industry, Trade and Investment.</p> <p>The recommendations were considered by the Federal Executive Council, and approved. Although</p>

			there were better economic solutions to the problem, as we discuss in section 4.4.8 the need to accept second-best solutions at the beginning of the reform process. In this case, a non-partner adopted ENABLE2's structured approach to advocacy to secure significant benefits for its members.
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Table 15: Advocacy organisations replication

4.4.3. Sustainability

As Table 14 demonstrates, there is strong evidence that many of our partners' practice changes are being sustained. In the case of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Group (PMG), partner endorsement has spurred replication, which led to positive results.

NATA have delivered numerous practice changes during our partnership. For instance, they have begun conducting their own research into their members' issues and through this research developing recommended solutions that government can implement. One example is their engagement of a quantity surveyor to develop plans for the construction of a mechanics village for their members. NATA is a clear example of a partner that has taken on board the need to abide by the terms of the core relationship between the advocacy organisations and members. In part because they deliver results for their members and keep them well apprised of these, they suffer to a lesser extent from an inability to collect dues and have been receptive to our recommendations on additional sources of income.

Encouragingly, our approach to gender equality and social inclusion has imparted lessons to partners that are likely to be sustained:

- > Social inclusion – MARIPA is showing signs of sustainability, despite starting the partnership with ENABLE2 as a grassroots organisation with extremely low capacity. Noting the falling competitiveness of Kano's tie and dye sector, they set out to understand the drivers of the phenomenon and locate potential solutions. The Kano State Ministry of Commerce has committed to collaboration on the development of clusters in the sector, releasing funds for the initiative. The project will include a value chain analysis of the sector, which will address critical gaps in the advocacy organisations' understanding. By improving its links to the government and delivering clear benefits, MARIPA can hope to emulate NATA's success in maintaining a consistent revenue base.
- > Gender equality – the Gender and Business platform holds significant potential for sustainability for ENABLE2's partners advocacy. By October 2017, there will have been three sessions in Kaduna, two in Katsina, and one in Jigawa. The extent to which government has bought into this platform has been encouraging as government engagement is a key driver of sustainability (see section 3.3.3). Our final contribution to the project will be the facilitation of peer learning networks, which will encourage state chapters to share approaches and lessons learned.

The primary drivers of sustained change for this component are:

- > ***Institutionalisation of reform.*** Partners who have created dedicated roles for advocacy activities are more likely to sustain changes over time. Partners who have institutionalised ENABLE2's approach include:

- > QBWA – Recruitment of Media Relations Manager, Social Development and Advocacy Officer
- > ELAN – Establishment of Advocacy Committee; recruitment of Advocacy Officer
- > NESG – Recruitment of Advocacy and Fundraising Manager
- > **Peer expectations:** a key driver in sustaining and building commitment to practice change has been the response from external stakeholders and peers. Their reaction can encourage, or discourage continued or further change and action. Kaduna and Katsina States have drawn heavily on Jigawa State’s implementation plans in the ongoing reform of their weights and measures systems. Jigawa State’s reputation as a first mover and expert in this area of reform provides a strong incentive for sustaining the changes.
- > ***Building from success and failure:*** advocacy organisations respond extremely well to past success. NASME, for example, generated a recorded replication by actively encouraging a peer to adopt ENABLE2’s five-step approach. Failures during partnerships allow the project to mentor partners on thinking creatively about how to adapt their approach when one method is unsuccessful. WEEO advocated in Year 1 for the transfer of a new market to a more lucrative location and transparency in the allocation of stalls in a new market. Despite government assent, the initiative was never funded and members did not receive the anticipated advantages. For a grassroots organisation that had invested financially in this campaign, this was a significant setback. However, we demonstrated to WEEO the successes of the GAB in Kaduna, and they have turned to the platform to revive their original advocacy aims.
- > ***Working with others:*** We have facilitated the creation of strong coalitions, which have demonstrated to partners the benefits of acting in concert. By mentoring partners in the identification of and engagement with potential partners, we have increased the likelihood that this remedy is a reflexive one when they are faced with particularly high barriers to reform. For instance, MAN brought together public and private sector stakeholders to develop sustained advocacy on the importance of promoting goods produced in Nigeria. The coalition includes the CEOs of Nigeria’s 20 top manufacturing companies (e.g. Proctor and Gamble and Dangote Group), whose pre-existing links to government reduce the need for advocacy organisations to invest significantly in developing these. Both these coalitions have gathered significant momentum. Bringing together multiple partners with overlapping but non-identical interests, they ensure that at least one party will always have an interest in progressing the advocacy effort.

Partners will need support in the following areas if they are to sustain results:

- > ***Financing advocacy:*** even when advocacy organisations provide valuable services to their members, they struggle to secure resources for advocacy. The project developed new mechanisms for addressing this issue, however, financing remains a threat to the sustainability of our initiatives. Financing also has an impact on turnover of staff, who are often unpaid or temporary – advocacy organisations struggle to maintain continuity as they are unable to create proper incentives for members who are required to invest significant amounts of time.
- > ***Stakeholder identification:*** advocacy organisations often fail to recognise the value of thinking creatively about potential coalition partners. This limits their ability to leverage the resources of other organisations with similar concerns. We have done significant

work to address this capacity gap. However, a contributing cause is the desire to acquire sole attribution for advocacy efforts. This is more difficult to address – advocacy organisations are aware that the results of advocacy are public goods and often seek to mitigate this by at least acquiring sole credit for the effort. The coalitions that have been developed are evidence that advocacy organisations are beginning to understand the value that partnerships can bring.

4.4.4. Innovations and lessons learned

- > ***Right-sizing interventions:*** we empowered informal but promising partners to act independently or through cooperatives, treating their status as a secondary consideration. This approach has created vibrant pockets of advocacy engagement in Katsina where business environment advocacy was previously patchy and of low quality. We also learnt to apply this flexibility even to the implementation of rigid frameworks, such as the five-step approach, to ensure that partners did not get preoccupied with technical weaknesses that might not be relevant to the achievement of immediate goals. This required the project team to learn the importance of accepting ‘second-best’ solutions, in cases where seeking perfection risked pushing partners too far and, ultimately, failure.
- > ***Defining success:*** we encouraged partners to look beyond the front page, replacing grand concepts such as ‘access to finance’ with smaller, more concrete interventions. For instance, the Kano Business Advisory Coalition (KaBAC) brought together banks, entrepreneurship development institutions, processor associations, BMOs and MSMEs to advocate for the release of funds from CBN’s MSME Development Fund in Kano. The coalition succeeded in advocating for the passage of a bill authorising the State Government to implement reforms necessary for the release of the funds. The coalition comprised actors who were independently advocating for increased access to finance. By joining together and developing a specific objective, the release of CBN funds was achieved in October 2016, despite wider persisting constraints in accessing finance.
- > ***Diversifying funding:*** even where member engagement and compliance were high, partners continued to struggle to finance their efforts. We incorporated fundraising training, which focused on analysing the market for funds present and future, actual and potential; defining and costing strategies for engaging with potential donors; tailoring investment in a proposal; to the potential for success; and creating implementation and evaluation plans for the fundraising effort.
- > ***Connecting executive and membership:*** partners struggled to provide their members with the feedback and results that incentivise payment. We developed database creation tools and piloted their use in Year 3 of the programme. The intervention involved simple activities, such as the automation of member registration forms. We amended the content of membership questionnaires to ensure that all critical information was captured digitally, to facilitate consolidation. Given the early closure of ENABLE2 the task remains at pilot stage. However, we are confident that this intervention should be a key feature of any future support to advocacy organisations, who suffer greatly from a lack of strong internal knowledge management.
- > ***Inadequate investment by partner:*** on occasion, we were unable to convert partners who had previously worked with grant-giving organisations to the M4P approach. We exited the WOFAN partnership when it became clear that they were unlikely to commit to

interventions that did not bring in funds directly. Similarly, FEPSAN's management declined to institutionalise reforms by creating new roles without direct support. Although the project has tailored its approach to the unique circumstances of particular partners, the refusal, from a partner of FEPSAN's size indicated an unwillingness to invest in sustained changes. In the case of Pastoral Resolve, there was a failure to invest the time required in the project. The diagnostic review alone took four months, and management eventually admitted that it was unable to dedicate the personnel required to absorb ENABLE2's support.

- > **Political capture:** MAN has been an extremely important partner given its level of access. However, such organisations are at times prone to complacency and political imperatives. However, its profile provides a direct line to the government that has reduced its willingness to lead platform-based initiatives such the Made in Nigeria project. An important closeout activity will be to work with MAN to reflect on improved advocacy, while identifying a potential coalition leader for Made in Nigeria.

4.5. Media Component (Output 3)

The Media component aimed to enable partners to create high-quality, sustainable media products addressing business environment issues, or to improve the quality of existing programmes. The project's theory of change posits that stronger and more regular media coverage of issues would result in an increase in the quality and quantity of dialogue on the problems facing businesses, and, ultimately, improvements in the business environment.

We envisaged the creation of business environment media products that were issue driven, bottom-up, investigative, balanced, interactive, accessible and commercially profitable. The last characteristic is a key impetus to sustainability.

To play an effective role, the media needed to focus on business environment issues; effectively investigate and report such issues; be impartial and balanced in reporting these issues; and capitalise on the commercial potential of business environment coverage to create a sustainable voice for businesses.

At the national level, deregulation of the media landscape in the 1990s had created space for a dynamic industry to develop. A large network of newspapers, radio networks and television networks, many with audiences across regions and states, provided opportunities for reaching previously inaccessible demographics. However, the quality of business environment reporting was mixed – there was a proliferation of single-sourced stories and articles or shows reporting verbatim the content of government press releases. A considerable amount of coverage was reported on a pay-to-play model.

In our focal states, Kano presented the most promising media market. The popular station, Freedom Radio Kano, with support from the first phase of ENABLE was already producing a high-quality business environment product, *Da Rarrafé*, and had hosted a number of open-air forums on business environment issues. In Kaduna, however, a similarly large and active media sector was yet to produce media products specific to the business environment.

Further north in Jigawa, government ownership of two of the three existing media houses complicated the problem of a relatively small media landscape. There was a question as to whether these organisations would be given the freedom to openly discuss government failings with respect to business environment reform. In Zamfara and Katsina, the media landscape was dominated by state-owned media and it was unlikely that engagement with the media in

these states could be undertaken without government engagement. These governments had previously demonstrated a lack of interest in engaging with small business in their states. It would be important, therefore, to explore alternative means for securing clear, unbiased reporting of business environment issues in these states. One option open to the project was the use of journalists in Katsina, employed by the national newspaper *Daily Trust*, to investigate stories in the state.

4.5.1. Approach

The media delivered the following two packages of support to its eight partners:

Direct Partnership intervention strategy: we provided support to media houses on a number of critical topics including:

- > Business Product development – prior to ENABLE’s interventions, partners had not fully grasped the importance of thoughtful, sustained coverage of business environment issues. Despite a significant amount of their listenership coming from Nigeria’s poor, media houses were failing to represent them effectively.
- > Decentralised and representative reporting – we worked with radio stations to increase their reach and relevance, tailoring some of their content to address the specific interests of rural and remote populations with two key initiatives:
 - > Village forums – these were media public-private dialogue (PPD) platforms that provided smallholder farmers and other micro-entrepreneurs at the grassroots level with access to the media. These sessions allowed them to raise their concerns about the business environment with the media and other key stakeholders, in a forum much similar to solution-oriented meetings in villages across Africa.
 - > Community Journalism – we encouraged radio stations to engage local community members as ‘journalists’, broadening their reach without the anticipated associated costs. These local actors improved the ability of central radio stations to gather information from all parts of the state without deploying journalists from cities. It also addressed some of the barriers outsiders face in retrieving information from tight-knit communities. As a result of our collaboration with Freedom Radio Kano alone, 45 community journalists improved their information gathering and reporting skills, and are now part of the station’s activities.
- > Skills and training capacity – even media houses that engaged in representative reporting of business environment issues suffered serious capacity gaps. We worked with partners in areas such as sound aesthetics and research and investigation of reported issues. Skills and training was provided to personnel at all organisational levels to ensure the sustainability of improvements in outputs.

Media Planning Services (MPS) Partnership intervention: audience research is critical for marketing (securing advertisers for revenue) as well as accessing feedback required to inform amendments and improvements to existing products. MPS developed the All Media and Products Survey (AMPS), an annual survey into listenership of media stations. While there had been strong uptake in the south of the country, our northern partners often displayed scepticism regarding the survey’s methodology and therefore the veracity of the information. This was a serious problem, given that advertisers sit on MPS’ quality control committee and are therefore likely to base their decisions on selection and payment of media houses on the AMPS findings.

Our northern partners were negotiating with advertisers without full access to the same information.

To counter the perception that MPS data was irrelevant, ENABLE2 and MPS organised a committee of media house personnel to join MPS data gatherers in the field in 2015. They observed the rigour with which communities were interviewed, and were given the opportunity to provide feedback on the process. As a result, Freedom Radio Kano, Liberty Radio Kaduna and the Daily Trust have taken out subscriptions to MPS' services.

4.5.2. Results

The media component has outperformed most of its logframe targets, delivering a high number of new and improved media products in the business environment space. Most impressively, the media component has delivered strong internal and external replication ahead of time. Of the 16 business media products with improved media quality scores, six are a result of scored replication products. In this regard, the component benefited from being able to draw a clear link between improved practices and commercial advantage. As we demonstrate below, even those partners that came on board with extremely low capacity, have improved significantly, both in terms of quality and replication.

4.5.2.1. Component outputs

Logframe Results	Indicator	Target October 2017	Achieved September 2017
Output: Media house publishes and airs journalistic products that investigate business environment issues that affect the poor, and marginalised women	Cumulative number of business media products with an improved media quality score (directly assisted products and known copycats)	12	16
	Cumulative number of media houses sustaining new or improved practices to publish and air investigative business media products (ENABLE2 partners and known copycats)	8	7
	Number of partners with 10% Percentage increase in audience of ENABLE2 media partners for relevant programming where at least 40% are active (project-supported media products)	6	7

Table 16: Media outputs

4.5.2.2. Component practice changes

Partner	New or improved products	Key reforms	Sustainability indicators
Daily Trust (federal)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Golden Harvest</i> • <i>Women in Business</i> • <i>SME Page</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Responsible agricultural investment • Weights and measures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Independent development of <i>SME Page</i>, an investigative and field-based product, with focus on poor and women • Investment in AMPS subscription • Independent engagement in AMPS fieldwork

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Repurposing of ENABLE2 training to develop revenue-generating journalism courses • Securing of funding for Solution Journalism from International donor. 	
Freedom Kano (Kano)	Radio	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Da Rarrafe</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Market fires (prevention and compensation) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adoption of community journalism and capitalised on it to create new weekly programme using stories from community voices • More audience interactivity, e.g. feedback via email, telephone, and location • Investment in AMPS subscription • Adoption by in-house training team of component curriculum for re-training staff on business reporting
Liberty Kaduna (Kaduna)	Radio	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Sana'a Sa'a</i> • <i>Village Forum Platform</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Street hawking ban • Access to Extension workers • Anchor Borrowers Scheme Implementation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased creativity in investigative reporting, e.g. travel to remote areas to understand impact of road conditions on productivity • Investment in AMPS subscription • Independent engagement in AMPS fieldwork • Funding third Village Forum
Jigawa Radio (Jigawa)	State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Sana'a abin Dogaro</i> (renamed from <i>Kowa Yar Ba Gidain in 2017</i> to reflect a change in focus from traditional to modern business) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Responsible agricultural investment • Weights and measures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extension of team-based approach to other programmes on the station • Sustained local marketing and recruitment of additional marketing staff
Pyramid Kano (Kano)	Radio	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Kasuwanci a yau</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Market fires (prevention and compensation) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adoption of team-based production structure and use of content research, field-based investigative reporting, sound aesthetics and audience interactivity for improved

			<p>business environment media product;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collaboration on the Media Forum on business environment issues such as the Kano market fires and the need to compensate small businesses
Express Radio Kano (Kano)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Da yau da gobe</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Market fires (prevention and compensation) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collaboration on the Media Forum on business environment issues such as the Kano market fires and the need to compensate small businesses
Kaduna State Media Corporation Radio (Kaduna)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Sana d Kasuanchi</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Street Hawking ban 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collaboration on the Media Forum platform on business environment issues such as the effects of the street hawking ban
Kano State Radio (Kano)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Guntun Gatarinka</i> 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of signature-tunes, sound effects, segment transition tunes and promotional jingles to make the programme more attractive to listeners. • Acquisition of equipment for field-based reporting to improve the quality of <i>Gutun Gatarinka</i>
Media Planning Service (federal)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>All Media and Products Survey</i> • <i>Media diaries</i> 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continuation of AMPS field data collation with the northern media observer group; this should sustain credibility and subscription and strengthen audience marketing and media coverage of pro-poor issues • Increased credibility and visibility of MPS in northern Nigeria with MPS proactively engaging new subscribers (Invicta and Nargarta)

Table 17: Media practice changes

4.5.2.3. Media product quality index

The media component's quality scores are provided by independent media experts. The examiners consider:

- > Business environment focus
- > Depth of its analysis
- > Balance of opinions presented
- > Extent of the investigative effort
- > Accessibility
- > Presentation
- > Audience interactivity
- > Inclusiveness

Of 12 products with improved media scores, seven products increased their scoring by 15% or more. *Mai Nema* and *Sana'a Sa'a* were the highest performers, recording respectively 106% and 122% increases in quality. These products were amongst the lowest scoring when the first assessment was conducted. As with the example of research institutions below, one explanation could be that a relatively low baseline means that partners suffer from multiple capacity gaps, so that addressing just a few has a radical impact on quality. However, this does not sufficiently explain the fact that *Sana'a Sa'a* now ranks as the highest scorer, with a final score of 3.66. The success of *Sana'a Sa'a* is correlated to Liberty Radio Kaduna's station's performance as a partner. They readily adopted many suggested reforms, investing in the audience listenership data subscription and working with ENABLE2 to perfect the village forum intervention.

Although reforming the practices of state-owned media houses presented some challenges, they performed strongly throughout their partnerships. Jigawa State Radio's *Sanao'in Mata Awarwara* improved its score by 59% to 3.33, rivalling the performance of most of our private sector partners. Similarly, Kano State Radio improved the quality of its own product by an impressive 64% to achieve the same score.

Despite the overall quality of the data, we observed some fluctuations in the data, which indicate that partners are yet to apply their learnings consistently to each instalment. *Sana'a Sa'a* was yet again a star performer on this analysis. The programme and the Daily Trust's *Women in Business* page were the only media products to reliably increase their scores over the life of the project.




Figure 12: Media quality scores

Of 14 products assessed, six increased their audience by 29% or more. For Freedom Radio Kano, the increase was 806% between 2014 and 2017. Although this signals that business environment reporting is reaching a wider audience, it is difficult to attribute this increase accurately to the programme, given that the programme was moved to a more popular time slot. Another potential explanation is that Freedom Radio Kano has subscribed to audience listenership data, and is using results to tailor programming to listeners' tastes. This analysis is undermined by poor performance at Liberty Radio Kaduna and Daily Trust, who have seen audiences fall by 62% and 64% respectively.

4.5.2.4. Replication

The media component has achieved a total of eleven known replications. Six of these have been scored by our independent media experts.

Original partner/product	Copycat partner/product	Replication type	Comment
Daily Trust (business environment pages)	Leadership (business environment pages)	External	Our diagnostics of Daily Trust revealed an absence of agricultural reporting in Nigeria. Daily Trust proved our theory that there was a demand for this material, quickly increasing its popularity and, with that, sponsorship. Ever since, both The Nation and Leadership adopted Agricultural reporting in the style of Daily Trust, such as Agric supplements and field reporting.
Kaduna (agricultural reporting)	The Nation (agricultural reporting)	External	
Kano State Media Corporation (business environment)	Queen FM (business environment programming; Suna Linzami)	Internal	Kano State Media Corporation's production team moved internally to a new station, Queen FM. They launched a new business environment programme, Suna Linzami, replicating many of the features of Sana'a Sa'a that capacity building and mentoring had introduced.

programming; Sana'a Sa'a)			
Jigawa State Radio (audience feedback, business environment programming; Kowa ya bar Gida)	Jigawa State Radio (audience feedback, business environment programming; Jigawar Yau)	Internal	Jigawa State Radio improved the quality of the Kowa ya bar Gida programme following capacity building sessions on investigative journalism, content research, interactivity and audience feedback. A new programme, Jigawar Yau, incorporates all these elements, after audiences responded positively to Kowa ya bar Gida, expressing a desire for more coverage of government reforms on a range of topics.
Express Radio Kano (field reporting; Da Yau da Gobe)	Express Radio Kano (field reporting; A Kula d'Hanyar)	Internal	Express Radio Kano uses field-based reporting to develop Da Yau da Gobe. Their new business environment programme, A Kula d'Hanyar, also relies heavily on field based reporting to produce episodes. They reported to ENABLE2 that the practice has greatly improved their business environment reporting.
Liberty Radio (business environment programming; Sana'a Sa'a)	Liberty Television (business environment programming; Mu Koma Gwona)	Internal (different medium)	ENABLE2 supported members of Liberty radio with improvements to content research, audience research, scripting, aesthetics and audience interactivity. Liberty Radio has the same management as the television station, and has replicated many of these changes, particularly on a new television show covering business environment issues in Kaduna and the rest of northern Nigeria.

Table 18: Scored media replications

Four examples of replication are yet to be scored. This is further evidence of the extent to which the media component has been able to generate enthusiasm for its initiatives, by placing commercial reward at the front and centre of incentives.

Original partner/product	Copycat partner/product	Replication type	Comment
Daily Trust (business environment pages, solution based reporting)	Daily Trust (arts section, solution based reporting)	Internal	ENABLE2 trained Daily Trust's reporters, including an editor of the Arts Section, on solutions based reporting. She used the technique for the first time in an article published in January 2017 and is now one of the trainers on the in-house curriculum.
Freedom Radio Kaduna (content research; <i>Da Rarrafe</i>)	Freedom Radio Kaduna (health, content research; <i>Aikin Likita</i>)	Internal	The Content Research Lead for <i>Da Rarrafe</i> participated in our content research training and incorporated it into the programme. He incorporated content research principles into the two other (non-business environment) programmes he produces.
Freedom Radio Kaduna (content research; <i>Da Rarrafe</i>)	Freedom Radio Kaduna (agriculture content)	Internal	Producers on other shows often request advice on replicating the quality of his other shows. He has provided mentoring and advice to these producers.

	research; <i>Filimona</i>)		
Liberty Radio (content research, planning, scripting; <i>Sana'a Sa'a</i>)	Liberty Radio (content research, planning and scripting; <i>Storytime</i>)	Internal	<i>Sana'a Sa'a's</i> Content Research Lead shared lessons from ENABLE2 mentoring with his colleagues, and mentored them on applying the new techniques to their own media products. <i>Storytime</i> , a children's programme was reportedly on the verge of failure, with little planning for instalments and unscripted episodes. After incorporating <i>Sana'a Sa'a's</i> learnings, the producers have reported increased positive feedback from listeners.

Table 19: Unscored media replications

4.5.3. Sustainability

Freedom Radio Kano stands a particularly strong chance of sustaining ENABLE2-facilitated reforms. Firstly, its subscription to AMPS increases the likelihood that it will implement the positive cycle of using the information to attract revenue and incorporate feedback into programming. Additionally, Freedom Radio Kano has proved particularly receptive to the concept of community journalism, reimbursing expenses for journalists traveling to their office. They are currently considering paying journalists a small stipend to secure their commitment to making ongoing inputs.

Daily Trust is another legacy partner showing great promise of sustainability. They have recently developed a training course for aspiring and existing journalists – the revenue generated from the sessions will sustain their desire to maintain and enhance positive practice changes. Additionally, the newspaper has independently launched an SME page, a field-based, investigative account of challenges facing businesses all over Nigeria. Despite the title, a majority of the content addresses issues facing micro-enterprises.

It is encouraging to witness significant progress by newer partners in our portfolio. Liberty Radio Kaduna has developed a strong business environment product, Sana a Saa, and, at the most recent validation, was maintaining the improvements to production and audience interactivity recommended by ENABLE2. They are increasingly demonstrating creativity in how they gather information for the programme – recently, staff travelled to rural villages to investigate the effect of bad roads on business. Although we are exiting this partnership at a relatively early stage, Liberty Radio Kaduna is an early adopter of the AMPS survey. We anticipate that the commercial imperative to sustain their investigative and representative reporting increases their potential to sustain practice changes.

The component's practice changes are more likely to endure in the following circumstances:

- > **Increased advertising revenue:** rather than requiring partners to place faith in our claims that improved quality drives revenue, we rely on the AMPS data to demonstrate the benefits of good journalism. Rebutting partners' assumptions with field engagements was also an important feature in encouraging them to take out these subscriptions. While subscriptions are annual, partners have indicated that the increase in advertising revenue is a strong incentive for renewal. Just like the research component, the media component has benefited from the clear link between improved practices and increased revenue. Importantly, there are signs that increased revenue has led to reinvestment in pro-poor coverage initiatives.

- > **Training:** we have shared a considerable body of knowledge and training materials with our partners. As improvements in quality continue to demonstrate their value, we are confident that this knowledge will be shared more widely across partners and with their subsidiaries.
- > **Budgets:** many partners suffered from an inability to budget overheads. While new shows were reflected in the budget, their quality would be seriously compromised when it became clear that operational and logistical costs were higher than anticipated. Our sessions walked partners through the process of budgeting to ensure that last-minute budget shortages would not affect the final output. Together with reductions in cost brought about by the use of community journalists, this is likely to keep the quality of products high.

While many of our partners are committed to sustaining their results, there are nevertheless persistent barriers to sustainability in the system. Some of these are:

- > **Relationships with MDAs:** it is important that partners have regular access to MDAs linked to business-environment activities if they are to provide well-balanced stories. This relationship is not yet fully formed, and the need for it is not as clearly demonstrable as the need for increased audience interactivity. This is because government has proved able to ignore or withstand media criticism, especially in environments where coverage is particularly fragmented.
- > **State-owned media houses:** state-owned media houses delivered positive practice changes as a result of engagement with the project. However, they were slower to take on ENABLE2 reforms and did not deliver to as high a degree of quality improvement as was seen in private media. They continue to risk capture by whatever government is in place, as they are insufficiently independent to engage in hard-hitting coverage of issues.

4.5.3.1. Innovations and lessons learned

Balanced reporting has been a critical concern for the project. We noted that partnerships were reliant on existing links for information, even when the creation of new relationships was likely to yield useful new insights. We encouraged participation in a media stakeholders' forum to link media houses to both the private sector and MDAs. Our partners worked with us to develop stakeholder databases and mechanisms for identifying which sources were most relevant for covering particular issues. We brought a wide range of partners together in three locations, covering three business environment issues in each one. This active involvement in developing partnerships began late in the programme, when it became clear that partners had not grasped the importance of venturing beyond traditional sources.

The early closure of the programme has had an impact on the number of partners that we are able to reach. Quality in non-partner institutions remains low, and we sought creative solutions to this problem. One such solution was the fostering collaboration between Daily Trust and radio stations. This new partnership permits radio stations in states to base their reporting of agricultural issues on the content of Daily Trust's Golden Harvest, a high-quality product developed in collaboration with ENABLE2. Freed from the pressure and financial implications of generating independent content, these radio stations can use their reach to more widely broadcast content, and provide feedback to Daily Trust based on their own local knowledge. While content copying is common in Nigerian journalism, this network offers an opportunity for such copying to yield mutually beneficial results. Such initiatives also ensure

that illiterate beneficiaries are also able to benefit from improved business environment reporting.

An important lesson for this component was the value of building close relationships with partners, beyond the professional requirements of the project. Given the often high levels of investment media partners were required to make or sustain, it was important to be attuned to their challenges outside of the development of business environment media products. By developing these close relationships, we were able to avoid partner dropouts, instead offering advice on how approaches could be tailored in responses to changes in circumstances.

Kano State Radio, a high performing partner in Year 1, was exited quickly at the end of Year 2. A new Managing Director (MD) was appointed by Kano State Government to run the station. With a clear mandate to raise revenue the new MD requested financial and equipment donations from ENABLE2. Despite several engagements to explain ENABLE2's role as improving business programming and sustainable practice, no progress was made. This experience has made the programme more wary of political stakeholders within state-owned radio stations. This validated the use of MoUs to keep communication clear and justified quick exit and relocation of resources.

The evolution of the Village Forum is also notable. Radio Kano participated in a pilot of the concept. However, due in part to its status as a state-owned partner, the event departed from the original aims of the intervention. Instead of bringing together grassroots participants and providing them with a rare opportunity to air their views, the event attracted members of the political elite, and our target group remained in the background. In subsequent sessions with Liberty Radio, the station made the following changes:

- > Reducing participation (20 or fewer individuals) to keep sessions productive
- > Recording discussions in the studio and using them to question officials in the studio in subsequent programmes – this format limited the potential for conversations to lose the main point

A key concern is that partners with whom we anticipated longer partnerships might be unable to sustain improvements. This is the case particularly for state-owned media houses. We will make a concerted effort in the last month of the programme to disseminate a broad range of training material.

4.6. Research and Information Component (Output 4)

The Research Institutions component's vision was to facilitate sustained improvements in the development and use of research in target states, leading to an overall increase in the quality and quantity of dialogue on business environment issues.

Before ENABLE2 began, there was some good quality research taking place at the national level. NOI Polls, for instance, produced a quarterly Consumer Confidence Index, which measured and reported Nigerians' outlook on the economy. We noted, however, that reports were often lengthy and written in inaccessible academic language, with little visual presentation; and research institutions did not make significant efforts to disseminate information. This, combined with limited incentives on the part of advocacy organisations and MDAs to access research, meant that the information in reports often remain known only to those who had developed them.

At the state level, Kano had the strongest track record of available research. CRD, a legacy partner, was already active in the generation of business environment research. In Kaduna, despite its reputation as a major academic centre, capacity to undertake business environment research and interest in doing so were low. As in other components, Jigawa, Katsina and Zamfara had weak options for engagement. Of these states, we chose to concentrate on Jigawa, where the presence of reputable academic institutions provided a potential entry point.

4.6.1. Approach

The Direct Partnership intervention aimed to support research institutions in producing more and better business environment research, which would in turn improve the quality of advocacy and dialogue events. A key feature of the intervention was the creation and deepening of relationships between research institutions and other actors in the advocacy market.

The component worked with its nine partners in four areas:

- > Awareness of Business Environment Research: we built partners' understanding of the business environment research market, their potential role within it, and the business models that could support increased activity. The capacity building also targeted advocacy organisations and MDAs with research units, however weak, to begin to generate links between actors and test the potential of a research network.
- > Product development: partners who displayed interest in expanding their portfolio of business environment research were given further support on the development of business environment products. In some cases, this included the provision of a technical expert, who guided staff through the processes of formulating research questions, designing an evidence-gathering approach, and synthesising findings. We incorporated into these sessions modules on gender inclusive, pro-poor research and improved data dissemination.
- > Access to funding and marketing development: we gave training on fundraising and broader knowledge of funding sources and requirements for access to partners developing publicly available research. Partners developing commercial research were trained on marketing and dissemination to build what was, across the board, a relatively low profile in the business environment space. NOI Polls proved particularly receptive to this training. The organisation held a public launch of its report on the manufacturing sector and used that platform to develop a relationship with MAN.
- > Development of research networks: we developed links amongst research partners to encourage the sharing of approaches and lessons learned; encourage collaboration where possible and desired; and, avoid needless duplication of research work. Together with CRD, we launched the Improving Socio-Economic Livelihoods in Kano State (ISELinKS) project, an initiative that brought together 39 stakeholders from CSOs, the media, BMOs, and MDAs. ISELinKS offers a platform for coordination, strategy development, and engagement with MDAs. There are encouraging signs of sustainability, as evidenced by the continued use of the platform by advocacy organisations and media outlets in search of business environment information.

In Year 2 of the project, we began to test interventions that would reduce the cost of research, if successful. For instance, we provided capacity building to ABU's research centre, in the hopes that the existing technical and operational capabilities would result in reduced costs for customers. Another attempt to reduce the costs of research saw us partner with state-

owned bureaus of statistics in Kano and Kaduna. The Bureaus proved receptive to our approach and we worked with them to significantly improve the quality of their research and build their profile amongst information seekers.

4.6.2. Results

The research component surpassed all its Year 3 output targets. We mentored partners to deliver a total of five new or improved business environment products, one more than the original target. By developing initiatives such as ISELinKS, we have broadened our partners' reach well beyond what was anticipated, recording 27 external stakeholders accessing research products, 69% more than the logframe required for Year 3. FUD's new Centre of Gender Studies, set up with ENABLE2's assistance, has also had some recent successes, sharing its report on barriers to female entrepreneurship with an impressively wide range of stakeholders. Overall, the component has delivered solid, useful outputs and ensured that they are widely benefited from.

4.6.2.1. Component outputs

Logframe Results	Indicator	Target Oct 2017	Achieved Sept 2017
Output: Research and information are available to advocacy organisations, MDAs and the media on a sustainable basis	Cumulative number of research providers producing new or improved Business Environment-relevant research and information (ENABLE2 partners and copycats)	4	6
	Cumulative number of advocacy organisations, MDAs and media houses accessing relevant research and information from project-supported research providers or known copycats	16	27
	Business environment Research Utility Index of project-supported research providers	3.5	4.2

Table 20: Research Institutions outputs

4.6.2.2. Component practice changes

Partner	Practice change	Key reforms	Indicators of sustainability (partners accessing product)
Centre for Research and Documentation (Kano)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of three new research products: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>Katsina-Dubai market stalls allocation: Making a case for equitable allocation towards effective income generation</i> ○ <i>The tie and dye sector – research support for MARIPA</i> ○ <i>Issues around access to credit for rural farmers in Kano</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tie and dye • Access to finance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Katsina Traders' Association • Women Economic Empowerment Organisation • Fertiliser Producers and Suppliers Association of Nigeria

Kaduna State Bureau of Statistics (Kaduna)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved business environment research e.g. the <i>Kaduna State Agricultural Structure Survey</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agriculture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Kaduna State Executive Council Kaduna Women Economic Advancement Forum
NOI Polls (federal)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adoption of new methods for conducting surveys, deployed in the manufacturing sector survey <i>Survey on MSME perception of Standards Organisation of Nigeria</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Product regulations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Standards Organisation of Nigeria Manufacturers' Association of Nigeria
Ahmadu Bello University (Kaduna)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development of new research product: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>SMEs in Nigeria: problems and prospects</i> <i>Benefits of removal of fertiliser subsidy</i> <i>Impact of tax on the business environment in Kano</i> <i>Multiple taxation – obstacles to SMEs in Kaduna</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agriculture Multiple taxation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Freedom Radio Kaduna Fertiliser Producers and Suppliers Association of Nigeria Abubakar Rimi Television Ministry of Commerce Kaduna
Centre for Democratic Development Research and Training (Kaduna)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development of new research: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Social and economic impact of rural banditry on Dan Sadau and Birnin Gwari communities</i> 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria
Federal University of Dutse (Jigawa)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development of new research: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Entry barriers and other challenges faced by women entrepreneurs in Jigawa State</i> 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Invest Jigawa Market Women Business Association Daily Trust Newspaper Jigawa State Radio

Table 21: Research Institutions practice changes

4.6.2.3. Business environment research quality index

The research component has consistently improved its Business Environment Research Quality scores, surpassing the Year 3 logframe target with a score of 4.2. It is encouraging to note that the content and the analysis indicator saw the second largest improvement – 54% – on Year 1. The relevance and utility of research also saw a consistent increase over time, reflecting the impact of our practice of encouraging partners to prioritise material supporting advocacy and consultation over academic papers. With Nigeria's economy at the top of most agendas, business environment research has acquired heightened relevance. Inclusiveness also saw an impressive 59% increase. This was driven first by our encouragement of collaboration between research institutions and grassroots and women's groups. The Centre for Democratic Development, Research and Training (CEDDERT), for example, went into the field and engaged

for the first time with pastoralists to deliver its report. Secondly, research institutions such as Centre for Gender Studies, despite being keen to understand the constraints facing women, had considered education and health care to be the primary issues facing women before engaging with ENABLE2.

Results must be considered in the context of northern Nigeria. The baseline for research institutions across all indicators was extremely low at the beginning of ENABLE2. A perception-based study, albeit conducted by experts, will struggle not to contrast low quality and limited subject coverage of most research institutions, with the improved outputs on offer today. The excellent scoring for this component, and its exceeding of logframe targets, risks obscuring the reality that research firms operating in northern Nigeria can still improve greatly in all the areas, on and beyond the index, if they are to meet standards available on the national and international market.




Figure 13: Business environment research quality index

Partners’ performance all scored above average for their outputs. KdBS’s Kaduna Agricultural Sector Survey outperformed all other reports, averaging a score of 4.5 across all indicators, and recording a high of 4.8 for its dissemination practices. Our lowest score went to the research on market stall allocation in Katsina, conducted by CRD. The research was undertaken in Year 1, at which point the actual production of a business environment report (scoring 3.9 and 4.0 respectively for utility and ease of use), was a significant achievement for a partner facing serious constraints from the outset. Overall, the results of the quality index reflect our qualitative assessments of partner performance.




Figure 14: Research product quality

4.6.3. Sustainability

Given the level of input and capacity building required to develop strong research, we conducted extremely thorough diagnostic exercises and concentrated our efforts on partners who shared our objectives and demonstrated commitment by contributing funds, or through other means. This means that we expect most of our partners, to sustain the changes we recommended to them. Furthermore, by increasing their awareness of funding sources, we have provided them with increased incentives to keep their output quality at a high level. FUD has directly attributed its success in securing a grant from the Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFUND) to our fundraising capacity building. CRD has provided research for two DfID projects, PropCom and NSRP. While not all of the research was business environment related, this is evidence of improved quality in their work, connecting partners to a broader client base.

NOI Polls has also stood out as a particularly engaged partner. Its research on the manufacturing sector was undertaken independently of ENABLE2 and the resulting launch event gathered together a wide variety of relevant and influential stakeholders. This is a central feature of our approach – if partners are able to secure grants or win tenders as a result of improvements to their approach, these changes are more likely to be sustained.

Research institutions are most likely to sustain improvements when the following conditions are met:

- > **Organisational reform:** where we see that an organisation is not set up to deliver good research, we make recommendations to partners based on best practices. CEDDERT has been convinced of the central role of marketing to its success and has hired a Director of Marketing to ensure that all business opportunities are identified and followed up. This is in contrast to CRD, who continues to lack the funds required to hire additional staff. It has addressed this by creating partnerships with external organisations which help to fill internal resource gaps, but an internal commitment to commercialisation would yield stronger results. KANBUS has similarly created Media Relations, Stakeholder Relations and Marketing Lead positions to ensure that its practice changes endure.

- > **External validation:** partners are encouraged by responses to improved material to continue to generate documents of similar quality. The Head of Service recently donated 19 laptops to KANBUS, in recognition of their improved outputs, and to facilitate their activities with improved hardware. KANBUS has responded to this by organising peer learning sessions with KdBS and working to expand its network.
- > **Partnerships with other business environment actors:** more than for any other component, partnerships are extremely important for research institutions – new partners more often than not form their core client base and improved relationships with the media simultaneously reduce the costs of media engagement and increase the reach of their work. Partners who have built strong relationships across a wide range of partners are more likely to experience increased demand for their work.
- > **Improved media relations:** platforms and opportunities for engagement such as ISELinkS have created relationships between research institutions and the media, reducing the likelihood that stories will only be reported in return for direct payment. Partners have reported a reduction in their public relations funds, which they are then able to channel into improving other aspects of their organisation.

We observed some factors that are likely to threaten sustainability in the long run. These are:

- > **Sporadic demand:** while there has been an increase in interest in business environment research, there is a risk that this will be sporadic – advocacy organisations and MDAs have also developed some internal capacity in undertaking research and might prefer not to incur the costs of outsourcing. The reduction of demand might have an impact on institutions' incentives to retain the quality gains they have achieved. There is a risk that external research will be a casualty of continuous cuts to advocacy organisations' and MDAs' budgets (see Sections 5.1 and 5.3)
- > **Minimal competition:** the relatively small number of high-profile research institutions in the north of Nigeria has kept incentives to improve quality at low levels. Existing actors receive funding, from donor agencies in particular, as a result of being one of few available options. Incentives to improve research are presently driven by the client and not the market which through competition is typically better equipped to drive irreversible changes in output quality.

4.6.4. Innovations and lessons learned

Our priority in quality improvement was increasing the depth of technical research undertaken by our partners. For partners who proved quick to learn and adopt our interventions, we introduced a new module of capacity building. Previously, research material was often presented in large tracts of unbroken text, reducing the willingness of stakeholders to engage. Our infographics capacity building taught partners to present information with rapidly digestible visual presentations, an approach that also had a positive effect on the overall presentation of the work. We learnt to focus not only on the content, but on mechanisms that would ensure that stakeholders would be driven to seek out our partners' work.

Another innovation was the increased focus on our public sector partners. Their longevity is ensured and their links to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) create opportunities for broader research in future. We adapted our training on fundraising to address their specific circumstances, for instance encouraging them to advocate for business environment research when making periodic budget requests to the state.

We developed a university placement scheme and funded the successful pilot with ABU. We planned funding for scale up from the Student Industrial Work Experience Scheme (SIWES) to provide interns for research efforts. This was to be a key element in driving down the costs of research. However, we underestimated the scale of the challenge involved in introducing a new category of funding and were unsuccessful in securing funds.

The KANBUS gross domestic product analysis project stalled as a result of their inability to raise funds. One reason for this was their inability to develop an appropriate process for gathering the information required for the report. This suggests that, at present, KANBUS is only capable of undertaking less ambitious research projects, and is as yet unable to provide a much needed product to a state seeking information on revenue sources. CRD is also running a similar risk – by failing to reform governance structures and commercialise its approach, it depends on precarious external arrangements to retain its funding.

5. Strategic learning

5.1. Theory of change

In Section 1, we outline ENABLE2's theory of change. In this section we compare this theory with what actually happened. We summarise which theory of change assumptions held and which did not, extracting lessons for other programmes.

5.1.1. Did interventions lead advocacy organisations to advocate better, media to cover business environment issues better, MDAs to consult better and researchers to improve their business environment research?

Section 4 analyses the output-level performance of each component in more detail; here we reflect on whether the assumptions underlying the Theory of Change at the output-level held in practice:

- > **Output assumption 1:** sufficient numbers of advocacy organisations, MDAs, media houses, and research providers are interested in adopting new or improved practices (with programme support);
- > **Output assumption 2:** incentives and capacity constraints within partners are amenable to change within the lifetime of the programme;
- > **Output assumption 3:** partners will be willing and able to sustain practice changes post-programme support;
- > **Output assumption 4:** non-partners would replicate the practice changes introduced by partners.

The programme achieved most of its output targets. Assumption 1 held in practice: demand for ENABLE2 support from advocacy organisations, MDAs, media houses, and research providers was high, despite the fact that ENABLE2 took money off-the-table. Likewise, a high proportion of partners across all four components (40 out of 56 partner organisations) used programme support to measurably improve practices (assumption 2). However, in some low capacity partners (including grassroots advocacy organisations but also some state-level MDAs), the level of programme support required to achieve practice change, sometimes including basic skills like report writing or basic project management, was higher than expected. Assumptions 3 and 4 are discussed in more detail in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.

Lessons for other programmes:

- > **Understand what motivates partner organisations:** for example, ENABLE2 understood what would motivate radio station managers to invest in raising the quality of their station's radio shows. Better radio shows should attract more listeners, but having more listeners was far likelier to increase revenues when radio stations a) monitored listenership figures and b) could persuade advertisers to pay more when listenership increased. ENABLE2 therefore helped radio stations to see the value in paying for audience research, and leveraged this support to interest radio stations in improving programme quality.
- > **Filter out "bad partners" early:** in line with good adaptive management practice, ENABLE2 applied several filters. Firstly, the programme used its State Coordinators and other sources of local political knowledge to understand the likelihood of a potential partner

sharing ENABLE2's objectives. ENABLE2 avoided organisations with weak prospects. Secondly, the programme refused to offer grants, mitigating the risk that organisations pretended to share ENABLE2's objectives in order to access money. Thirdly, ENABLE2 began partnerships with a diagnostic exercise. ENABLE2 dropped eight partners at the diagnostic stage, usually because they lacked relevance to ENABLE2's objectives, or the feasibility of improving their performance was low. Finally, ENABLE2 carefully monitored its partnerships. If a partner failed to improve practice despite receiving capacity building, we moved resources to more promising partners. Where partnerships changed quickly due to political interference, they were put on hold or stopped, or conversely when political momentum was garnered, more support was given. By keeping up-front investments in partners modest, ENABLE2 was able to test potential partners at low risk to value-for-money.

- > **Follow up training with mentoring:** mentoring made it far likelier that partners applied the theory they learned in training.

5.1.2. Did more and better advocacy, media, research and consultation practices lead to more and better public-private dialogue?

At the outcome-level, the following assumptions were made in the Theory of Change:

- > **Outcome assumption 1:** improved capacity and practices in partners would translate into repeat cases of good-quality PPDs (including more inclusive PPDs);
- > **Outcome assumption 2:** government would be sufficiently open to engaging in dialogue with advocacy organisations partners, or participating in media-hosted dialogues;
- > **Outcome assumption 3:** stakeholders would have sufficient capacity to engage constructively in government consultations.

There is strong evidence that more public-private dialogue has happened due to ENABLE2. As detailed in Section 3, practice changes by ENABLE2 partners have contributed to an extra 53 public-private dialogues being held. Our qualitative indicator score of PPDs moved from 3.40 to 3.75, driven by improvements in discussions, outcomes and inclusiveness.

Assumption 2 is also supported to some extent by the number of additional dialogues achieved. These could not happen without government participation. However, the programme encountered two distractions that limited the effectiveness of government to maximise the benefits of consultation. Firstly, MDA partners would often see dialogue as a goal, not a means to an end. Only after dialogue does the hard work of policy drafting and implementation begin, whereas officers and directors would often be content to see public consultation happen. Secondly, ENABLE2 frequently had to deter government from turning dialogues into political rallies or mouthpieces for government announcements. In most cases this was flagged early and easily handled by emphasising that we need to get policy right first before government celebrates it. However, on one or two occasions, such as the Village Forum in Getso, Kano, farmers' voices were drowned out by political speeches and party supporters. Despite this, there are also numerous examples of government policy improving based on feedback from ENABLE2-supported public-private dialogue.²⁵ However, there are also ways in which future dialogue could improve.

²⁵ For example, Kano State Ministry of Commerce learned through consultation that traders are interested in fire hazard insurance and that there is at least one company willing to offer such insurance to market traders, with an Islamic Insurance product which

In terms of assumption 3, Advocacy Organisations' contributions to dialogue are often hampered by a lack of understanding of what makes for effective policy. This problem is most acute among grassroots advocacy organisations, where education levels and ability to pay for research are lower. This underscores the importance of working on both the demand-side and the supply-side of the reform 'system'. More generally, willingness to pay for research is low within government and civil society.

The lack of demand is compounded by the often-low quality of research on offer in northern Nigeria, and in Nigeria nationally. Many of the researchers the programme encountered struggle to analyse and question information. Many also struggle to understand business environment reform, sometimes recommending actions which would worsen the business environment, if adopted. ENABLE2 sought to address these shortcomings through extra capacity building, in Year 3 in particular. Our efforts were curtailed by the programme's early closure.

Use of evidence remains a weakness in government policy-making, at the federal as well as state level. Persuading MDAs to value and invest more in research was beyond ENABLE2's scope. Other DfID programmes may however wish to address the issue.

5.1.3. Did the increase and improvement in public-private dialogue lead to more business environment reform?

At the impact-level, the following assumptions were made in the Theory of Change:

- > **Impact assumption 1:** good-quality (and inclusive) PPDs would contribute to (pro-poor) reforms-on-paper;
- > **Impact assumption 2:** sufficient organisational and financial capacity exists within government to ensure reforms-on-paper are translated to reforms-in-practice, leading to concrete improvements in the Business Environment of micro-enterprises in particular (include female-owned);
- > **Impact assumption 3:** macro-economic conditions and political stability would not deteriorate further.

In terms of assumption 1, it was recognised that not all PPDs would contribute to actual reforms. In the logframe targets it was assumed that, on average, every sixth PPD would contribute to reform. In practice performance was better with 47% of PPDs contributing to a successful reform. On average, each reform took 2.14 PPDs to achieve. Similarly, it was assumed that not every reform-on-paper would lead to reforms-in-practice.

As detailed in Section 2, the programme met its target of 11 reforms. Below we outline some of the factors which contributed to getting from dialogue to reform:

- > **Prioritising reform-minded parts of government and their priority reforms:** for example, ENABLE2's political economy analysis identified Kaduna's state government as being reform-minded, and keen to raise more tax revenue. This made it more feasible for ENABLE2's advocacy organisation partners to persuade government to simplify the state's tax system – by arguing that tax simplification would increase government revenue.
- > **Coalitions achieved most reforms:** coalition building either between government and private sector or between multiple Advocacy Organisations appears to have led to more

appealed to traders. The ministry has since requested additional funds from the state government to organise an event, in partnership with the insurer, to promote its fire insurance product. Without insurance, traders rely on government pledges to assist them financially to recover from fires – pledges which appear to be rarely honoured.

successful reforms, both between ENABLE2 components and outside. Of the 15 reforms reported, eight were driven by coalitions (nine if Competition Bill is included)

- > **Follow-up:** reforms were likelier to happen when advocacy organisations and the media recorded commitments made by government at dialogues and followed up on their implementation.
- > **Both large, inclusive dialogues and closed-door, technical dialogues contributed to reforms:** large, inclusive dialogues contributed to nine of the eleven reforms. Closed-door technical dialogues contributed to at least six. These two different formats often served different, complementary roles. Whereas dialogues with more stakeholders and broader themes allowed micro-enterprises to bring new issues to policy-makers' attention, smaller and narrower dialogues often allowed participants to plan reforms in more detail.

The programme also faced obstacles to getting from dialogue to reform-on-paper. Notably:

- > **After dialogue, government often needs further technical support to refine the proposed reform based on feedback.** This step is largely overlooked in the programme's theory of change, and evidence suggests Assumption 2 was weak. For some reforms, ENABLE2 has overcome this by partnering with other programmes (e.g. GEMS3 on Competition and STMA) which give government technical assistance on policy design.
- > **Draft Federal legislation must pass through eight stages to become law.** The number of steps required to pass federal legislation frequently leads to long delays and loss of momentum in passing legislation.
- > **Alone, researchers struggled to influence reform.** Given MDAs' and advocacy organisations' low willingness to pay for research, several of ENABLE2's research partners self-funded their research. In some cases, such as CEDDERT's research on the farmer-herder conflict, they focused on topics of interest to them personally and professionally. While this strengthened their ownership, it also meant that they lacked the involvement of an advocacy organisation to lobby for their recommendations to be acted on, or an MDA which felt directly responsible for adopting their recommendations. Thus, even where MDAs have participated in dialogue on researchers' chosen topics, the interest shown by government has translated only into modest action.

As detailed in Section 2, ENABLE2-supported reforms have benefited large numbers of micro-enterprises, but the programme has fallen short of its 2017 outreach targets. Arguably, this shortfall results chiefly from unrealistic targets – a topic discussed in more detail in section 5.2.9. However, there are lessons we can learn from some of the factors which inhibited larger numbers of micro-enterprises from benefiting, despite the programme achieving its target of eleven business environment reforms.

Issue selection. Sector-based M4P programmes (e.g. agricultural market development programmes) conventionally choose which business environment (or other) constraints to address. They base their decisions on, among other things, how many poor women and men would benefit from the constraint being addressed. While ENABLE2 did limit itself to partnerships focused on issues relevant to micro-enterprises and workers, the programme supported reforms with both low and high outreach. While there are clearly arguments in favour of focusing more on high-impact reforms, there are also several reasons why ENABLE2 chose to support partners advocating for lower-impact reforms as well:

- > *Desire for local ownership.* ENABLE2 recognised that partners were likelier to achieve and sustain practice change when advocating for, reporting on, researching and consulting on the business environment reforms which matter most to them. These issues were not always going to achieve high impact, but it did increase ownership.
- > *Contract focused on outputs.* ENABLE2 has operated under an output-based payment system; for implementers to get paid, the programme was required to achieve a large number of logframe outputs. This in turn required the programme to enter into a large number of partnerships. The task of maintaining a balanced portfolio with grassroots organisations and the availability of suitably motivated partners after ENABLE2's first two years meant that the programme could not afford to limit itself to partnerships targeting high-outreach business environment reforms. For its future programmes, DfID might wish to consider reverting to payment modalities which do not reward implementers for focusing on outputs at the expense of impact.
- > *DfID preference to work with grassroots advocacy organisations.* Advocating for change in national policies requires resources, connections and economic and policy expertise – all of which grassroots advocacy organisations lack. Grassroot organisations therefore tend to focus their advocacy on local, smaller-scale issues.²⁶

Not always addressing root causes of business environment constraints. M4P programmes often conduct in-house diagnosis of the root causes of constraints (including business environment constraints). Addressing root causes can lead interventions to achieve larger impact, as well as greater sustainability. ENABLE2 did little in-house diagnosis around business environment issues, instead following the process from the first phase of ENABLE, the programme let partners identify constraints and work towards finding solutions. Many partners lacked capacity in this area, which at times led to policy proposals and reforms which fell short of addressing root causes. The Tie and Dye sector reforms and the Made in Nigeria campaign are arguably examples.²⁷ ENABLE2 evolved its approach in Year 2 and 3 assessing reforms which partners were pursuing and investing more in those which would have a larger impact. A scoping mission was planned to diagnose high-outreach reforms which new or existing partners could advocate for. This 'hybrid' approach was curtailed when the programme was ended early.

Finding reforms relevant to micro-enterprises in the informal sector. ENABLE2's results demonstrate that improving the business environment can benefit micro-enterprises directly, as well as indirectly through economic growth. Nonetheless, the fact that many micro-enterprises are not registered for tax, off the "radar" of regulatory agencies and unable to access credit from the formal financial sector, reduces the impact on micro-enterprises of these "classic" large-scale business environment reforms. To achieve outreach, ENABLE2 has therefore had to complement reforms to tax, regulations and finance with other reforms less known to development practitioners.²⁸ The programme's approach of allowing grassroots

²⁶ One exception is ENABLE2 partner the Quintessential Businesswomen's Association (QBWA), which is national in its outlook and yet draws its membership largely from micro-entrepreneurs.

²⁷ The Made in Nigeria campaign is based on the premise that Nigeria's manufacturing sector struggles to compete with imports. The barriers to Nigerian manufacturers' competitiveness include the country's unreliable electricity supply, skills shortages, high cost of tax and regulatory compliance, under-developed transport infrastructure and government intervention to increase the value of the Naira. Instead of pressing government to remove these barriers to competitiveness, the Made in Nigeria campaign asks government to compensate manufacturers for them. Thus not only does the campaign side-step root causes, by offering compensation it risks weakening manufacturers' incentives to advocate for the root causes to be addressed.

²⁸ For example, helping NATA mechanics to gain permission to road-test vehicles in Kaduna; and supporting the standardisation of weights and measures in Jigawa, Katsina, Kano and Kaduna.

partners to identify issues has helped this, but bespoke reforms come at the expense of high impact outreach.

Government implementation capacity. A challenge that we have seen is moving from reform-on-paper to impact on micro-enterprises. How quickly this happens will depend on government capacity and will to implement the reforms it approves. With ENABLE2’s mandate focused on advocacy and consultation, our understanding of and ability to influence implementation has been limited. Assumption 2 at the impact level suggests that government could implement reform with sector-specific expertise. As capacity for implementation began to delay results in Year 3 ENABLE2 began offering (modest) technical assistance to government towards implementing programme-supported reforms. However, ENABLE2’s main response has to been to partner with programmes (mainly GEMS3) which specialise in assisting government to implement business environment reforms. In line with this approach, ENABLE2 intends to “hand over” support to the implementation of several reforms to other DfID programmes.

ENABLE2 has been fortunate in that its timeframes and priority reforms aligned with GEMS3’s around several reforms. In contexts such as northern Nigeria, a key learning for the programme is that advocacy and consultation *may fall short of achieving impact* without support being available for reforms’ implementation. We therefore recommend that DfID considers, when designing future programmes, consolidates advocacy and implementation capacity building in one programme (as with PERL). Or, if that is not feasible, ensuring that the programme which builds business environment reform implementation capacity extends beyond the programme building advocacy capacity.

Unintended consequences. As mentioned in the Impact Section, ENABLE2 has identified benefits of the reforms it has contributed to which go beyond the logframe (benefiting consumers, increasing tax revenues, etc.). It is also worth acknowledging that a small number of reforms may have unintended costs as well. For example, the Federal Government’s decision to introduced tariffs on imported pharmaceuticals should benefit workers in the domestic manufacturing sector. So will the Made in Nigeria campaign, as government procurement increasingly favours domestic producers. However, these reforms will also increase the price of medicines for Nigerian consumers and the cost of procurement for the Nigerian government. Full cost-benefit analyses are rarely done in the Nigerian public sector, and with ENABLE2’s target group defined as micro-enterprises and workers, were beyond scope of programme.

5.2. Logframe changes

In line with good practice, ENABLE2 reviewed its logframe after every Annual Review to ensure the programme’s targets remained stretching. Below we cover the logframe changes and then provide a wider reflection on the logframe’s appropriateness for guiding the programme.

5.2.1. Logframe changes

We made the following changes to the logframe:²⁹

Old indicator – Outcome 4.3	New indicator – Outcome 4.3
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²⁹ See Logframe Explanatory Notes and Logframe Revision Proposals for more detail

Percentage of stakeholders reporting satisfaction with public-private dialogue on business environment issues	Utility index for PPDs on Business Environment issues
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Table 22: Changes to Outcome 4.3

Results reported as a satisfaction percentage were uninformative as the link between satisfaction and impact was unclear. New indicator emphasised utility of PPDs in achieving goals and measured inclusiveness.

Old indicator – Output 1.3	New indicator – Output 1.3
Percentage of relevant private sector stakeholders reporting an improvement in the consultation performance of project-supported MDAs	MDA consultation performance index

Table 23: Changes to Output 1.3

Satisfaction results were not informative of quality of practice changes. Agreed with 2015 Annual Review Recommendations to review.

Old indicator – Output 2.3	New indicator – Output 2.3
Percentage of advocacy organisations' members reporting an improvement in the advocacy performance of their advocacy organisations (project-supported advocacy organisations)	advocacy organisations advocacy performance index

Table 24: Changes to Output 2.3

The new Advocacy Organisations Advocacy Performance Index quantifies the perception of business environment stakeholders (i.e. MDAs, media houses, members of partner advocacy organisations, other advocacy organisations, and research firms) regarding the advocacy performance of ENABLE2 advocacy organisation partners. Satisfaction results were not informative of the quality of practice changes. Agreed with 2015 Annual Review Recommendations to review.

Old indicator – Output 3.3	New indicator – Output 3.3
Percentage of target audience reporting an improvement in quality and relevance of business coverage (project-supported media products)	Number of ENABLE2 supported products or known copycats which improve number of active listeners [by] at least 10% since the programme was launched.

Table 25: Changes to Output 3.3

The proposed indicator will serve as a proxy for quality of project-supported media products by assessing the percentage increase in the overall audience size and the type of listeners/readers. Previous indicator of satisfaction was of a very small number of listeners, whereas the existing national Media Product Survey provided more accurate results.

Old indicator – Output 4.3	New indicator – Output 4.3
Percentage of advocacy organisations, MDAs and media houses expressing satisfaction with research and information accessed from project-supported research providers in the year	Business environment research quality index

Table 26: Changes to Output 4.3

The business environment research quality index quantifies the perception of business environment research users (i.e. advocacy organisations, MDAs, media houses etc.) and

research experts (independent) regarding the quality and utility of business environment research products produced by ENABLE2 research institution partners.

Other changes to the logframe included increasing the 2016 Media Output 3.1 target from 7 to 8 due to the component performance, and changing the MDA risk rating from 'high' to 'severe' due to several political economy issues; the absence of President, vacant posts of State Level officials in key partnerships and government funding reduced during recession.

5.2.2. Logframe reflections

Beyond logframe amendments, reflections on logframe design and its influence on programme delivery conclude the following:

The outreach and income targets need to better reflect the realities of implementing reform. The programme exceeded its target of 11 reforms, yet a majority of these need to move from reform on paper to implementation. Implementation may include activities such as the government recruiting and training staff or construction of new buildings. In cases such as taxation, a new financial year may be required before change affects beneficiaries. In many cases, government requires further support from development partners to implement reforms. The lesson for ENABLE2, is that there is a delay between reform on paper and implementation and that moving from reform on paper to micro-enterprises benefiting requires further inputs, which would not be captured in the existing logframe.

The logframe design (linked to the payment by results framework) encouraged investment in outputs over impact. As only one practice change could be recorded per partner as an output, the logframe pushed the programme to continue to invest in new partnerships each successive year. Each new partner would likely select a new business environment reform it would wish to pursue. This effectively spread the programme thinly across multiple issue and multiple partners. At the end of Year 3, ENABLE2 was working on over 15 potential reforms, almost all of which implementation and sustainability would require further support. We believe this is the upper limit of what is feasible for the programme's size, in both its financial and core team resources becoming overstretched. If the programme continued into Years 4 and 5, it is likely we would be too thinly spread to push forward effective reform.

In future logframe design, DfID and other development partners should incentivise systemic change through reporting multiple outputs per partner. In addition, reducing the target number of reforms and reporting impact in Years 4 and 5 would allow more focus on bringing reform from paper to implementation.

5.3. Sustainability

Sustainability is central to our approach and measurement of partners' practice changes. Component specific considerations are covered in Section 4 (Outputs). This section offers lessons programme-wide learning on what has helped and hindered the sustainability of practice changes. The section ends with some brief reflections on factors favouring and risking the sustainability of reforms.

5.3.1. Factors aiding the sustainability of practice changes and dialogue platforms

- > **Avoiding grants.** ENABLE 1's Project Completion Review recommended ENABLE2 preserving the approach of only giving technical assistance, not grants.³⁰ ENABLE2 has done this, and the approach remains a strength. By clarifying that grants are not on offer, ENABLE2 avoids partnering with officials whose main motivation is to access donor money (and who may only pretend to share the programme's objectives in order to get that money). In some instances ENABLE2 has exited partnerships quickly when it is clear the main driver of cooperation was anticipation of donor funds, for examples Kano State Radio and Women's Farmers Association of Nigeria.
- > **Rolling exits.** ENABLE2 continued to monitor its partners after they changed practice, to see if they sustained changes introduced with programme support. Where former ENABLE2 partners encountered problems, which could be solved with further, light support, the programme has from time to time assisted.³¹

5.3.2. Challenges and risks to the sustainability of practice changes and dialogue platforms

Changes in leadership. Although ENABLE2 made progress in establishing a culture and practice of consultation in the Nigerian civil service, civil servants who value consultation remain a minority. Thus when the civil servants ENABLE has worked with are replaced, which can be often, ENABLE2 has had to help their replacements to see the value of consultation. The programme considered partnering with civil service training colleges to train the "mass" of civil servants; the idea was abandoned due to early closure as it would have taken several years to implement. With ENABLE no longer around to train civil servants on consultation, the risk is that new leadership might therefore revert to the "bad old ways". To mitigate this, ENABLE2 is engaging with PERL to see if they can continue this work.

5.3.3. Sustainability of reforms and their impact

Risks are lower where there is cross-party support. Many of the reforms ENABLE2 has supported are at low risk of reversal following a change in administration. The Competition Bill, for example, has attracted cross-party support. Meanwhile, reforms such as renovating Katsina Central Market and allowing mechanics to road-test vehicles are uncontroversial and would require no further action from a future administration. The risk is higher for reforms which require ongoing implementation and which are driven partly by the priorities of the incumbent administration – Responsible Agricultural Investment in Jigawa for example.

Risks are higher where reforms require ongoing spending commitments. For example, in Jigawa, current or future administrations may decide to stop subsidising the standard-size bowls used by market traders (but could continue to enforce their standardisation). Equally, rising federal government debt levels threaten continued government subsidies to domestic manufacturing via its Made in Nigeria policy.

Risks are lower as advocacy organisation partners defend reforms. Many business environment programmes rely on their in-house experts or institutional clout to press for reforms. When the programme ends, the pressure ends, and the risk of reversal is high. ENABLE is different.

³⁰ 'ENABLE [1] developed an enviable reputation amongst partners for not providing grants. This was one of the strengths of the programme and a foundation for its success. It should not be compromised.' Source: ENABLE1 Project Completion Review.

³¹ For example, when the Ministry of Commerce in Kaduna saw its Commissioner (the official in charge) replaced, staff at first struggled to explain to the new Commissioner the value of hosting a public-private dialogue. ENABLE2 encouraged the staff to persevere in making the case of public-private dialogue. In July 2017 they reported that the planned event has since been given the go-ahead.

ENABLE's contributions to reforms are through partners; the same Nigerian media, research and advocacy organisations which persuade government to reform will remain after the programme ends and will see it as their role to defend the reforms. This is a key strength in our approach. The Equipment Leasing Association of Nigeria is evidence of this; during the hiatus between ENABLE1 and ENABLE2, the programme partner advocated against the repeal of legislation it had advocated for during ENABLE1.

5.4. Replication

5.4.1. What we mean by replication and why it matters

When an ENABLE2 partner changes practice, sets up a dialogue platform or passes a reform, this can inspire others to copy them. We call this 'replication'.

Replication is an important goal of Market Systems programmes. Often referred to as 'crowding in', it matters for several reasons:

- > **Scale:** when replicators improve their practices, set up a dialogue platform or pass a reform they contribute to the programme's results.
- > **Sustainability:** replicators improve practice without direct ENABLE2 support, or with less support than the programme's initial partners. As they depend less on ENABLE2, they are likelier to continue the practice change after ENABLE2 ends.
- > **Value for money:** when replicators achieve results with little or no direct support from ENABLE2, they improve the programme's value for money.

5.4.2. ENABLE2's replication strategy

Within each intervention, ENABLE2 pursued two generic strategies for replication. This first strategy involved promoting replication through a demonstration effect. This was the most common replication strategy. This strategy involves working with one or more 'first movers' to demonstrate that change is both feasible and beneficial to the organisation (proof of concept). Similar organisations would then notice and replicate the change (either 'organically', with no programme support, or with limited programme support). For this strategy to work a number of assumptions need to hold:

- > Success in first movers is visible to second movers;
- > Second movers attribute success in first movers to the adoption of the practice change;
- > Second movers have sufficient incentives and capacity to replicate the change;
- > Second movers have access to the know-how (a 'transition mechanism' exists)

The second strategy was to work with 'scale-agents' who have the capacity and incentive to promote change among other organisations. For example, Media Planning Services, which provides audience research to a large number of media houses in Nigeria. By working with a scale-agent it is possible to leverage their footprint and networks to reach a large number of connected organisations.

5.4.3. How we measure and categorise replication

ENABLE2 starts by defining what can be replicated. For each component we define which specific practices the programme wants to promote.³² We also define which reforms we want these practice changes to directly contribute to. ENABLE2 then looks out for instances where non-partners have adopted the same practice change, set up a similar dialogue platform or made progress towards a similar reform.³³

ENABLE2 distinguishes between different types of replication, depending on who the replicator is and whether they received ENABLE2 support. Figure 15 below explains the different categories used by the programme.

	Spontaneous	Supported
Internal	Same partner – different unit / team Launched without support from ENABLE	Same partner – different unit / team Launched with (limited) support from ENABLE
External	Different partner or non-partner Launched without support from ENABLE	Different partner or non-partner Launched with (limited) support from ENABLE

Figure 15: Replication categories

5.4.4. ENABLE2's replication results

The table below shows instances of replication which, at the time of writing, have been validated by the measuring and results measurement team. Practice changes are in purple, dialogue platforms and business environment media products are in blue, and reforms in green. Details of each replication can be provided on request.

	Spontaneous (Launched without support from ENABLE)	Supported (Launched with ENABLE2 support)
Internal (Same partner – different unit team)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Freedom Radio Kano and Liberty Media replicate improved marketing practices from their business environment-related radio programmes. Applying the same improved marketing practices across their radio and TV stations. Liberty Media replicates content research, script-writing and better planning from its business environment radio programme. For example, Liberty TV adopts these good practices in a new agriculture focused programme. Jigawa State Radio and Freedom Radio Kaduna replicate content research practices from their 	<p><i>Projected in 2018:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Daily Trust in-house training team improve journalism practices across newspaper. QBWA's state-level advocacy officers apply improved advocacy practices learned from national-level advocacy officers.

³² For example, the Media Component supports and persuades media houses to change the following practices: using audience feedback to improve content and marketing; conducting more and better content research; making radio and TV more inter-active; make reporting more balanced; including women and poor men's perspectives; presenting the programme better (e.g. through scripting and improved sound aesthetics) and; reporting more from rural and peri-urban areas.

³³ More detail on how ENABLE2 assesses attribution for suspected replication is available on request.

	<p>business programmes. Improving the content research behind other radio programmes. Jigawa State Radio also replicates issue-based journalism practices.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Following ENABLE2 capacity building, Express FM began reporting from rural and peri-urban areas for its first business radio programme.³⁴ Express FM then set up a second business radio programme, replicating the practice of field-based reporting. 	
External (Different partner or non-partner)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Group replicates NASME's improved advocacy practices, persuades Federal Government to tax medicine imports. • ENABLE2-trained radio producers leave Kaduna State Media Corporation (KSMC), moving to Queen FM. There, they launch a new business related programme, featuring the good practices ENABLE2 helped them to adopt at KSMC. • With ENABLE2 support, the Daily Trust became Nigeria's first national newspaper to introduce a dedicated agriculture section. Newspaper bosses felt that an agriculture section would be unprofitable. Yet the Daily Trust's agriculture section soon became popular and attracted sponsors. Soon after, two more national newspapers, Leadership and The Nation launched agricultural pages. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Almost all the practice changes ENABLE2 partners adopted were first piloted during ENABLE1. Often in Lagos, where partners had stronger capacity and motivation to test new ways of working. • Katsina, Kano and Kaduna start to copy Jigawa's weights and measure standardisation pilot • Katsina Traders' Association, Women's Economic Empowerment Organisation and Katsina Ministry of Commerce launch Gender and Business dialogues, emulating programme partners in Kaduna.

Table 27: Overall replication results

³⁴ Before ENABLE2 intervened, Express's business journalists mainly interacted with businesspeople near their inner-city office, as these were the most convenient people to interview. As a result, the views of and problems affecting peri-urban and rural women and men were underreported

5.4.5. Lessons learned

ENABLE2 anticipated replication to occur in Years 4 and 5 as more partners improve advocacy and achieve results in the business environment sphere. However, the last year of ENABLE2 has been successful in garnering replication of practice changes and we have assessed our findings. Below are some key lessons:

- > **Media houses have acted fastest in copying innovations.** Some possible explanations are as follows. Firstly, media products are highly visible to competitors and relatively easy to reverse-engineer. Secondly, media houses are more commercially minded than advocacy organisations, MDAs and research institutions, and compete with each other more directly than do ENABLE2's partners in other components. Thirdly, staff turnover is frequent in the media sector; in the case of Queen FM this served to spread practice change.
- > **ENABLE2 did little to support partners to replicate practices internally.** ENABLE2 has made some investments here, supporting the Daily Trust to set up an in-house training team to spread good journalism practices, and supporting QBWA's national advocacy officers to replicate advocacy training with state-level counterparts.³⁵ ENABLE2 could have done more, but is not directed in its logframe to promote internal replication – with the exception of the Media Component.³⁶ Instead, ENABLE2's logframe and output-based payment system encourage the programme to move to new partners after supporting an initial practice change. In some ways this is unfortunate, as supporting internal replication can often improve the sustainability of practice changes.
- > **Advocacy organisations *can* replicate each other's practice changes.** In the case of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Group, this happened because one of its most influential members was also the president of a second advocacy organisation, the ENABLE2 partner NASME. At NASME he learned and applied good advocacy practices, before introducing the same to the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Group. However, beyond this case of an advocacy organisation leader who was influential in two different associations, we have not identified cases of spontaneous replication between advocacy organisations.

5.5. Adaptive management and payment by results

The ENABLE2 programme's market systems-driven approach lends itself to a number of adaptive management principles. These principles involve the use of an adaptive, flexible and socially entrepreneurial approach. Following the successful use of this management strategy during ENABLE1, ENABLE2 has further embedded, into its approach, the strategy of acting as a facilitator that catalyses changes in performance, strengthening the capacity, incentives, and relationships of system actors as opposed to displacing them.

Based on this adaptive approach, our team of facilitators take calculated risks, carefully monitor results, and use learnings from successes and failures to inform and modify our strategy.

³⁵ As these are recent developments, it is too early to verify practice change, however

³⁶ The Media Component has an indicator measuring the number of media products improving, as well as the number of partners. Other components' output indicators focus on the number of partners.

The programme has also deployed a portfolio approach by dropping unsuccessful partnerships in order to focus effort and resources on those partnerships most likely to deliver results and catalyse systemic change.

5.5.1. Political Economy

The programme regularly used five types of political economy analysis to inform and adapt its interventions. Below we describe each type, and how we used it.

Federal and state-level political economy analysis. When designing the programme we analysed the political economy in each focal state and at the federal level. Our assessment informed how we prioritised states and how we operated within them. Specifically, we prioritised our effort across the states based on two criteria:

- > **Need:** States were rated as having a higher need if they have high poverty rates, a less favourable business environment for informal micro-enterprises, a large population of informal micro-enterprises, and a weak level of Public-Private Dialogue.
- > **Feasibility:** States were rated as having high feasibility if they have a large number of proactive and credible actors across each of the four components (drivers of change), and a supportive political economy.


As a result of our assessment we decided not to intervene in Zamfara. While Zamfara scored highly on need, it also scored exceptionally lowly on feasibility, with very little political will for reform, little government motivation and capacity, little space for public-private dialogue and limited media freedom.

We updated our state-level analysis after gubernatorial and presidential elections in 2015. A comprehensive engagement strategy was developed with DfID to keep ENABLE2 interventions and partners engaged.³⁷ Changes in the feasibility ratings led ENABLE2 to change its strategy; dropping plans to intervene in Zamfara, reducing footprint in Kano and increasing investment in activity in Kaduna and Federal level.

Figure 16 below shows how ENABLE2's State Need and Feasibility analysis from changed over time. This assessment is broadly consistent with our actual experience of feasibility during programme implementation, giving credence to the rigour of our assessment. For instance, the Federal level and Kaduna State, which scored highest on feasibility, have passed the most reforms.³⁸

³⁷ See Self- Assessment Report Year 2 for more information on post-election government engagement strategy.

³⁸ Here we refer to the reforms supported by ENABLE2.



FED = Federal government; JIG = Jigawa; KAD = Kaduna; KAN = Kano; KAT = Katsina;
JIG = Jigawa

Figure 16: ENABLE2's State need and feasibility analysis, January 2015 (left) and September 2015 (right)

Partner-level political economy analysis. Before offering capacity building to an MDA, advocacy organisation, research institution or media house, we conducted a diagnostic study. This study assessed the potential partner's current performance on consultation, advocacy, research or media product quality. Our diagnosis included an assessment of two "micro" political economy factors: internal governance (for advocacy organisations and media) and presence of "champions" for change. Our findings informed whether to partner with the organisation under review, and which types of support to offer. For example, our diagnosis of the Master Bakers' and Caterers' Association found that its leaders were unelected, and this reduced the association's legitimacy and thus its ability to advocate. ENABLE2 subsequently built the association's capacity to organise elections.³⁹

ENABLE2 analysed political economy factors affecting the feasibility of specific business environment reforms. Our analysis was informed by key informant interviews and at times by stakeholder mapping. We used this analysis when deciding which reforms to prioritise (and therefore which partnerships to continue). For example, based on our political economy analysis we decided to avoid working with ENABLE1 partner LAPAN because the reform under review had too many powerful opponents.⁴⁰

Additionally, when ENABLE2's early closure was announced, we reassessed which business environment reforms to prioritise, again considering political economy factors affecting reforms' feasibility. Our findings informed which partnerships we exited quickly and how much we invested in the remaining partnerships.

Monitoring and responding to changes. Politics can change fast; receiving regular political economy updates has therefore been important to the programme. We developed a system to receive regular updates from three sources: State Coordinators, Observation Diaries and the Business Environment Media Monitoring team. The role of each information source is explained briefly below.

³⁹ The Master Bakers used ENABLE2's support to hold their first ever elections, in 2017

⁴⁰ The programme reviewed the feasibility of achieving reform or replacement of the government's Leather Export Expansion Grant. The scheme was reportedly prone to corruption and to late payment by government. Large tanneries captured the grants, giving them a perceived unfair advantage over their smaller competitors. Large tanneries would probably have blocked efforts to change this, alongside those in government who benefited from the current arrangements.

- > **State Coordinators** report regularly to the Deputy Team Leader on relevant political and economic changes in their state. The Deputy Team Leader passes on key insights to the relevant colleagues.
- > **Observation Diaries:** programme staff and consultants are required to report on events they attend and other significant changes they observe using a standard template called an Observation Diary which includes a section for political economy observations. The KRM team and relevant component leads automatically receive consultants' Observation Diaries once entered into the system. This has not always worked seamlessly, but when it does, Component Managers get almost real-time political economy updates.
- > **Business Environment Media Monitoring:** this ENABLE2 team monitors business environment relevant trends in the media, particularly where relevant to the programme's partners and priority reforms. ENABLE2 colleagues receive weekly and monthly summaries as well as flash reports on highly relevant breaking news.

Building advocacy organisations' capacity to analyse the political economy. Finally, we trained each of our advocacy organisation partners to analyse the political economy around their desired reform. Advocacy organisations learned how to map stakeholders and assess each stakeholder's interests in and influence over the relevant reform. We then taught our advocacy organisation partners how to use these insights in forming their advocacy strategy. For example, when advocacy organisations identified other powerful stakeholders that supported their desired reform, they learned to consider advocating alongside their fellow supporters in a coalition.

5.5.2. Payment by Results

As one of DfID Nigeria's first large-scale programmes to substantively take on DfID's Payment-by-Results approach, the programme team has had to work hard to create a model that would most effectively meet the programme's flexible and adaptive approach while also delivering results. DfID and ASI began by developing a set of criteria for ENABLE2's Payment-By-Results Model:

- > A clear link between results and reward is required
- > Agreement on activity plans and delivery should be ensured on a quarterly, rather than ongoing basis
- > Payments should be linked to the delivery of packages of work that contribute to the achievement of logframe outputs
- > Delivery of log frame outputs can be expected both within one quarter and/or over many quarters, and thus flexibility in approach is vital.
- > As an Output-based Project, the Service Provider was entitled to have control and oversight of all project inputs once outputs are agreed.

With this in mind, the programme designed a commercial process centred on a series of component-level milestones - budgeted, approved and delivered on a quarterly basis. However, by the end of Year 1 it had become clear that a quarterly milestone and budgeting system was untenable for a programme with ENABLE's flexible facility. The budgeting and milestone approval processes were causing significant administrative bottlenecks and delays for both DfID and the programme team. With 98 milestones to deliver, innovation was being lost and the team was unable to support partners in a dynamic manner as all efforts were focused on achieving output targets. This hindered the programme's ability to take on partner priorities

without being tied to delivering planned activities that might have lost relevance as the partnership progressed during the quarter. That system also severely limited risk taking and encouraged conservative planning for short-term, achievable deliverables.

Based on these challenges, ASI and DfID Nigeria agreed to revise the payment-by-results model in Year 2 with less of a focus on milestones and more of a focus on flexibility and higher level results. For example, it was agreed that the programme would reserve the ability to change and redeploy technical and financial inputs between partnerships and activities, without requiring DfID approval. By agreeing upon iterative roadmap budgets for partnerships and milestone targets on an annual (rather than quarterly) basis, DfID and the ENABLE2 programme team was able to agree on the broad nature and level of technical and financial support required for each component in the programme year.

Payments would be made according to the programme’s achievement of already agreed upon log-frame output level targets (or milestones) across the 4 components. This approach was better suited to the programmes’ partner-driven, adaptive approach and has helped to ensure that partnerships and investments can be quickly scaled up or down to allow for more efficient opportunities, while still maintaining high degrees of accountability.




Figure 17: Milestones billed per component (left) and per year (right)

This capacity to scale up and down according to changes in partnerships and the wider business environment can be seen when comparing the projected and actual spend on partnerships in Years 2 and 3 of the programme. In both years⁴¹, the programme has spent within 0.001% of its total approved managed fund budget⁴². However, as shown in Figure 18, ENABLE2 substantially scaled up investments with various partners, whilst substantially scaling down inputs with others.

Along with increased efficiency and effectiveness of allocating resources across the portfolios, we have also been able to use this data to learn and improve programme management systems, budgeting processes, and partner assessments. These learnings are evidenced in the improved accuracy the programme has gained in budgeting for its yearly inputs. For instance,

⁴¹ Year 3 Spend is projected, based on contracted work up to the end of September 2017

⁴² Fees Only

in Year 2 more than 90% of the actual spend on various partnerships deviated significantly from what was originally budgeted (Figure 18). However in Y3, about 50% of the partnership budgets came within close range of the forecast. This was in part due to having focused and more consolidated partnerships, however, this was also influenced significantly by more rigorous internal management systems.




Figure 18: Projected versus actual spend, in Years 2 and 3.

However, despite the successes achieved through the programme’s ‘Roadmap’ Payment-By-Results Model, there have still been challenges in making Payment-By-Results truly optimal. For example in Years 2 and 3, significant time had to still be invested in ensuring that the programme could meet additional reporting requirements- the average length of a milestone report was between 6-7 pages and frequently required multiple rounds of revisions and clarifications. This caused a significant reduction in the programme’s efficiency. In addition, while budgetary shifts no longer required prior approval, addition of new interventions or consultants at the input-level still required prior approval from DfID and in many cases led to bottlenecks and delays in activities. The overall effect was that the programme’s capacity to be opportunistic was limited.

However, perhaps the key challenge in how ENABLE2’s work to align Payment-By-Results with the Adaptive Management principles is in the model’s focus on discrete output-level results as opposed to wider systemic change. By placing a commercial focus on planning, budgeting, delivering and reporting on output-level results, there is a risk that the opportunities for innovation, risk-taking and adaptation have been de-prioritised. By placing a level of substantial commercial risk on the achievement of pre-determined output-level results, the programme has had to work to maximise its output-level targets, irrespective of where they may come from.

5.6. Collaboration

ENABLE2 has been well positioned to benefit from collaboration with eleven or more DfID programmes, across multiple areas. Collaborations are outlined below, followed by an assessment of the drivers and barriers for programmes working together.

5.6.1. Collaboration with other programmes

Programme	Issue	Details
Deepening Democracy in Nigeria (DDiN)	National Assembly Business Environment Roundtables (NASSBER)	ENABLE2 has worked with the DDiN and Promoting Good Governance And Citizen Access programmes to understand better the legislative process and associated risks. This has led to better intervention planning.
Growth and Employment in States 3 (GEMS3)	NASSBER	ENABLE2 through NASSBER worked on identification of priority bills and strategy for the Senate and National Assembly. GEMS3 provided joint funding of research and technical inputs into the following bills: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Competition Bill • Secured Transactions and Movable Assets Act • Credit Reporting Act
	Responsible agricultural investment (RAI)	GEMS3 worked with Jigawa State Government on a framework and principles of RAI. One principle involved communication and community participation. ENABLE2 worked with InvestJigawa on improving the state government's dialogue with affected communities.
	Kaduna State tax harmonisation	Advocacy for tax reform was supported in the first phase of ENABLE. GEMS3 worked on drafting a tax harmonisation bill. ENABLE2 continued advocacy support to raise awareness with the new Governor and support awareness of implementation.
Mafita		ENABLE2 has introduced Mafita to our partners, the Nigerian Automobiles Technicians Association (NATA) Kaduna and the Master Bakers and Caterers' Association. They are exploring opportunities for mechanics and bakers to gain formal, recognised vocational qualifications. In July 2017, Mafita began a diagnostic assessment of NATA, a potential step towards partnership. Mafita have also held several meetings with the Master Bakers.
Nigerian Infrastructure Advisory Facility 2 (NIAF2)	Federal Roads Authority Bill and Roads Fund Bill	As a result of ENABLE2's support to NASSBER, NIAF2 was invited to provide technical submissions on the infrastructure bills. Both bills at the time of writing have reached the third reading in both Houses of the National Assembly.
	Kaduna and Kano State infrastructure bills	ENABLE2 helped trade unions and business organisations prepare advocacy positions on the Kaduna and Kano Infrastructure bills prepared by NIAF2. In Kaduna this bill has now become law.
Propcom Maikarfi	Value chain training for	An ENABLE2 partner, Daily Trust Newspaper, in collaboration with Propcom Maikarfi, organised a value chain training

	regional reporters	session for reporters to improve the quality of business issue coverage.
	Secured Transactions and Movable Asset Bill (STMA)	Propcom Maikarfi see the STMA Bill as having potential to boost lending opportunities to the agricultural sector. They are investigating ways to support this.
The Partnership to Reform, Engage and Learn (PERL)	Capacity building and partner identification	PERL is interested in using ENABLE2's 'how to' guides on advocacy and community journalism as a resource for their partners. ENABLE2 partners still working towards reform will also be flagged to ECP as potential partners for them to work with.
State Partnership for Accountability, Responsiveness and Capability (SPARC)	Development of agricultural strategy for Jigawa	ENABLE2 and SPARC jointly facilitated agriculture policy development, through a series of workshops, consultations and research. ENABLE2 also provided some support to farmers' organisations.
Other Department for International Development and Business Environment Programmes		ENABLE2 worked with the following programmes to share lessons learned, provide strategic advice and help develop logframe and measurement tools. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Zimbisa: ENABLE2 media component and project manager provided strategic inputs on component strategy and Value for Money Metrics. Zimbisa Team Leader provide inputs into the ENABLE2 Strategic Review • Essor in the Democratic Republic of Congo consulted ENABLE2 on logframe design and adopted several of our indicators. • Sierra Leone Business Advocacy updated their measurement tools based ENABLE2 experience, specifically around measuring effectiveness of PPDs • Kuza in Kenya and Business Sector Advocacy Challenge Fund engaged in peer learning with ENABLE2 Advocacy component.

Table 28: ENABLE2 issue-based collaboration with other programmes

5.6.2. Lessons learned

We believe that the drivers and barriers of collaboration are important to understand and learn from. We conclude that the main drivers of collaboration are:

- > **Shared Implementer:** ENABLE2's largest collaboration was with Growth and Employment in States 3 (GEMS3). Both programmes are implemented by Adam Smith International (ASI).⁴³ The programmes shared the same Project Director and Project Managers. The Team Leader of ENABLE2 was previously the Regional Manager GEMS3. This provided for an open dialogue between the two programmes and a stronger understanding of each programme's strengths, goals and objectives. Key learnings about partners or political economy were quickly shared. Short term consultants would work for both programmes with relative ease. Finally, both programmes shared the same offices in Abuja and Kano.

⁴³ ENABLE2 is co-implemented by ASI and The Springfield Centre.

This proximity allowed collaborations to flow naturally, without the need for formal meetings or travelling. Speedy resolutions and quick information sharing were much greater in this environment. Ultimately, this encouraged trust and a stake in each programme's respective activities succeeding when they led to a shared goal, such as the passage of the Competition Bill.

The benefits outlined above could also be seen in our collaboration with Nigerian Infrastructure Advisory Facility 2 (NIAF2) and Mafita, despite neither being business environment nor market systems programmes. Similar sharing of expertise, relationships and resources materialised. Outside of Nigeria, ASI recommended ENABLE2 to Zimbisa in Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone Opportunities for Business Action (SOBA) and Kuza in Kenya as a programme that could share examples of success and lessons learned. This led to several information sharing opportunities, as well as peer learning between Zimbisa and ENABLE2.

- > **Collaboration set as a high priority and need for technical expertise on business environment issues:** The Senior Management Team set collaboration as a priority for the programme. This was in part driven by ENABLE2's facilitative approach and the general principle that collaboration is in DfID's interest. However, the SMT also recognised that existing programmes had expertise in business environment issues. Rather than duplicate efforts, ENABLE2 sought to leverage on existing expertise.

However, barriers to collaboration are also worth noting, as other programmes may be facing similar constraints.

- > **Prioritising systemic change over direct delivery:** ENABLE2 puts emphasis on systemic change, in most cases advising partners to lead activities and find solutions rather relying on continued development aid. In some cases, potential collaborations with other DfID programmes have not been pursued to avoid undermining partners' ownership and sustainability. For example, Liberty Radio funding for the Village Forum concept was discussed with PERL, however ENABLE2 encouraged Liberty to raise funds through advertising revenue. They succeeded and therefore support from PERL was not required. In the National Assembly, ENABLE2 encouraged a balanced approach: asking development partners to focus on technical submissions to committees rather than wholesale drafting of legislation. The latter, more direct approach, may have been speedier but would have detracted from NASSBER ownership.
- > **Programme Business Plan Cycles:** On several occasions ENABLE2 has not been able to adapt to requests from DfID or other programmes for inputs as it came after ENABLE2's budget and business plan approval. Equally, ENABLE2 has brought issues to the table that other programmes did not have the resources to take on.
- > **ENABLE2 Theory of Change:** On several occasions ENABLE2 has declined collaborating with another programme as the approach they took fell outside ENABLE2's theory of change. For example: GEMS3's request to ENABLE2 to train Kaduna Board of Internal Revenue on PAYE Tax Systems will make it easier for medium and large enterprises and employees to pay their tax. Despite ENABLE2 having a relationship with the bureau, a solid reputation in Kaduna and an interest in improving the business environment, the activities would not fit ENABLE2's Theory of Change. In these cases, even when activities benefited the business environment, it could not be recorded in our logframe.

5.6.3. Did Collaboration enhance programme delivery?

We feel that collaboration has increased the odds of success in some key reforms. Particularly in taxation in Kaduna and converting bills into laws at the National Assembly. The largest impact reforms that ENABLE2 has contributed to have all come after collaboration with another programme in some form.

In Kaduna, it is unlikely the tax harmonisation bill would have been as high quality if GEMS3 inputs had not been supplied. Conversely, without ENABLE2's partners advocacy the bill may have not made it into implementation. At the National Assembly, the Competition and Infrastructure Bills had not been passed despite several years of attempts. The technical inputs of NIAF and GEMS3 improved the quality of the bills to the extent that they could be more widely accepted by members of both Houses; while ENABLE2's support to NASSBER improved the consultation and ownership by the National Assembly.

Recommendations to DfID and other development partners are to create incentives for cross programme collaboration. Some thoughts on incentives to encourage programmes to work together are:

- > Programmes with logframes that target similar beneficiaries or impact will find it easier to collaborate, such as micro-enterprises or number of jobs.
- > Programmes which collocate together will also improve linkages
- > Planning in consultation with other programmes before annual business plans and budgets are approved will also ensure that resources are available for joint ventures.

5.7. Lessons learned from Phase 1

Although there was a high degree of continuity in the basic strategy and approach of ENABLE 1 and 2, several innovations were introduced at the start of ENABLE2 in response to important lessons learned.

Developing state-level strategies. Although ENABLE1 had a clearly delineated geographic focus, strategy development was always at the component level. During the design for ENABLE2 it was felt necessary to overlay component-level strategies with state-level strategies. This was for two reasons. Firstly, without a state focus it was hard to integrate political economy considerations into programme decision-making, for example how much resourcing to devote to partners in new focal states Katsina and Zamfara, or whether a state coordinator for each state was justified.

Secondly, under ENABLE1, it was recognised that reform efforts were more likely to succeed if partners from multiple components 'crowded-in' around a business environment issue, covering both the 'demand' and 'supply' side of reform. Under ENABLE1 this happened fortuitously (without conscious thought); to increase the likelihood of this happening, ENABLE2 consciously sought to ensure a balanced portfolio within each state. During the ENABLE2 inception phase, the programme therefore undertook state-level diagnostics for the first time, and developed a state-level prioritisation matrix. Partnership decisions were not made in isolation within each component, but were made in a joined-up manner looking at the balance of the partnership portfolio in each state. In practice this worked well. The spread of each components partners in states reflects the state prioritisation analysis and there is no state where one component is working individually.

Adopting a hybrid strategy in business environment issue selection. Under ENABLE1 the programme was firmly agnostic in regard to the particular business environment issues chosen

by partners. It was felt that to achieve local ownership, partners should be given full autonomy to select whatever issues they wanted – although ENABLE1 would be free to decline to support a given organisation if the chosen issue was self-evidently counterproductive to ENABLE1's overall pro-poor objectives, in practice ENABLE1 did not undertake any serious ex-ante analysis to understand the likely impact of a particular issue or advocacy position or actively try to shape issue selection within partners (other than promoting general good practice, such as consulting with members). This changed under ENABLE2 for three reasons.

Firstly, ENABLE found that partners are often not good at selecting business environment issues that are well defined and feasible to address. For example, grassroots advocacy organisations would often pick 'access to finance' as a business environment issue, which is too all encompassing to tackle in one go, and is too ambitious for the typical grassroots advocacy organisation to tackle. ENABLE2 therefore took a more hands-on role in working with advocacy organisations to shape their issue selection whilst still maintaining local ownership and not imposing an agenda.

Secondly, reflecting on the observation above regarding the crowding-in of organisations around a particular issue, ENABLE2 decided to be more proactive in selecting high-impact, high-feasibility issues to target. ENABLE2 still maintained its behind-the-scenes facilitation principles and did not actively advocate itself on these issues; instead it set-up a cross-component collaboration model (initially termed Business Environment Reform Working Groups) to help encourage more crowding-in from across the components around target issues. For example, this might involve linking relevant advocacy organisations with a media partner that was investigating a particular issue, or helping stakeholders to form an issue-based coalition. Adding an issue-focus also helped ENABLE2 get tighter on likely impacts of given reforms, using ex-ante impact assessment, and likely feasibility of reforms, using political economy tools such as the power-interest matrix.

Thirdly, linked to the above, having a clear focus in terms of priority business environment issues was also designed to aid collaboration with other programmes (who often had an issue-focus), and to better communicate likely impacts and contribution narratives to DfID.

As the programme moved from outputs to impact, the third aspect became the most important driver of business environment selection, and even more so with early closure. After the programme's early closure was announced, resources were reallocated towards priority reforms. These reforms were selected based on criteria such as the reform's projected outreach, contributions to increasing micro-enterprises' and workers' incomes, feasibility, benefits to women and value for money.

Less focus on market-based solutions and more focus on non-market based, low-cost solutions.

Under ENABLE1 a number of attempts were made to catalyse market-based solutions for certain 'supporting functions', most notably research (but also media relations and other services). Although some successes were achieved, it was noted by programme staff and in the ENABLE1 Project Completion Review that outside of Lagos, the ability and willingness to pay for these solutions among both advocacy organisations and state-level MDAs were weak. In the case of research, relatively high levels of cost-share were still required to support the commissioning of bespoke research by advocacy organisations or MDAs, with only a few examples of a partner paying the full cost. As ENABLE2 dropped Lagos as a focal state, and added two Northern states with very low levels of capacity, and reflecting on the successes and failures of ENABLE1, it was recognised that the programme would need to reduce its focus on promoting market-based solutions and instead explore non-market based, low-cost

solutions. For example, ENABLE2 piloted a university placement scheme, and supported a number of advocacy organisation partners to test member-led research, to provide a low-cost solution to the provision of research.

In reflection there have been some moderate successes in the engagement of media. Advocacy organisations and MDAs have managed to engage the media in a non-pay to play model to raise awareness of business environment issues and solutions. On the other hand, low-cost access to research has not been sustained. The pilot university scheme has struggled to find a funding source even with ENABLE2 assistance in scoping. This is despite positive feedback from our partners that had access to the placement scheme. Research providers remain weak and costly for advocacy organisations and MDAs in the north. ENABLE2 attempts to move their focus from international development partners to the local market have met a lacklustre reception.

Improving gender and social inclusion outcomes. One weakness of ENABLE1 was the sophistication of its gender and social inclusion strategy. ENABLE1 only developed a gender strategy towards the end of the programme, and because of its agnosticism regarding business environment issues and lack of ex-ante impact assessment the programme was not always good at articulating how it would promote improved dialogue and reform for the poor in particular. ENABLE2 therefore put increased emphasis on gender and social inclusion within state and component level strategies, for example by developing a better understanding of which economic sectors are most relevant to the poor in different states, deliberately partnering with women's organisations and grassroots organisations where possible, and targeting business environment issues of high relevance to large numbers of micro-enterprises (a proxy for poor entrepreneurs).

The Output, Outcome and Impact sections show that a substantial number of partners, PPDs and business environment reforms have focus on pro-poor and gender issues. This reflects the programmes ability to mainstream gender and social inclusion. However, lessons learned show that the issues that women's groups championed tended to be smaller in impact outreach. On the other hand, national or state level reforms tended to bring benefits to more women than smaller reforms, but tended to benefit fewer women than men.

6. Monitoring results measurement and Value for Money

6.1. Monitoring and results measurement

This section outlines the Knowledge and Results Measurement (KRM) team's key activities over the lifetime of the programme. The main changes to the KRM system have been driven by lessons learned, DfID recommendations, logframe indicator revisions and changes to standards for best practice.

6.1.1. Systems

Our KRM system had three main goals:

- > Reporting on programme achievements;
- > Supporting implementation, management and finance teams to improve their performance by providing results updates; and
- > Regulating communications within the team.

The KRM system was designed in accordance with the Donor Committee for Enterprise Development's (DCED) standards, and provided all delivery teams with near real-time data. The system was an integral feature of overall programme operations, playing a role in defining the rules and procedures for implementation and data collection. Senior Management personnel advised on, oversaw and approved all the main elements of the system.

6.1.2. KRM processes

Two main documents guided the implementation of the KRM system: ENABLE2's Operations Manual and the KRM guidelines. In Year 2, the programme developed new procedures to manage the challenges and information needs that ENABLE2 was encountering during implementation. Specifically, the original system was not well set up to capture a proliferation of activities and results, occurring regularly in a large number of locations. We were in a prime position to undergo and pass a DCED audit, but cancelled these plans as a result of early closure.

6.1.2.1. Observation diary

The observation diary was the programme's central database containing the most up-to-date information about project activities and results. It was developed in Year 2 and has been implemented ever since. The database provides information such as:

- > Logframe indicators
- > PPD reports
- > Activity reports
- > Observations
- > Political economy
- > Lessons learned
- > Partner quotes

The diary was a powerful tool for the ENABLE2 team. All team members could filter information to download partner-specific updates, using these to inform implementation and key decisions such as deepening and exiting of partnerships. The database provided simple links to verification and validation documents, providing significant amounts of context for those less actively involved in the technical management of the project. The diary saved team members administrative reporting time, allowing them to make well-supported assertions without making significant inputs.

There is a still room for improvement in the system. Firstly, better inputs would contribute to better findings. Senior Component Managers and their short-term technical assistance pools switched wholesale to reporting through the observation diaries, incurring not insignificant switching costs as they adapted to the new system. This is easily avoided – implementing such a system at the beginning of a project will reduce the risk of shortfalls in future. Additionally, the system would have benefited from linkages to financial data, providing yet more real-time insights into the value for money of our activities.

6.1.2.2. Data collection

We developed multiple survey tools for our different logframe needs. At the outcome level, we used the PPD utility index to score PPDs across a number of indicators. At the output level, we developed tools that assisted us with keeping track of our components' improvements in performance. The KRM guidelines defined what data collection mechanisms were best suited to specific queries at impact assessment level.

The observation diary also resolved inefficiencies in data collection about activities. By requiring all technical personnel to provide regular updates, the project was able to keep track of its progress more efficiently.

6.1.2.3. Business Environment Media Monitoring

Learning was a priority on ENABLE2. The Business Environment Media Monitoring (BEMM) team was created to strengthen our support to partners by informing management decision-making with live updates, and contributing to MRM. BEMM provided the following support to the programme:

- > Business environment weekly summary: weekly summary of major business environment issues in states and at the federal level
- > #Flash Alerts: real-time alerts when an ENABLE2 partner or issue featured in the media
- > Bespoke research: preliminary desk research on issues, identified by the project or its partners
- > Translation: tracking media logframe indicators through identification and translation.

The BEMM process was reviewed in June 2016 to capture progress to date, lessons learned and opportunities for improvement. The review findings showed several successes in management and value for money (VfM) delivery but also identified areas for improvement. One of the key lessons was the need to improve the tracking of potential replication in locations outside ENABLE2 focal states. We took this feedback on board and have been rewarded with a greater ability to track replication.

6.1.3. Beneficiary feedback

The KRM team developed and improved a beneficiary feedback mechanism in the first two years of the programme. The system separated beneficiaries into two categories: organisations and enterprises. The KRM team urged increased usage of feedback in developing intervention strategies. For example, during our work on Weights and Measures in Jigawa, feedback from traders suggested that implementation of new standards measures was weakening. ENABLE2 used this information to adapt its strategy and work with government partners to address concerns.

6.1.4. Lessons learned and innovations

We can offer the following insights on KRM for M4P business environment projects:

- > Although the KRM system should be one of the primary activities in programme design the system will almost certainly need to continually evolve and adapt to programme needs.
- > Implementation teams must be fully integrated into the processes of data and value for money analysis, if this is to play an active role in their implementation approach. The programme is closing at a very early stage of its attempts to integrate all teams – at closure, most financial and value for money information continues to be calculated by the Senior Management Team.
- > Quality of research from local service providers and consultants is very low, and the KRM team was often required to spend considerable time working with providers to improve their submissions. Internally conducted surveys have proved more cost effective. What this capacity gap has done is highlight the very real need in Nigeria for work similar to that undertaken by our fourth component. While our partners took some positive steps towards producing high-quality information, our overall assessment is that Nigeria's capacity to seek information and answer questions about itself remains limited.