Project Completion Review

Title: Business Innovation Facility (BIF) - Phase 2		
Final Programme Value £ (full life): £29.6m		**Review Date:** March 2020
Programme Code: 114178 - Business Innovation Facility (BIF) 203964 - Business Innovation Facility in Burma	**Start Date:** September 2013	**Final End Date:** December 2019

Summary of Programme Performance

Year	**Jan 15**	**Jan 16**	**Jan 17**	**Jan 18**	**Jan 19**	**Mar 20**
Programme Score	**A**	**A**	**A+**	**A+**	**A+**	**A+**
Risk Rating	**Medium**	**Medium**	**Moderate**	**Moderate**	**Moderate**	**Moderate**

DevTracker Link to Business Case:	https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-114178/documents
DevTracker Link to Log frame:	https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-114178/documents

A: Summary and Overview

Description of programme and what it has achieved

The Business Innovation Facility (BIF) Phase 2 was approved in 2013, and ran from Sept 2013 to December 2019, building on insights gained from a pilot phase between 2010 and 2014. It was implemented by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC).

BIF aimed to identify and address key constraints to inclusive business, a private sector approach to providing goods and services on a commercially viable basis to people at the base of the economic pyramid by making them part of the value chain. It did this through through technical assistance (TA), support to access new technology and develop innovation, market research, collaboration and learning. In doing so, it sought to directly improve the productivity and income of smallholder farmers (SHFs) and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) by developing inclusive supply chains and new products that offered them opportunities as producers and consumers.

BIF had three Windows:

1. Country Window (operational from 2013 in Myanmar and Malawi and 2014 in Nigeria): aimed to improve the lives of the poor through the application of a market systems approach to 11 inclusive business markets:

- Myanmar – garment making, tourism, bamboo.
- Malawi – rice, pigeon peas, pico-solar products (PSP).
- Nigeria – dairy, maize, cassava, aquaculture, information & advisory services.

Target markets in each country were selected on the basis of market failure/gap analysis and BIF's ability to add value in a way that directly benefitted the poor (for example, by increasing agricultural, aquaculture and dairy yields) and/or facilitated their inclusion in SME supply chains (for example as rice paddy outgrowers in Malawi or hatchers of catfish fingerlings in Nigeria). BIF's approach was tailored to each country and market, but with some common approaches within and across countries, for example seeking to address poor yields of pigeon peas and rice in Malawi through the introduction of high quality certified seeds, poor dairy yields through the introduction of better fodder (napier grass in Nigeria) and reduce wastage through seed dressing and targeted crop protection inputs (pigeon peas in Malawi, cassava in Nigeria) as well as improved storage and processing techniques (maize and milk in Nigeria). In Malawi, BIF's intervention in pico-solar was to enable an affordable supply of high quality products for poor consumers. In Myanmar, BIF worked in key value chains (garment-making, bamboo and tourism) to create opportunities for the poor as employees and suppliers, as well as to improve the quality and dignity of jobs (working conditions, HR practices).

The Country Window achieved some notable successes:

- In **Nigeria**, BIF-supported innovations were being utilised by over 650,000 poor producers by August 2019, with a cumulative net increased income of £32.2m. This was a significant **overachievement** of the programme targets, primarily driven by the programme's interventions in the maize and information & advisory services markets, and their long-term and trusted

relationships with national scale agents through whom BIF reached large numbers of smallholder farmers (SHFs). In the dairy sector, BIF's introduction of napier grass as improved fodder for cattle increased milk yields by up to 300%. Improved milk handling processes then boosted gains further by reducing wastage by another 20%. This had unexpected other benefits too, particularly that it reduced local conflict by reducing the need for nomadic herders to allow their cattle to roam.

- **Malawi** was one of the most challenging components of the BIF programme, with a limited number of market players, low levels of entrepreneurship and high risk aversion. Progress in one of the three markets (pigeon peas) was seriously affected by an exogenous shock (the global collapse of prices) as well as extreme weather (drought and storms). Nevertheless, in the two agricultural markets (pigeon peas and rice), nearly 96,000 SHFs benefitted from new or enhanced income generating activities as a result of BIF intervention, almost double the target of 49,000. Nearly 50,000 SHFs increased their net income by an aggregate gain of nearly £870,000. This was a significant **underachievement** against the target of £3.25m, mostly due to the global collapse of pigeon pea prices. However, the technologies and innovations (introduction of higher yielding, certified seed and seed dressing to increase germination rates) and lobbying the Government of Malawi to buy pigeon peas for school and prison feeding programmes) helped save those farmers from even greater losses, and have set the market on a better footing for when prices do recover in this notoriously volatile market. Other companies have recognised and now entered the market for seed dressing and crop protection inputs for SHFs, and the benefits of certified seed are also being replicated more widely. BIF's interventions in the pico-solar (PSP) market have helped create a sustained and growing demand for these small scale solar systems. In particular, BIF helped reduce prices to affordable levels by lobbying the Government of Malawi to reduce VAT on PSP, and their support to Total brought a wholesaler into the market to ensure an affordable supply of high quality products.

- In **Myanmar**, BIF worked in the garment-making sector, tourism and bamboo, and generally **met or overachieved** against its targets. This was particularly impressive as during BIF's implementation, the political context in Myanmar changed considerably, with elections (Aung Sang Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy's landslide election victory but continued heavy control by the military), and later the Rakhine and Rohinga crises. These impacted heavily on global perceptions of Myanmar, which had an impact on tourism as well as opportunities for export in the garment supply chains. Interventions such as training and advocacy with garment-makers improved worker welfare for more than 24,000 garment makers, most of whom are young women (significantly exceeding the target of just over 18,000).

2. Business Partnership Fund (BPF) (active since 2017, fully operational since 2018): included the Core Fund, Replication Fund and the DFID Support Service. The BPF included:

- **Core Fund** - grants to Multinational Companies (MNCs) to develop and implement a total of 10 inclusive business ideas, often with new technology, for example the development of a fortified milky drink to help combat malnutrition in Zambia with Arla, efforts to improve weather data and forecasting in Rwanda by tracking interference in mobile phone signals (with Ericsson), leveraging remittances to deliver affordable housing (Malawi and Kenya) and trials of the use of drones in Nigeria and Ethiopia to deliver critical healthcare products;
- **Replication Fund** (5 grants to share best practice from MNCs on inclusive business); and
- **DFID Support Service** (13 pieces of demand-driven TA to help DFID staff to engage more effectively with MNCs).

The BPF was only fully operational for 2 years. During that time, its grants helped develop useful ideas and encouraged MNCs to pilot and learn from them. However, there was not sufficient time for most of the ideas to move to scale, even after successful pilots. BIF expects several of the Core Window projects to move forward independently over the next year.

3. Company Window (active since 2017, fully operational since 2018): supported five innovative projects in four countries, using a market systems approach to support companies to innovate in a pro-poor way, including:

- developing and selling affordable personal hygiene products in Pakistan, with direct benefits for the health of poor consumers, as well as generating income for women entrepreneurs (with Reckitt Benckiser);
- supporting collaboration on tea export pricing (tea swaps) to stablise incomes for producers in Kenya (with Unilever, Camelia, Tata Global Beverages, Finlays and Global (Crown Foods));
- developing access to finance for high value agriculture, such as avocado, mango and potato in Kenya (with Barclays) and supporting producers to manage risks to production with climate and climate information;
- improving worker healthcare in Bangladesh with Marks and Spencer (M&S) and GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) through the rollout of the Health Access and Linkages Opportunities for Workers (HALOW) programme;
- improving crop yields, reducing losses to pests and developing an inclusive supply chain for malt barley in Ethiopia (with Diageo).

The Company Window successfully demonstrated that TA during the design and delivery of inclusive business models by MNCs can help instill new ways of working, improve focus on the poor, and increase the willingness of MNCs to engage in poor countries. It only operated for 2 years, however, and so struggled to move beyond its pilots to impact at scale. BIF's work through the Company Window supported nearly 58,000 people to increase their income and improve their job or livelihood (impact target), and over 19,000 to access new or enhanced products or services (outcome target). Overall, this was a moderate **underachievement** against the impact target (mainly due to seasonality in the malt barley market in Ethiopia, which meant that impact was not measurable within the programme lifetime). However, it was a significant **underachievement** against the outcome target of 178,000, mainly because of technical/financing delays in scaling the business model in Pakistan. The new entity is now however fully operational and hopes to reach 1.2 million households in the next year.

Overall Score:

Overall, BIF has scored an A+ (moderately exceeded expectations) for this final review period. It exceeded its programme level impact targets, with:

- Nearly 715,000 producers utilising new or enhanced income generating opportunities as a result of programme activities (against a target of nearly 215,000)
- Beneficiaries reporting an aggregate total of nearly £35m in additional net income among producers as a result of programme activities (against a target of just under £22m)
- Nearly 585,000 people utilising new or enhanced products or services as a result of programme activities (against a target of 519,649).

Across its Windows and markets, BIF interventions have tackled market failures that had serious negative consequences for the poor (for example, unproductive and poor quality seeds, poor agricultural yields, high losses to wastage and pests, poor human resources and working practices). Innovations appear to be sustainable, with demand continuing this year after direct project support has ended. The fact that BIF was able to bring about changes at all levels from field to Government policy speaks to the depth of expertise of their local teams and strength of the relationships and trust built. Interventions in the Country Windows were generally better able to demonstrate results at scale. The global windows (the BPF and Company Window) had mixed success, in part because of the short timespan (2 years) of those interventions. Their impact should be realised in coming years as they move to scale.

Lessons learnt and recommendations for future programmes

Adaptive programming

- BIF has worked in challenging markets with external factors outside the programme's control (exogenous shocks) sometimes impacting the programme's performance and impact. In Malawi, interventions to pigeon pea farmer incomes were technically successful but undermined by a global collapse in prices. In Burma, efforts to strengthen inclusive tourism were hampered by an overall decline in tourism after the Rohingya crisis. In Nigeria, potentially feasible business development (e.g. napier pelletising) were not possible because of limited access to finance (foreign exchange). In some cases, responding to these challenges mean a change in focus and skills (eg from technical advice at field level to Government lobbying) to get results. It is

important for a large programme such as BIF to be flexible and adaptive to change. Taking a market systems approach enabled this, although there were some concerns that targets set by DFID early in the programme were too rigid. It is important to consider exogenous shocks when assessing the programme's performance.

- Unsurprisingly, success rates were better in the country window, where BIF had much longer to operate. Success also appears to have been better when BIF intervened at all levels of a market – from the individual smallholders/SMEs and consumers up to the national level trade associations and farmers associations, as well as with Governments (for example to remove VAT on solar imports and encourage use of pigeon peas for school feeding programmes in Malawi). Engagement at the Governmental level in Myanmar was often impossible because of restrictions on interactions with the former military regime. Where possible, future programming should aim to engage at all levels.

Market systems approach / use of grants

- BIF was a pioneer in its market systems approach, and has provided lessons for other DFID programming since. It was designed <u>not</u> to rely on grant funding for impact in the Country Window, but to provide targeted TA to encourage change. Whilst this helped bring about sustainable change through the private sector, it meant some changes (such as a shift towards using new types of seeds) were slower than they might otherwise have been as they required SMEs and the SHFs (who could afford failure least) taking the risk. In Myanmar, the team felt that impact in the bamboo sector in particular would have been helped by a small grants facility to support innovations and changes. Overall, BIF's approach seems to have delivered sustainable changes in demand (as opposed to changes that revert back after the grant ends), but it would have been have been helpful to consider ways to support the poorest to innovate that protected them from the initial risks, for example underwriting risks (importing new seed, investing in new technology) for the first year.. Where this was done in Malawi, it was very successful – the seeds sold rapidly and the guarantee was not called. Future programming should also consider how to support participants access credit to enable them to expand successful pilots.

Strategic Partnerships:

- BIF's country window worked in three countries with a strong DFID country presence, including in aligned sectors (for example oil seeds in Malawi, garment making in Asia). There is limited evidence of strategic partnerships within country or across DFID programmes to share lessons and good practice. Opportunities to work together to improve impact (eg by replicating seed dressing approaches or expanding napier grass for dairy feed to other countries) may have been missed as a result. Future programmes, particularly centrally managed programmes that fund work in-country, should build in stronger cross-DFID relationships from the start.
- Better donor co-ordination and alignment of donor-funded private sector development programmes is needed, including agreement where market failures need to be addressed by grants and where other approaches (technical assistance) would work. There was some unintended market distortion and undercutting by other donor programmes, such as in heavily aided Malawi, where some partners and beneficiaries choose to wait (for example hoping for free solar products from NGOs), rather than invest upfront. In Myanmar, efforts to develop a sustainable market for factory consultant services were undermined by the provision of free training by other development partners.
- The quality of the relationship and level of trust between BIF and its local service providers and/or MNC is crucial for the successful adoption and adaptation of inclusive business models within the Country and Company Windows. Responsiveness was crucial, as well as deep local knowledge from staff on the ground.
- Through its work, BIF has built a network of SMEs and MNCs that could be champions of inclusive business. DFID should continue to use these Champions. Future programming should build in creating and using similar Networks of Influencers from the start.

Social inclusion, political drivers and conflict

- Social inclusion of the poor was a strong driver in market choice and strategy design, but gender and the inclusion of marginalised or protected groups less so, especially in the early years of BIF.

BIF Country Window markets were chosen before the introduction of the International Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014 and remedial action was needed to ensure compliance. This may have meant that opportunities to proactively target women, the disabled and others from the start were missed. Future programming choices should be informed by a Gender, Equity and Social Inclusion (GESI) strategy from the start.

- The success of the BIF's interventions in Malawi, Nigeria and Myanmar was heavily influenced by historical legacy and political economy (for example, risk aversion and corruption in Malawi, military influence in Myanmar). Future programmes should actively consider political drivers (including corruption) as well as socio-economic factors in deciding how and where to target support.
- Programming in fragile and conflict affected areas should be guided by conflict sensitivity analysis.

Impact through MNCs

- The Company Window and BPF were fully operational for a much shorter time (1-2 years) than the Country Window. In future, such interventions should operate for longer if they are to be expected to demonstrate impact at scale.
- The success of interventions with MNCs depended on the MNC's own internal buy-in and the alignment with their own goals/priorities. Interventions worked best when they were clearly owned by the MNCs, for example in Pakistan healthcare. In those cases though, it is also worth considering whether the successful projects would have happened anyway.

Learning and Knowledge Products:

- BIF produced and used high-quality evidence, with considerable attention to detail on monitoring and reporting. Highlights include the randomised control trials run by Tufts University in Myanmar and Bangladesh to assess how interventions in the garment-making sector affected productivity, health and staff welfare outcomes. This produced useful evidence that could be shared with others (for example, buyers, academia, and industry bodies). Given the complexity and range of the programme, however, there was no impact evaluation (despite being part of the original business case). There is also no overarching report on the programme as a whole to bring all the learning together. Both would be useful to learn from future programmes.
- Whilst approaches in each market were different, there was scope for considerable lesson learning across the markets, countries and windows, but this was not adequately built into the programme design. Thinking more about what works and how should be a significant value add for a large multi-window centrally managed programme, and should be a stronger focus in any future programmes.
- The milestones for the Replication Fund (research) output are input-based (number of projects supported and accessed by market). There are some anecdotal, positive reports as to the quality and relevance of the work, but several also missed their deadlines for publication, and there is no evidence as to uptake and/or any changes brought about as a result of their advice. Future programming should track uptake and impact of research and recommendations.

Follow up actions required following approval of this report:

Learning:

A huge amount of information, and many valuable insights have been produced during the implementation of BIF. It is important now that DFID can find a way to work with the BIF team to ensure that these are drawn together and shared within the countries, across DFID and with interested other development partners and private sector companies. There were close out events in-country, summary sheets and publicity materials produced. It is worth considering further what else can be done to share BIF's successes, challenges and earning more widely.

Champions:

Through its work, BIF has built a network of SMEs and MNCs that could be Champions of Inclusive Business. DFID should continue to use these contacts to develop programming and promote Inclusive Business globally.

B: DETAILED OUTPUT SCORING

Output Title	BIF pursuing credible strategies and interventions within focus markets		
Output number per LF	1	**Output Score**	***A+: moderately exceeded expectations***
Impact weighting (%)?	20%	Impact weighting % revised since last AR?	N

Indicator(s)	**Milestones**	**Progress**
1.1.1 Market strategies developed and approved by DFID	**Total: 16** Myanmar: 3 Malawi: 3 Nigeria: 5 Country Window: 5	**Met: 16** Myanmar: 3 Malawi: 3 Nigeria: 5 Country Window: 5
1.2.1 Interventions developed including: partnerships with market actors with the potential to address root causes of market underperformance; logical results chain showing how BIF expects to improve market system and benefit the poor	**Total: 46** Myanmar: Malawi: 14 Nigeria: 23	**Met: 46** Myanmar: Malawi: 14 Nigeria: 23
1.3.1 Number of BIF service recipients and other market players (in case of BIF2-Company window) supported.	**Total: 340** Myanmar: 224 Malawi: 27 Nigeria: 73 Company Window: 16	**Exceeded: 357** Myanmar: 235 Malawi: 27 Nigeria:73 Company Window: 22
1.4.1 Number of MNCs supported under BIF2 (CW and BPF).	**Total: 19** BPF: 11 Company Window: 8	**Exceeded: 20** BPF: 10 Company Window: 10

Supporting narrative for the score

In its six years of operation, BIF has developed 16 market strategies in its three countries and the Company Window:

- Myanmar – garment-making, tourism, bamboo.
- Malawi – rice, pigeon peas, pico-solar products.
- Nigeria – dairy, maize, cassava, aquaculture, information & advisory services.
- Company Window: personal hygiene in Pakistan through Reckitt Benckiser, high value agriculture in Kenya with Barclays, RMG worker healthcare in Bangladesh with M&S and GSK, tea trading/swaps in Kenya withUnilever, Camelia, Tata Global Beverages, Finlays and Global Crown Foods, malt barley in Ethiopia with Diageo.

Country Window: These markets were selected on the basis of research, market failure/gap analysis and BIF's ability to add value that either directly benefitted the poor (for example, by increasing agricultural yields or dairy milk production) and/or facilitated their inclusion in SME supply chains (for example as rice paddy outgrowers in Malawi or hatchers of catfish fingerlings in Nigeria). BIF's approach varied across the various sectors but with some common approaches within and across countries, for example seeking to address poor yields of pigeon peas and rice in Malawi through the

introduction of high quality certified seeds and seed dressing, and reduce wastage through targeted crop protection inputs (pigeon peas in Malawi, cassava in Nigeria) and information on improved storage and processing (maize and milk in Nigeria). In Nigeria, interventions in both the diary and cassava markets focused on animal nutrition. These agricultural interventions dramatically changed success rates for framers – in Nigeria for example, BIF's introduction of napier grass as an improved source of nutrition for dairy cattle helped to increase milk yields by up to 300%. Improved milk handling process then boosted gains further by reducing wastage by another 20%.

The market strategies were adaptative during the programme, enabling flexibility for activities to adjust in response to exogenous shocks, for example the reorientation of the pigeon pea support in Malawi in response to a global collapse of pigeon pea prices and export markets. In some cases, BIF lobbying and intervention with Governments created considerable impact – for example, in Malawi, where BIF lobbied encouraged the Government to move to purchase pigeon peas for school and prison feeding programmes after export markets collapsed. Also in Malawi, BIF lobbying for the reduction of VAT on the imports of solar products which helped bring them within the affordability of low income consumers.

In some cases, however, market strategies were either developed quite late in the programme (for example, bamboo in Myanmar) or windows were only operational for a relatively short period of time (particularly the BPF), which limited the sustainable impact they were able to have. Some market choices were also constrained by needing to avoid markets already covered by DFID or other donor programmes (for example, oil seeds already beng covered by DFID's MOST (Malawi Oil Seed) programme). Four of Country Window market interventions ended early after reviews of progress and showed impact was limited or scaling unlikely within the timeframe.

Company Window: Under the Company Window, BIF's point of entry in to the market was through MNCs interested in investing in a pro-poor way. Rapid market assessments were conducted on the viability of seven proposals, of which five proposals/markets in four countries were then supported. These varied from a project (personal hygiene in Pakistan) with clear and direct benefits in terms of health for the poor and support to women entrepreneurs to interventions to support tea export pricing (tea swaps In Kenya) and stablise incomes.

Lessons identified this year linked to this output and recommendations for future programmes
See Recommendations in summary, page 3-5, especially on adaptive programming, market systems/use of grants, strategic partnerships, social inclusion and conflict analysis.

Output Title	First mover market players **adopt** innovations		
Output number per LF	2	**Output Score**	***A+: moderately exceeded expectations***
Impact weighting (%)?	25%	Impact weighting % revised since last AR?	N

Indicator(s)	**Milestones**	**Progress**
2.1.1 Number of first mover market players adopting innovations who have received direct support from BIF2 Country Windows and Company Window.	**Total: 150** Myanmar: 80 Malawi: 20 Nigeria: 37 Company Window: 13	**Exceeded: 172** Myanmar: 85 Malawi: 22 Nigeria: 41 Company Window: 24
2.2.1 Number of MNCs adopting innovations who have received direct support from BIF2 (Company Window).	**Total: 2**	**Met: 2**

Supporting narrative for the score

This output captures BIF's success in supporting partners to pilot and adopt an innovative business model or practice. BIF moderately over-achieved against its targets, demonstrating that it targeted its interventions well and built a good level with its partners so that they were willing try new approaches.

Examples of successes include:

Malawi: BIF slightly exceeded its target of 20 first mover adopters in Malawi, with 22 successful intreventions (7 in pigeon peas, 6 in rice and 9 in pico-solar products (PSP)). These included the introduction to Malawi of seed dressing technology capable of protecting pigeon pea seeds from fungus and pests, and dramatically increasing germination rates. This was then supported by targeted crop protection inputs (pesticides) as well as fertilisers in affordable quantities for SHFs. Five companies now dress seeds and the approach has been expanded beyond pigeon peas to other types of seeds. In rice, no certified (guaranteed quality) seed was available in Malawi before BIF's intervention. By underwriting the initial imports to reduce risk to suppliers, and demonstration of the significant yield benefits for farmers, BIF helped shift the market so that about 10% of farmers now purchase certified seed from two partner companies, and demand is growing. Finally, in PSP, BIF shifted its approach to work with Total as an wholesale importer of PSP to ensure affordable supplies for customers.

Myanmar: BIF slightly exceeded its target of first mover adoption in Myanmar, with particularly good progress in improving productivity, working conditions and human resources (HR) practices in garment factories on the basis of their training packages, as well as improving inclusivity of tourism opportunities, despite a significant overall downturn in tourism because of the Rohingya crisis. There was also good progress in the bamboo sector where 30 first movers entered the market as a result of BIF support, creating jobs and developing enhanced income opportunities for the poorest in sustainable value chains.

Nigeria: BIF in Nigeria exceeded its target for first mover adoption by about 10% (with 14 in diary, 6 in information & advisory, 5 in maize, 9 in aquaculture and 5 in cassava). This was partly because of the success of the interventions (in dairy for example, the yield gains were so impressive that they offered a very powerful demonstration effect to encourage adopters), but also because partners in Nigeria were generally more prepared to innovate (whilst others, such as in Malawi, were risk-adverse). BIF's intervention on cassava created an entirely new use (cassava peel as cassava grits to be used as animal feed) for something that would previously have been discarded. Aquaculture interventions focussed improving the quality and supply of catfish hatchlings/fingerlings for rearing, as well as supplies of good quality, reasonably priced food for the fish.

Company Window: The Company Window was particularly successful, securing 24 first mover adopters against a target of 13. Success rates were particularly good where the innovation was well aligned to the MNC's existing ethos and planning, for example the malt barley supply chain in Ethiopia (Diageo) and the personal hygiene products in Pakistan (RB).

Lessons identified this year, and recommendations for future programming

See Recommendations in summary, page 3-5, especially on adaptive programming, market systems/use of grants and strategic partnerships.

Output Title	First mover market players **adapt** innovations		
Output number per LF	3	**Output Score**	***A: met expectations***
Impact weighting (%)?	30%	Impact weighting % revised since last AR?	N

Indicator(s)	**Milestones**	**Progress**

3.1 Number of first mover market players continuing independent activity around innovations	**Total: 86** Myanmar: 54 Malawi: 12 Nigeria: 20 Company Window: 0	**Met: 89** Myanmar: 58 Malawi: 10 Nigeria: 21 Company Window: 0

Supporting narrative for the score

This output captures whether BIF partners have continued to implement and develop their innovative business model, practice or product/service offer without direct BIF support. Overall, BIF has slightly exceeded its targets with 89 first movers continuing to implement innovations.

Malawi: BIF moderately underperformed against its target for continued independent activity from partners but the actual interventions that were sustained were important in fundamentally changing the market. For example, after the introduction of seed dressing for pigeon pea seeds, the technology was adapted by the companies for use on other types of seeds before sale, as well as to treat seeds bought elsewhere and brought to BIF partners by farmers for treatment before sowing. The global collapse of pigeon pea prices limited the scope for continued innovation, with most efforts turning to trying to maintain a steady income. In rice, about 10% of farmers now regularly purchase certified seed, supplied by two companies (one of whom also exports to Mozambique and Zambia). The companies continue to innovate and improve on the varieties of rice, introducing higher yielding strains and guaranteeing their quality through certified seeds. Finally, in PSP, Total's role as a wholesaler is now well established, with a steady flow of orders (8,000 new units earlier this month from Lujeri alone for example, and other new onsellers such as Vitalite entering the market). BIF helped create an environment for independent activity around innovations for example through its lobbying of Government of Malawi to remove VAT on solar imports (improving affordability and viability across the sector) and financing options (working with organisation that can offer access to affordable credit).

Myanmar: In Myanmar, BIF moderately exceeded its targets. Initiatives such as the Myanmar Responsible Tourism Awards, travel hubs and online travel information platform and the MGMA (Myanmar Garment Makers Association) helped to ensure uptake, adaption and continued engagement with first movers and new market entrants. In bamboo, activities made a good start, but the intervention only started in 2015, which gave less time to be able to see sustained independent innovation.

Nigeria: BIF's first adopters in napier grass/dairy very successfully took on the new approaches and tried also to adapt, for example into napier grass pelletisation to produce animal feed for sale and to use throughout the year. Whilst the ambition was there, they struggled because of exogenous factors such as lack of local finance for machinery. By working though milk producing co-operatives/farmers groups, however, there was an internal support system which facilitated the continued independent development of ideas. In maize, whilst targeted first movers did start to produce maize, because this was a new crop in most cases, it didn't benefit from the scale of yield increases that more experienced maize farmers might have achieved. In maize and information & advisory services, adaption, replication and expansion, was reinforced by BIF's choice of partners with significant reach and credibility (such as the Maize Association of Nigeria and Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN)) .

Company Window: The target for adaptation and expansion for the Company Window in this final year was zero (perhaps as the Window and its relationships were still relatively young, at less than 2 years). Whilst MNCs offer real scope for impact at scale, their internal decision-making can also be slow. Hopefully, however, adaptation and expansion of this work within the first movers will expand in the future as the ideas that they have piloted under BIF start to demonstrate that their commercial viability.

Lessons identified this year linked to this output and recommendations for future programmes

See Recommendations in summary, page 3-5, especially around market systems/use of grants and strategic partnerships.

Output Title	BIF facilitates broader market change		
Output number per LF	4	**Output Score**	***A+: moderately exceeded expectations***
Impact weighting (%)?	20%	Impact weighting % revised since last AR?	N

Indicator(s)	**Milestones**	**Progress**
4.1 Number of learning products produced and disseminated by BIF.	**Total: 49** Myanmar: 16 Malawi: 6 Nigeria: 19 Company Window: 8	**Exceeded: 72** Myanmar: 26 Malawi: 6 Nigeria: 19 Company Window: 21
4.2 Number of events held by BIF that convene other market players	**Total: 79** Myanmar: 58 Malawi: 10 Nigeria: 11	**Exceeded: 94** Myanmar: 69 Malawi: 10 Nigeria: 15
4.3 Number of collaborations facilitated by BIF between other market players or development Partners	**Total: 23** Myanmar: 11 Malawi: 1 Nigeria: 11	**Exceeded: 28** Myanmar: 16 Malawi: 1 Nigeria: 11
4.4 Number of support projects delivered to DFID (disaggregated by Department/Programmes/ Country Offices supported)	**Total: 13** BPF: 13	**Met: 13** BPF: 13

Supporting narrative for the score

This output captures how BIF facilitates broader market change through the development and dissemination of learning and knowledge products, workshops and other events to bring together strategic stakeholders, facilitating collaboration between market player and also providing support to DFID on working with MNCs. BIF has considerably exceeded its targets in this area, although all targets are input-based (number of events held, products disseminated) and there is limited evidence on how successful the interventions actually were at sharing good practice.

Learning Products: BIF's targets on learning products were exceeded, particularly in Myanmar (despite having been revised upward) and through the Company Window. The garment-market intervention in Myanmar relied heavily on the development of case studies, videos and learning modules which could be more broadly shared, adding to impact. Learning products elsewhere ranged from cross cutting knowledge on 'How to be Successful in Inclusive Business' to technical inputs such as an Aquaculture learning video and training curriculum on Improved Fish Farming (Nigeria).

Events: In Malawi, BIF supported 10 events (meeting their target). These included: a Development Partners roundtable, the Malawi Energy Access Workshop and a Business Dialogue Forum on PSP; Demonstration Field Days and quarterly stakeholders meetings for the pigeon pea sector, which the Legume Development Trust has agreed to organise in the future, helping promote both certified seed and also develop sustainable markets for pigeon peas; and rice marketing and stakeholders conferences. Nigeria and Myanmar both exceeded their targets. In Nigeria, events ranged from sector-level (Nigeria agriculture investment summit and info-radio programming) to technical (dairy improved fodder learning event and maize costing matrix dissemination). In Myanmar, events ranged from active learning bamboo farmer "field schools" to garment industry-level conferences and buyers' fora.

Collaboration: In Myanmar's bamboo sector, there were 30 first movers, who received direct support, and then a further 49 producters who entered the market replicating those original interventions. Whilst the market is growing, the relatively late addition of this work to BIF (2015) meant there wasn't enough time to develop collaboration as much as in other markets, although this is expected to happen independently in coming years. Improvements in workers' rights, working practices and HR in Myanmar's garment sector were replicated by engagement with EU and US supply chains, as well as in other sectors such as food and beverages.
In Malawi, BIF facilitated collaborations for example by encouraging Total to become a wholesale importer of PSP, with smaller companies (including some original first movers) then becoming offtakers of more affordable products. BIF was less successful in facilitating collaboration directly between farmers in Malawi however because of societial/historical legacy of previous Government policies.
In Nigeria, collaboration through maize farmer associations and dairy farmers cooperatives helped consolidate and expand innovation. In all of the markets, there were collaborations that helped ensure access to finance (aquaculture and information & advisory for radio broadcasts), offtaking and processing (cassava) and replication (for example, diary and cattle fodder).

The **Business Partnerships Fund (BPF)** included the **Support Services Fund for DFID**, which received 25 requests for technical and practical assistance and supported 13 of those (1 for a country office, 5 departments, 3 programmes). These projects focused on developing strategies for engaging with the private sector, and building connections and organising sessions with the private sector. The focus areas varied from global to local strategies - from looking at MNC engagement in nutrition, testing out approaches to strengthening business integrity, developing data-driven strategies with MNcs, improving business inclusivity for disabled people and more. Six recipients provided feedback that they were now better equipped to engage with MNCs.

Lessons identified this year linked to this output and recommendations for future programmes
See Recommendations in summary, page 3-5, especially around strategic partnerships, research and learning products.

Output Title	BPF pursing credible partnerships to support replication of Inclusive Business through research and knowledge dissemination		
Output number per LF	5	**Output Score**	***A: met expectations***
Impact weighting (%)?	5%	Impact weighting % revised since last AR?	N

Indicator(s)	**Milestone**	**Progress**
5.1.1 Number of service providers contributing to one or more IB knowledge products developed by the BPF and accessed by the market, that address internal constraints to replication.	**Total: 5**	**Met: 5**

Supporting narrative for the score

Business Partnerships Fund (BPF): The BPF Replication Fund supported five research projects/publications that drew on experiences and case studies from 36 MNCs across the world to provide insights to help other MNCs overcome constraints to scaling and replicating inclusive business (IB) models:

Organisation and title	**Purpose**
Accenture Development Partnerships (ADP): **Inclusive Business Reimagined**	How MNCs can develop and replicate IB initiatives that utilise new technology and leverage their existing innovation structures.

Endeva: **Inclusive Business - Make or Buy? Corporate Impact Venturing at the Base of the Pyramid**	Explores Corporate Impact Venturing (CIV) – evidence and how to establish.
Business Call to Action (BCtA)	Identifying the internal barriers to IB and management practices to support IB
Business Fights Poverty (BFP) with the League of Intrapreneurs: **The intrapreneurship Ecosystem - creating the conditions for social innovation to flourish in your company**	Providing a framework for understanding an 'Intrapreneurship Ecosystem' – the processes, practices, resources and relationships that facilitate or inhibit intrapreneurship and social innovation
Hystra: **Multinational corporations' journey to inclusive business**	Capturing insights from Hystra's work supporting multinational and regional companies' IB initiatives

The reports highlight common constraints to IB (for example, lack of organisation buy-in, lack of suitable risk-adjusted finance and finding people with the right skills and experience to lead work) and provided key messages including on:

- The need to align management practices with an MNC's purpose (securing organisational buy-in)
- Identifying and supporting the change leaders
- Looking beyond business as usual (for example, experimenting with Corporate Impact Venturing)
- Identifying new business models with potential to be profitable
- How to support change (with comms, blogs, online events, workshops)

Lessons identified this year linked to this output, and recommendations for future programming
See Recommendations in summary, pages 3-5, especially on research and learning products and strategic partnerships.

C: GENDER AND INCLUSION

The BIF programme was designed to support the development of IB, with a focus on creating opportunities for poor SHFs and consumers. Whilst women, the disabled and protected groups are of course part of the poorest consumers cohort, BIF was designed before the International Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014 requirements, and did not proactively target women across the programme from the start. Over the course of BIF's implementation, gender and equity considerations were more actively incorporated more in activity planning. Wherever possible, all data was disaggregated.

Several of the BIF interventions had notable gender impacts. In Myanmar for example, BIF's interventions in garment-making such as training and advocacy on workers' rights, working conditions and HR practices improved worker welfare for more than 24,000 garment makers, most of whom were young female migrant workers. These improvements were then replicated and magnified by engagement with EU and US supply chains, as well as in other sectors such as food and beverages.

In Malawi, BIF set gender targets within some of its interventions, for example, that at least 50% of its rice paddy outgrowers should be female. BIF also monitored the number of people in each household who were disabled. 20% of the households that reported at least one disabled member agreed with the statement that "income from MHL rice has benefitted me in looking after my disability or a disabled family member". Also in Malawi, women and children were particularly targeted in the pico-solar (PSP) market – these low cost solar products are 20x cheaper over 5 years than kerosene lamps, and provided significant indoor air quality benefits as well as allowing children to study after dark. The USB port on the PSP enabled women to charge for mobile phone charging, producing a small income. In areas such as Lujeri tea estate, almost all PSP consumers were female.

In Pakistan, support through the Company Window for Reckitt Benckiser developed a sustainable supply of affordable personal hygiene products. These were targeted at women and families in particular, with direct benefits for health, and were sold by women entrepreneurs who benefitted from additional income. After a successful pilot, this project is expected to scale to reach up to 1.2m people this year.

In Nigeria, over 50% of the agricultural workforce are women, particularly in the more menial and poorly paid tasks. BIF's interventions in the dairy sector transformed productivity, with 300% increase in yields after using napier grass as fodder. These yields were then magnified by 20% by BIF's interventions to improve milk processing (hygience and pasteurisation). 99.5% of the farmers who received this training were women, and they earnt on average over £315 more per season than farmers who weren't trained.

D: THEORY OF CHANGE AND PROGRESS AGAINST OUTCOMES

Overall assessment of whether the expected outcomes and impacts were achieved

BIF aimed to address key constraints to IB through TA, support to access new technology and develop innovation, market research, collaboration and learning. It sought to directly improve the productivity and income of smallholder farmers (SHFs) and SMEs by developing inclusive supply chains and new products that offered them opportunities as producers and consumers.

Overall, BIF scored an A+ (moderately exceeded expectations). Across its Windows and markets, BIF interventions have tackled market failures and constraints (unproductive and poor quality seeds, poor agricultural yields, high losses to wastage and pests, poor HR and working practices). Innovations appear to be sustainable, with demand continuing after direct project support ended. The fact that BIF was able to bring about changes at all levels from field to Government level speaks to the depth of expertise of their local teams and strength of the relationships and trust built. Interventions in the global windows (the BPF and Company Window) had more mixed success, mainly because of the short life of the interventions. Their impact should be realised in coming years as they move to scale.

Progress against outcomes and impact targets:

Impact in BIF's logframe is measured in terms of increased income and welfare for the poor. Indicators are broken down by income, employment and basic human needs. The programme over-achieved against all impact targets, in some cases achieving results that are several times greater than the projected figure (see table below). The most impressive result was impact indicator 1.1 where 748,148 producers are utilising new or enhanced income generating opportunities (against a target of 213,904).

IMPACT - Increased Income and Welfare for the poor		
Impact Indicator 1 - Income	**Year 6 Nov 2018 - Dec 2019**	
1.1 Number of producers utilising new or enhanced income generating opportunities as a result of programme activities (disaggregated male/female)	Planned	213,904
	Achieved	748,148
1.2 Number of producers recording increased net additional income as a result of programme activities (disaggregated male/female)	Planned	200,821
	Achieved	606,832
1.3 Aggregate net additional income among producers as a result of programme activities £)	Planned	21,613,842
	Achieved	35,355,545
Impact Indicator 2 - Employment		
2.4 Number of people benefitting from improved working conditions as a result of programme activities	Planned	56,767
	Achieved	70,098
Impact Indicator 3 - Basic human needs		
3.1 Number of people utilising new or enhanced products or services as a result of programme activities (disaggregated male/female, disaggregated by category e.g. health, primary education, lower secondary education, clean drinking water, improved sanitation facility, energy)	Planned	519,649
	Achieved	584,803
OUTCOME - Market uptake of innovation		
Outcome Indicator 1 - Expansion of innovation amongst other market players		
1.1 Number of other market players adopting or adapting the innovation. (Disaggregated by direct/indirect support)*	Planned	202
	Achieved	214
1.2 Number of market players and MNCs who have adapted or replicated BIF2-CW supported innovations (with or without support from BIF2-CW)	Planned	18
	Achieved	21
1.3 Number of MNCs that have adopted the IB model supported by the BPF.	Planned	9
	Achieved	7

1. Country Window:
In **Nigeria**, BIF-supported innovations were being utilised by over 650,000 poor producers by August 2019, with a cumulative net increased income of £32.2m. This was a significant **overachievement** of the end of programme targets (the utilisation target by nearly 300% and the net income increase nearly 100%). This success was primarily from the maize and information & advisory services markets, where long-term and trusted relationships with significant national scale agents enabled BIF to reach significant numbers of SHFs. In dairy, BIF's introduction of napier grass as improved fodder for cattle increased milk yields by up to 300%. Better milk handling processes then boosted gains further by reducing wastage by 20%. This had other benefits too, for example, by reducing local conflict by reducing the need for nomadic herders to allow their cattle to roam.

Malawi was one of the most challenging components of the BIF programme, with a limited number of market players, low levels of entrepreneurship and high risk aversion. Progress in one of the three markets (pigeon peas) was seriously affected by an exogenous shock (the global collapse of prices) as well as extreme weather (drought and storms) and pests. Nevertheless, in the two agricultural markets (pigeon peas and rice), nearly 96,000 SHFs benefitted from new or enhanced income generating activities as a result of BIF intervention, almost double the programme end target of 49,000. Nearly 50,000 SHFs increased their net income by an aggregate gain of nearly £870,000. This was a significant **underachievement** against the target of £3.25m, which was almost entirely due to the global collapse of pigeon pea prices. However, the innovations (introduction of higher yielding, certified seed, seed dressing to increase germination rates) and high level interventions (with Government of Malawi to encourage them to buy pigeon peas for school and prision feeding programmes) helped avoid worse losses and set the market on a better footing for when prices do recover. Other companies have now entered the market for seed dressing and crop protection inputs for SHFs, and the benefits of certified seed are also being replicated. BIF's interventions in the pico-solar (PSP) market helped create a sustainable and growing demand for small scale solar systems. In particular, BIF helped reduce prices to affordable levels by lobbying the Government of Malawi to reduce VAT on PSP and by encouraging Total to become an import wholesaler to ensure a supply of affordable, high quality products.

In **Myanmar**, BIF worked in the garment-making sector, tourism and bamboo, and generally **met or overachieved** its targets. During BIF's implementation, the poltical context in Myanmar changed considerably, with elections (Aung Sang Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy's landslide election victory but continued heavy control by the military), and later the Rohingya crises. These impacted heavily on global perceptions of Myanmar, which had an impact on tourism as well as opportunities for export in the garment supply chains. Despite this, BIF met or significantly exceeded all of its impact and outcome targets. Interventions such as training and advocacy improved welfare for more than 24,000 garment makers, mostly young women (significantly exceeding the target of just over 18,000).

2. Business Partnership Fund (BPF) incorporated the Core Fund, Replication Fund and the DFID Support Service. The BPF was only fully operational for 2 years. During that time, 10 grants from the Core Fund helped develop useful ideas and encourage MNCs to pilot and learn from them, but there was not sufficient time for most of the ideas to move to scale, even after successful pilots. BIF expects several of the Core Window projects to move forward independently over the next year. Grants through the Replication Fund produced five research publications sharing best practice on how to deliver IB. No evidence is available on uptake, use and impact of those products. The DFID Support Service produced 13 pieces of demand-driven TA for DFID staff to help them engage more effectively with MNCs. No evidence is available on the use and impact of that work.

3. Company Window supported five innovative projects in four countries, using a market systems approach to support to companies or groups of companies to innovate in a pro-poor way. It successfully demonstrated that TA during the design and delivery of inclusive business models by MNCs helps develop new ways of working, improves focus on the poor, reduces risks and increases the willingness of MNCs to engage in poor countries. It only operated for 2 years, however, and so struggled to move beyond successful pilots to delivery and impact at scale. BIF's work through the Company Window supported nearly 58,000 people to increase their income and improve their job or livelihood (impact target), and over 19,000 to access new or enhanced products or services (outcome target). Overall, this

was a moderate **underachievement** against the impact target (mainly due to seasonality in the malt barley market in Ethiopia, which meant that impact was not measurable within the programme lifetime). However, it was a significant **underachievement** against the outcome target of 178,000, mainly because of technical/financing delays in scaling the business model in Pakistan. The new entity is now however fully operational and hopes to reach 1.2 million households in the next year.

Summarise the programme's Theory of Change (ToC) and major changes to it in the past year

BIF focused interventions on specific markets based on identified market constraints or failures, relevance to the poor, opportunities for growth, feasibility and synergy with existing development efforts. Markets included agriculture, aquaculture and dairy productivity, food and fodder processing, product and commodity markets (pico-solar), basic services such as health, workers rights and the creation of decent opportunities within growth sectors such as garment-making or tourism.

The programme's ToC has not changed this year, and is as follows (detailed ToC also available for each Window):



BIF used a markets systems approach based on the 'Adopt-Adapt-Expand-Respond' framework to conceptualise, and measure, the extent and depth of uptake:

- Adoption: Adoption of innovations by first mover(s); those firms supported initially by BIF.
- Adaptation: First mover(s) continues independent activity around innovation and invests to support, tailor and/or embed in operational norms. First mover(s) are likely to continue to improve, develop and roll-out innovation.
- Expansion: Other market players adopt the innovation (or variants thereof) as a result of demonstration or competitive pressures.
- System response. Increasingly mainstream innovation triggers a secondary response from players in the system, or in adjacent systems (eg changed or new supporting functions and rules). The original innovation has now created a new set of market conditions that have encouraged evolution in and re-organisation of the market.

The outcome level focused on the spread of innovations beyond direct recipients of BIF support. This included other market players taking up the innovation (expansion) or through a deeper market response to the presence of the innovation (system response).

The impact level captured the effect that BIF interventions had on poor people as producers, employees and consumers. For producers, BIF aimed to increase net incomes. For employees, BIF aimed to create decent sustainable jobs or improve employment conditions. For consumers, BIF aimed to increase access to products or services which meet human needs such as food, shelter, sanitation, energy, healthcare or education.

E: VALUE FOR MONEY

VfM performance compared to the original VfM proposition in the business case.

Overall, BIF cost £32.3m, and exceeded its programme level impact targets, with:

- Nearly 715,000 producers utilising new or enhanced income generating opportunities as a result of programme activities (against a target of nearly 215,000)

- Beneficiaries reporting an aggregate total of nearly £35m in additional net income among producers as a result of programme activities (against a target of nearly £22m)

- Nearly 585,000 people utilising new or enhanced products or services as a result of programme activities (against a target of 519,649).

The Business Case used benchmarking of comparable programmes to suggest that for every £1 spent on BIF2, the programme would increase the net incomes of poor people by at least £4. By the end of programme implementation (Dec 2019), beneficiary net incomes had risen by just over £1 for every £1 invested. However, these changes are as a result of fundamental market and process improvements, which appear to be self-sustaining in terms of ongoing demand, so it is seems likely that this target will be realised in coming years.

Some examples of particularly impactful interventions measured by the end of 2019 include:
In **Nigeria**, as part of the information & advisory market, BIF leveraged key outputs from their work on sustainable agricultural educational broadcasts (original cost £62,000) by working with Sterling Bank and FRCN to produce a radio programmes for SHFs in northern Nigeria. Farmers who followed the advice in the broadcasts earnt an estimated aggregated additional income of £7m. In dairy, napier grass interventions with the Ladduga grazing reserve co-operative that cost £5,000 enabled local farmers to earn an additional total income of £365,000.

Overall, the BIF programme was delivered on schedule. The BFP and Company Windows were agreed midway through the programme (in place of co-financing from country offices). Some BIF activities (such as Myanmar bamboo as well as the BFP and Company Window projects) started later than the majority of the Country Window work, but all activities were completed by the target end date. Given the nature of the work however, some of the long term impacts of BIF will only be fully realised until after the programme end date.

The full review of BIF's performance on Economy, Efficient, Effectivess and Equity can be found in Annex A.

Highlights include:

Economy: good value inputs, the right skills and quality at the right price:
BIF maintained strong control on weighed average fee rates for staff and consultants in 2019:

- £441 for core team personnel.
- £531 for London--based staff

- £407 for country team staff.
- £296 for TA consultants in-country (the rates varied between locations based on local market prices, and were significantly less in Malawi and Myanmar than in Nigeria)
- BIF consistently challenged consultant daily rates for the BPF to keep them lower than £1,000 per day

In this final year, around 72% of country window work (and 78% of the local staff days) were from local teams/national staff rather than internationals.

Effectiveness: "Spending Wisely", meeting outcomes
The efficiency indicator for the Country Window measures the number of days of TA per direct response by a market player (adopt/adapt). Performance fell slightly across all countries in the final year, with the aggregate figure increasing from 46 to 50 days. This was because the programme focused on scaling up existing interventions, rather than seeking out new adopts and adapts.

The less mature Company Window, which still had a focus on encouraging first movers in its markets, saw a significant improvement in its efficiency indicators as the number of intervention design, management and delivery days per market player adopting CW supported innovations fell from 246 in year 5 to 114 this year.

Effectiveness: "Spending Wisely", meeting outcomes
The BIF Country Window further improved its effectiveness indicators in the final year measuring the conversion of outputs to outcomes – a higher ratio signifies a greater number of expansions per direct response (adopt/adapt) or learning product/event.

- The ratio of expands to direct responses increased in 2019 from 0.75 to 0.91.
- The ratio of expands to learning products by end of 2019 was 1.50, up from 1.35 a year ago.

Equity: "Spending fairly" - whether outputs and outcomes benefit everyone fairly. Did benefits reach the most disadvantaged?

- **Targeting interventions on the poorest, disadvantaged groups and women**
  - In Nigeria, almost of all the farmers receiving milk hygiene training were women. The sale of pasteurised milk for the first time is also providing health benfits for customers. The Kano Dairy Union has established literacy and numeracy lessons for their members, with some people over 70 years old learning to write for the first time. Also in Nigeria, the catfish hatcher intervention primarily benefited older farmers who are now able to earn a living without the need for significant manual labour.
  - In Myanmar, most of the 24,000 garment-makers benefitting from better working practices are young female migrants. In the bamboo market, BIF developed a method to improve bamboo treatment before it was used in house construction by the poor. This should increase its life from 2-3 years to over 30 years.
  - In Malawi, the agricultural inventions targeted smallholders with less than 0.5 ha. Women were targeted particularly for the pico-solar products interventions too, and reported increased health benefits (indoor air quality), safety (reduced risk of fire), financial savings, and educational benefits as children were able to study at night. Charging for phone charging via the USB also provided a source of income.
  - The Company Window supported projects such as hygiene product distribution in Pakistan, improving health for women and familes (eg reducing transmission of diarrhoea) and gave the almost entirely female saleforce a source of income, and afortified milky drink in Zambia to help combat child malnutrition.

Did the programme represent value for money?
Yes, based on BIF's overchievement against its targets, and the fact that these changes appear to be sustainable and based on fundamental improvements in the relevant markets.

Cost drivers and performance
The majority of BIF's expenditure was on **consultancy fees and associated expenses**. These fees varied widely across the programme, reflecting the different nature of services procured in each

circumstance, in terms of location (UK-based or in country), sector and role (management vs technical assistance. BIF consistently tried to drive down fee rates and to manage expenses (for example by combining trips and updating the accommodation policy to enable cheaper family and friends accommodation options). As a multi-country programme, **location** of inputs had a bearing on cost. For example, Nigeria as an operating environment was more expensive than Malawi and Myanmar. Supply and demand was an issue, particularly the scarcity of suitable local consultants in Myanmar which meant that BIF had to use regional/international expertise more often than elsewhere.

BIF consistently challenged market prices to try to get best value for money. Meeting rooms and office space were major cost during the programme. BIF used pro bono PWC and other donor space where possible to significantly reduce these costs.

Inflation was proactively managed by BIF throughout this five year programme. The primary mitigation measure was currency management. All contracts with implementing partners were in GBP, as well as contracts with third parties where possible.That transferred part of the risk to the implementing partners. In Nigeria, BIF foreign currency exchanges for local expenses were maximised by spot checking rates periodically to benefit from the best rates.

Maximising VfM within BIF: sharing and reducing costs, making savings where possible.
BIF consistently sought to reduce and share costs where possible. Full details are available in the table in Annex A. For example, BIF made savings by cost sharing and synergy with other programmes, donors or service recipients such as co-financing cassava grits interventions in Nigeria with the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) and co-financing maize interventions with PERL-ARC. In Myanmar, the World Bamboo Event was co-financed with other donors (BIF paid 40% and the others 60% of the costs). In the garment-making sector, approximately 3000 days of staff time were contributed in kind from garment-making factories, against 800 days of BIF staff time. Over 700 days were contributed by factory trainers for delivery of training, supported by 270 days of BIF staff time. In Malawi, BIF's Market Systems Adviser was also the technical director for the DFID-funded MOST programme and most of his visits were combined so that travel costs could be shared. In all locations, the BIF team used PWC meeting rooms (and/or space provided by aligned programmes) to reduce costs.

All BPF grants were matched funding, with the MNCs providing the same or more as BIF's contribution. Overall, the BPF grants were just over £2.9m, and partners' co-financing was just over £3m.

F: RISK

Overall risk rating: Moderate

Overview of programme risk during the past year and over the life of the programme

The BIF Implementing partners used risk processes that mirror DFID's Risk Management Framework. Risks were reviewed on a quarterly basis at four levels: country, market, intervention, and activity. Risks were logged against the DFID standard categories (External Context, Delivery, Safeguards, Operational, Fiduciary and Reputational) and scored against a 5x5 impact vs likelihood matrix. The DFID team assessed and managed overarching programme risks on a similar basis.

Overall, risks were managed well within BIF. Several exogenous shocks impacted on the success of the work (for example, for Malawi, the global collapse of pigeon pea prices as well as extreme weather). In Myanmar, an international downturn in perception of the country after the elections and Rohingya crisis impacted on tourism and markets for ready-made made markets (by putting at risk Myanmar's access to EU markets through the Generalized System of Preferences, GSP) . In these cases, BIF was able to pivot its assistance to ameliorate the impact of the shocks (for example, by lobbying to create domestic markets for pigeon peas for school and prison feeding in Malawi, and in Myanmar by improving working practices and standards to support the case for the country in more ethical supply chains).

The final year of the programme focussed on consolidating results. A delivery risk was that contractor staff would begin to leave before the programme was completed. In the end, turnover remained relatively low across the programme as a whole, with 8 team members (out of 48) leaving. In all cases, replacements were either recruited or internal replacements deployed.

Safeguarding: A programme-wide Safeguarding Policy is in place for BIF. This took a risk-based approach, assessing and managing safeguarding risks that may exist or emerge at the market and intervention level. In the garment sector in Burma, BIF developed and implemented a child labour remediation policy, while in the tourism sector BIF encouraged the application of the Do No Harm approach amongst service recipients and other market players, including a Do No Harm Toolkit.

Security: Insecurity posed by terrorist organisations (Boko Haram and the Islamic State) and political violence surrounding Nigeria's elections posed difficulty to travel to some of the northern regions throughout the lifetime of the programme. BIF's Security Manager actively monitored the situation and the viability of operating in insecure areas. While this was a risk during the early years of the programme, BIF was able to operate effectively and deliver significant results in the northern regions in later years.

Reputation: BIF was mindful of the dangers of working with politically exposed persons, businesses linked to them and MNCs acting irresponsibly in partner countries. BIF developed a thorough due diligence process which mitigated these risks effectively.

Update on Partnership Principles
BIF's market systems development work primarily supported the private sector, poor producers, SHFs and consumers. Whilst there was some high level lobbying work with Governments (eg to remove VAT on PSP imports to Malawi), no activities in any of the Windows involved funding Governments directly or funding through Government systems. The Partnership Principles were not therefore directly relevant. The PSD team managing BIF did however liaise with DFID country offices on performance of each country against the Principles,

G: DELIVERY, COMMERCIAL & FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

Performance of partners and DFID, notably on commercial, and financial issues
The implementing partner for the programme was PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). The International team in London provided a single point of contact for all Windows and also undertook central functions - tracking outputs and indicators across the programme, financial monitoring and quality assurance across BIF outputs. The local implementation teams for BIF were the PwC Office in Burma, Imani Development (Malawi) and the Convention on Business Integrity (Nigeria).

There was a very good level of consistency within the delivery team during the final year of the programme. The implementing partner sought to keep key members of the team in place for as long as necessary. Staff turnover had been an issue for the programme over its lifetime, and the improvement over the final year was vital to programme handover and lesson learning. Special credit should be given to some longstanding members of the BIF Team who provided excellent continuity throughout the delivery of the programme.

Spending under the programme remained largely on track over the final year of the programme. Some activities under the BPF were delayed (the delayed release of telecommunication network data by the Rwandan authorities meant that the amount of time Ericsson had to translate this into rainfall patterns was significantly constrained) and other activities cancelled (Huawei were unable to develop the business case for using the Vikava refrigerated boxes to create a coolchain for fish in Kenya due to operational challenges in the aquaculture market).

Final spend against each of the programme windows was as follows:

BIF Activity	Final spend
Country Window - Burma	£6,977,413

Country Window - Malawi	£5,493,488
Country Window - Nigeria	£8,759,204
Company Window	£3,865,624
Business Partnership Fund	£4,461,460
Total	£29,557,189[1]

The BIF programme came in approximately £2.7m under budget. Underspends (e.g. BIF Malawi due to the dropping the PSP market or insufficient time to complete some BPF projects), overspends (e.g. BIF Burma taking on additional activities in the Bamboo market) and adjustments between windows were agreed with DFID in advance. UK VAT was payable on elements of the Company Window and Business Partnership Fund, where activities took place in the UK.

The quality of narrative reporting was very good. The timing of narrative reports was generally good - there was some slippage of timelines for the final round of programme completion reporting.

Approximately £10,000 of further costs are due to paid against the current budget – these are forecast to be paid in April 2020. Financial reporting was timely and of a high standard. Forecasting was generally accurate - towards the end of the programme there was some slippage of BPF grant payments against forecasts, these discrepancies had an impact as other programme spending lines (the country window) were reducing.

Annual audits of the BIF management system were undertaken by independent auditors. The following are extracts from the final audit report (dated 19/12/2019) - "We consider that PwC has good systems in place, including a robust Internal Audit Department, to ensure compliance with DFID requirements. As a result, we have not identified any opportunities for improvement, and we therefore have concluded that management systems in place for the BIF management systems are in line with DFID requirements and international best practice." And "We confirm we have considered the potential for fraud and corruption both from an internal and external cost point of view. We have not noted any instances of fraud and/or corruption for the period."

Date of last narrative financial report	19 March 2020
Date of last audited annual statement	19 December 2019 (covering 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019).

H: MONITORING, EVIDENCE & LEARNING

Monitoring

Overall, M&E accounts for 7% of BIF's total expenditure. There was a full time M&E manager for each country programme, and BIF had a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system which measured change at four interconnected levels: market, intervention, systemic change and impact level.

In advance of each intervention, a management plan set out the strategy and results management matrices, including tracking adopts, adapts and expands. Impact calculations (with disaggregated data) were regularly updated.

Over the course of the programme, BIF has tighten the methodological approach used to define 'adopt', 'adapt', 'expand' and 'respond'. These revised approaches have been disseminated across the programme to ensure consistency in approach. BIF applies different research methodologies to collect data at different logframe levels across the programme (all methodologies are fully described in the BIF M&E methodology document). Progress against output and outcome level indicators is collected by BIF field research teams, based on monitoring visits, interviews and other relevant evidence collection. Impact level assessments are also conducted, focusing on Country Window interventions in Nigeria, Malawi and Myanmar. BIF has developed a robust system for data quality assurance as data passes

[1] UK based management, technical inputs and expenses accounted for approximately 21% of the overall cost of the programme.

from field research teams through a cleaning and interrogation process by country M&E managers, before being fed up for final aggregation and validation by BIF's Head of Global M&E in London.

This PCR was informed by a field visit to Malawi, as well as discussions with the PWC BIF team in London and DFID staff working on the programme. Comprehensive BIF reporting was provided to DFID.

Evidence

Whilst there is excellent montoring and reporting on BIF, there has not been either an mid-term or overarching impact evaluation of BIF to understand more about what worked, why and how. However, BIF has generated several relevant pieces of high quality evidence:

- **Random control trial (RCT) under Country Window: Myanmar Garment-making interventions (2018):** led by Tufts University, monitored results across fourteen garment factories in Burma that had participated in a BIF programme, to determine the impact of supervisor training and the introduction of new HR and productivity systems on working conditions, job quality productivity and factory performance.
- **RCT under Company Window: Bangladesh factory workers (2018-9):** assessed the extent to which there has been an increase in Bangladeshi factory workers' knowledge, empowerment, and access to health services through targeted training. The baseline report was based on a survey of workers, supervisors, and managers in 15 factories. Data was collected on pre-intervention levels of health knowledge, access to health services, empowerment, productivity, and health outcomes
- BIF also partnered with **Acumen LeanData** to generate data on its distributional impact. Eight studies covered the maize, dairy and information services sectors in Nigeria to provide information on the poverty profile of BIF beneficiaries and the impact of different interventions.

Learning

As detailed in this PCR, a huge amount of information, and many valuable insights have been produced during the implementation of BIF. It is important now that DFID can find a way to work with the BIF team to ensure that these are drawn together and shared within the countries, across DFID and with interested other development partners and private sector companies. There have been close out events in country, summary sheets and publicity materials produced. It is worth considering further what else can be done to share BIF's successes, challenges and earning more widely.

Progress on recommendations from annual reviews for this programme

2019 recommendation	Progress
Moving into the final year of implementation, the recommendations, focus on ensuring a strong close-out phase with an emphasis on sustainability and learning. In the final year, all windows should focus on consolidating results and ensuring sustainability of impact through partnerships with market and non-market actors, and activities to consolidate and disseminate evidence.	BIF placed a clear focus on sustainability of impact. In Burma for example, there were market celebration events to share achievements and lessons learnt. There were also strategic partnership consultations and a strategic partners meeting, facilitated by DFID for representatives of other DFID-funded programmes. Malawi held similar stakeholder and close-out events to share lessons learnt. In all countries, BIF sought out partnerships where possible with others who could continue key work.
As the programme winds up, there should be more focus on scaling up interventions with proven impact rather than implementing new interventions.	In Myanmar, BIF focussed on disseminating the findings of the garment-making case studies at industry level. In tourism, BIF targeted "expands". In bamboo, there was another round of the successful farmer field school and collaboration at national level on policy and advocacy. In Nigeria, BIF introduced no new interventions or activities in 2019, and focused entirely on scale and sustainability by consolidating its existing work and disseminating key learning from the 5 years of operations.

The BPF is building a compelling portfolio of inclusive business models and lessons learned on what is required for replication. These lessons should be disseminated strategically to highlight the catalytic impact of the Fund and to demonstrate innovative approaches to inclusive business. Selected MNCs that are demonstrating a strong commitment to inclusive business models should be identified and invited to participate in strategic discussions with DFID on how to scale up inclusive business models that support the Sustainable Development Goals.	The BFP's two years of operation was a short time to achieve results at scale. Some of the Replication Fund research pieces struggled even to be published by the end of the Window. Nevertheless, learning about what worked and what didn't is still important and it is worth considering further what else can be done to share BIF's successes, challenges and learning more widely. DFID has reached out to the MNC Inclusive Business Champions who worked with BIF, engaging them on the design work for the new Business Partnerships for Green Growth (BP4GG) programme as well as for the Africn Investment Summit.
After the decision to not conduct a mid-term review, DFID has been considering conducting an external evaluation of BIF at the close of the project to determine the extent and quality of long-term impact under the Country Window (Nigeria, Malawi, and Burma). DFID should finalise its decision on this evaluation by February 2019. If the external evaluation does not proceed, DFID should consider other opportunities to synthesise the breadth of data generated by BIF through the programme's lifecycle as part of wider programme learning and evidence mapping.	DFID decided not to conduct an external impact evaluaton of BIF. As noted above, BIF held close out events and produced written summaries It is worth considering further what else can be done to share BIF's successes, challenges and earning more widely.
Across all windows, there is a continued need to draw out the gender and inclusion dimensions of the programme to better understand where interventions have had positive impact and identify challenges that can be addressed in future programming.	BIF continued to track progress on gender with disaagregated reporting over the last year. In Myanmar, BIF over achieved against its targets (most garment-workers were young women) , but it underachieved against the targets for bamboo and tourism (in bamboo because forestry and construction mainly employs young men, and in tourism as the approach was used a poverty definition for its inclusive targeting, rather then gender) . In Nigeria, BIF included questions in its impact assessments and case studies on gender and equity.
The Company Window provides a unique model for working in partnership with MNCs to deliver inclusive business models within specific value chains. All the current interventions have required significant lead-in times and investment to deliver results. As this was designed as an innovative model –the last year of implementation should capture the lessons on the viability of this model of working with MNCs	Yes, in common with the rest of the programme, BIF has collated extensive reporting on the progress of the Company Window. There is scope to develop additional learning and dissemination materials from this, and to use contacts for a senior "Champions Network" in the future.

Annex A: VfM Assessment Detail

Economy: good value inputs, the right skills and quality at the right price:
An increase in the weighted average daily fee rates of BIF core team personnel from £434 last year to £441 in the final year. Whilst this figure is higher than the past 3 years, it is below the original £446 weighted average reported in year 2, the first year that data was reported. The increase reflects the fact that during the final year of implementation a greater of proportion of programme time was accounted for London-based team members as BIF was closed out. The weighted average cost of London-based inputs fell from £543 last year to £531 in the final year. The weighted average for the Country Teams as a whole slightly increased from £400 to £407 as implementation by core team members reduced, while senior leadership time was still required for close-down operations and final reporting. The CW, however, which saw an increase in its activity over the last year, experienced a marked drop in its average weighted daily fee rates by £64/day (£526 to £462).
Weighted average daily fee rates for TA consultants increased from £246 in year 5 to £296 this year; though this is still lower than the average in years 2 and 3. This increase was driven primarily by National TA rates, as the International weighted average fell from £415 last year to £386, which is significantly lower than the averages reported in years 2-4 of the programme (£702, £634, £469). The decrease is a consequence of falling international TA costs in Malawi and Myanmar. The large increase in Nigeria from £294 to £630 had little impact on the overall programme's figures, as during its final year of implementation BIF Nigeria only engaged one international TA consultant at the rate quoted above. The average cost of National TA rates rose from £199 last year to £248, which is the highest level this figure has been during the programme's lifetime. This was caused by a rise in fee rates in both Myanmar and Nigeria of, on average, £53/day and £37/day, respectively. In Nigeria, this reflects the programme moving from its main implementation phase, to the focus in the final five months on scaling-up impact by attracting private and public investment. This investment promotion phase relied heavily on the deployment of a more skilled and costly communications consultant, which could not be offset by the lower-skilled TA typically used during regular implementation. The Company Window, however, saw a decrease in National TA rates from £393 to £284 as core implementation work scaled-up in the Kenya High-Value Agriculture and Pakistan Health & Hygiene Products markets
The proportion of work delivered by national vs international personnel on the country windows fell from 76% to 72%, which reflects the programme coming to an end and the need for greater international oversight of close-down and reporting activities. This percentage is still very similar to years 3 and 4, and much higher than year 2. On the CW, where implementation on the ground was increasing and at full capacity for most of the final year, the percentage rose significantly from 69% to 76%.
The percentage of days delivered by in-country team, as opposed to London-based staff, on the country window fell from 84.0 to 78.3%. This is a direct consequence of implementation tapering off in each country, whilst IPMT reporting and close-down activities continued. Indeed, the total number of days worked by IPMT decreased slightly from 1,109 to 1,029; however, the number of days for in-country teams fell substantially (5,825 to 3,722).
BPF – BIF challenged consultant daily rates to keep them lower than £1,000 across all three BPF components
BPF's DFID Support Service provided multiple options for consultants for projects to allow matching of experience to specific tasks and deliver savings on rates.
Efficiency "Spending well", meeting outputs
The efficiency indicator for the Country Window measures the number of days of TA per direct response by a market player (adopt/adapt). Performance by this metric fell slightly across all countries in the final year, with the aggregate figure increasing from 46 to 50 days. This is unsurprising as feedback from DFID in the year 5 annual review recommended that the programme focus on scaling up existing interventions and work with current partners, rather than seeking out further adopts and adapts. The less mature Company Window, which still had a focus on encouraging first movers in its markets, saw a significant improvement in its main efficiency indicators as the number of intervention design, management and delivery days per market player adopting CW supported innovations fell from 246 in year 5 to 114 this year. As no new market assessments were conducted in the final year of the Company Window, the efficiency measure relating to this output has not changed from last year.
The BPF indicators provide an absolute measure of time spent to progress Core Fund applications to Panel and contract signature as well as the cost of Replication Fund (RF) and Support Service projects. No further Core Fund applications were taken to Panel this year, so this indicator remains unchanged. The final contract was signed with Arm. The timeframe to sign this contract was notably longer than others due to Arm's particularly long internal approvals process. This meant that the average time from approval to a signed partnership

increased slightly from 25 weeks to 27 weeks. The total value of grants disbursed under the Replication Fund was £277,887, and average funding per study £55,557.

The average cost of the DFID Support Service projects was £9,337.

Effectiveness: "Spending Wisely", meeting outcomes

The BIF Country Window further improved its effectiveness indicators in the final year measuring the conversion of outputs to outcomes – a higher ratio signifies a greater number of expansions per direct response (adopt/adapt) or learning product/event.

- The ratio of expands to direct responses increased again this year, from 0.75 to 0.91.
  - This was mainly driven by improvement in Burma where the number of expands grew by 56, compared to an increase of 21 for direct responses.
  - Nigeria's ratio dropped slightly from 0.50 to 0.48, as the number of new direct responses (mainly from the slow-moving cassava market) exceeded the number of new expands.
  - Malawi's performance did not change as the programme ended in March 2019, thus limiting the time available to monitor new expands since last year's annual review.

- The ratio of expands to learning products at the end of year six is 1.50, up from 1.35 a year ago.
  - The only increase at a country level was in Myanmar, where the increase in the number of expands of 56 far exceeded the growth of learning products/events (21).
  - Malawi's ratio fell slightly from 0.29 to 0.25, as two further learning products/events were conducted but no further expands recorded.
  - The ratio also fell marginally in Nigeria from 0.90 to 0.88, as 4 learning products/events were produced and 3 expands were recorded. This is unsurprising given BIF Nigeria's focus during its final few months on hosting a series of investment promotion events. These events will hopefully yield further expands after the lifetime of the programme, which was always part of their purpose.

Equity: "Spending fairly" - whether outputs and outcomes benefit everyone fairly. Did benefits reach the most disadvantaged?

Targeting interventions on the poorest, disadvantaged groups and women	BIF used the *Progress out of Poverty Index* was used in Malawi in 2017 and 2018, and in Nigeria in part in 2018 and 2019 to identify beneficiary populations, based on the definition of poverty of the respective government. Outcome level monitoring 1. All impact indicators are disaggregated by poverty level, gender and disability. 2. Female respondents were asked how the activities have benefitted them.	BIF analysis has shown that there is 97% probability all the producers reported as beneficiaries under impact indicator 1.2 (based on MHL intervention) are poor (earning less than $2.50 per day).
	Nigeria: the businesses BIF worked with to implement contract farming schemes typically work with SHFs owning 2 hectares of land, and the typical purchaser of certified maize seed typically has less than 1.8 ha. In dairy, BIF worked with nomadic pastoralists, a group with extremely poor links to formal markets.	Cassava interventions mainly worked with female microprocessors to produce cassava grits from peel (previously a waste product). The beneficiaries reported spending their additional income on school fees, including household investments, new businesses and increasing land under cultivation. Almost of all the farmers receiving milk hygiene training were women. The sale of pasteurised milk for the first time is also

		providing health benfits for customers. The Kano Dairy Union has established literacy and numeracy lessons for their members, with some people over 70 years old learning to write for the first time. The catfish hatcher intervention primarily benefited older farmers who are now able to earn a living without the need for significant manual labour.
	Malawi: BIF agricultural interventions promoting use of certified rice and pigeon pea seed was targeted SHF who owned less than 0.5 hectare of land. PSP interventions targeted the women and the poorest households, helping them access a cleaner, safer, cheaper energy.	Women with pico-solar products reported increased health benefits (indoor air quality), safety (reduced risk of fire), financial savings, and educational benefits as children were able to study at night. Charging for phone charging via the USB gave very poor women a source of income.
	Myanmar: training and advocacy on workers' rights, working conditions and HR practices improved worker welfare in garment-making factories. In bamboo, BIF helped to ameliorate problems faced by the poorest households by rolling out treatment for bamboo used in their house construction to increase its useful life.	More than 24,000 garment makers have benefitted from safer jobs and better working conditions. Most of these workers were young female migrant workers. Treated bamboo to be used for house construction by the poor should now last over 30 years, more than 10x its current viability.
Company Window	Pakistan hygiene products	In Pakistan, the hygiene products are improving health for women and familes (eg reducing diarrhoea) and gave the female salesforce a source of income.
	Zambia fortified milk drink	Milky Boost was specifically developed to help combat child malnutrion in Zambia, providing energy, calcium and fortified with vitamins and minerals.

Maximising VfM within BIF: sharing and reducing costs, making savings where possible.

	Examples	**VfM savings/impact**
Savings through cost sharing and synergy with other programmes, donors or service recipients	Nigeria examples include: cassava grits: co-financing with the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) maize: cofinancing with PERL-ARC bundled service package for farmers dairy: BIF's relationship with a small-scale investor secured a £7,700 contribution towards the rural milk processing centre	BIF contributed £12,000 of TA and ILRI approximately £9,000 of staff time. ILRI's contribution reduced the advisory services that BIF had to buy in. IRIL's respected brand helped build trust amongst farmers. BIF contributed nearly £220,000 and PERL-ARC just over £270,000. Joint work enabled efficiencies of scale in package development and rollout. Total savings of £307,700.
	Myanmar garment-making: cost and time sharing sought from all service recipients for example, for the development and delivery of training.	A total of approximately 3000 days of staff time contributed in kind from garment-making factories, against 800 days of BIF staff time. Over 700 days contributed by factory trainers for delivery of training, supported by 270

		days of BIF staff time.
	Myanmar bamboo: events such as conferences and workshops were often undertaken jointly with other programmes. Also in bamboo, some service providers gave time on a pro-bono basis	World Bamboo Day 2018 costs shared with MRBEA and other donors. BIF contribution 40% of the total, others contributed 60%. eg senior consultant from Yadana Tint (bamboo TA provider) worked at least 32 days free of charge.
	Malawi: BIF's Market Systems Adviser was also the technical director for the DFID-funded MOST programme.	When possible, trips to Malawi were synchronised with MOST and costs alternated or shared. The programme benefited from knowledge sharing he provided across both roles.
Use of pro bono facilities, staff and technology	Nigeria: use of free online software for the tablets Team quarterly strategic sessions were predominantly held in Abuja, in a meeting room provided for free by a GIZ-funded donor programme with whom BIF was working) Implementing partners staff provided free for due diligence and M&E	Cost savings on software licensing costs. Savings of £29,000 in last two years of the programme Savings of £40,000 in last two years of the programme
	PWC security team advice (especially important for Nigeria, Myanmar and Pakistan) was included within the PWC project overheads.	Significant savings over project duration.
	Company Window teams in Pakistan, Kenya and Bangladesh operate out of PwC offices	Significant savings on office hire and meeting space
Minimising travel expenses	Combining trips and using a cheaper family and friends accommodation option rather than hotels. eg Myanmar Programme Manager stayed with family & friends, rather than in hotels on most trips.	Average accommodation cost was £15-20 per night (against a cap of £80 in the Expenses Policy)
BPF co-financing	All BPF grants were offered as matched funding, with the companies providig at least (and sometime more) than BIF's contribution. This ensured buy in from partners and enabled BIF funds to support twice thenumber of projects that if it had offered 100% funding.	BIF's contribution was just over £2.9m for the BPF, and the partners' co-financing was just over £3m.